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 Preface 
This thesis introduces a comprehensive approach for making a particular class of 
embedded processors self-testing and self-repairing, such that a limited amount of 
permanent hardware faults that occur during the lifetime of these processors in the 
field will not prohibit the functional behavior of the user application running on 
the processor. The presented concepts all use redundant hardware, but the 
techniques used for administrating the hardware-redundancy range from hardware-
based methods over hybrid methods to pure software-based methods, whereby the 
focus is on the latter ones. The proposed methods will be demonstrated by using a 
processor that is well designed for diagnostic self-test and self-repair purposes. This 
will also highlight some architectural properties of such a processor, which are 
beneficial for performing a software-based self-test and self-repair process.  
Chapter 1 is an introduction to the field of dependable systems and fault tolerance. 
Fundamental terms and notations, which are used throughout this thesis for 
classification and evaluation, are provided. The used processor model – the VARP 
processor – is introduced in chapter 2 together with a hardware-based self-repair 
scheme for that processor. The results are used as reference values for evaluating 
the software-based methods. Chapter 3 introduces the fundamental concept of the 
software-based self-repair. In chapter 4 hybrid methods are derived by combining 
software-based and hardware-based methods, highlighting the synergy effects of 
the combination. Finally, in chapter 5, a diagnostic and adaptive software-based 
self-test scheme is introduced. This self-test scheme provides the diagnostic 
capability that is needed in the field for identifying defect components in the 
VARP processor and completes the comprehensive software-based self-test and 
self-repair approach. Each chapter provides a short summary of the advantages 
and disadvantages of the presented methods. Chapter 5 will close with a summary 
for the comprehensive approach. 
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 Chapter 1  
Introduction and Foundations 
The shrinking feature size of integrated circuits described by Moore's law is 
twofold. On the one hand it allows for building integrated circuits that can 
perform more complex tasks much faster, at lower power consumption, and at a 
cheaper price per transistor and per function. For those reasons integrated circuits 
get into more and more fields of our everyday life. They are embedded for special 
purpose computing into consumer electronics like mobile phones, audio devices and 
TVs, but also into mechanical systems like aircrafts, cars, and medical devices1. 
There is a clear trend that more and more functionality in electronic and 
mechanical devices will be controlled by embedded systems, and the functionality 
that is provided by them becomes more and more complex. This requires very 
powerful embedded systems that can be obtained, for example, by further 
shrinking the feature size2. On the other hand, the shrinking feature size of 
integrated circuits increases their vulnerability to various physical defects [32, 190] 
leading to a reduced life time [176]. As a consequence, it becomes more likely that 
they can compute wrong results or even totally give up their functionality during 
their operational phase [49]. Such a malfunction in an embedded system for 
consumer electronics may be annoying, but acceptable. However, for safety- and 
mission-critical embedded systems that are used for example in automotives or 
1 It is common to refer to these embedded integrated circuits for special purpose computing as 
embedded systems. 
2 Current CMOS process from Intel for processor manufacturing uses 22 nm since 2011 and will 
move to 14 nm in 2014 [78].  
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avionics, a malfunction may become life-threatening for persons or will cause the 
loss of high-priced equipment. 
Automotive applications are a good example for this trend. A few years ago 
integrated circuits were used in cars only for controlling relatively uncritical and 
simple functions like window opener, engine injection control, etc. These functions 
did not require extraordinary computational performance. Thus, the integrated 
circuits could be manufactured using technologies with larger feature size that 
were very robust. These devices had a long lifetime. Reliability of hardware was 
not a major concern, except for contacts exposed to corrosion. But this situation 
now changes. More complex driver assistance systems become state of the art for 
cars, finally maybe reaching a point where cars drive completely autonomously. 
This makes the safety of car passengers much more dependent on the reliability of 
the embedded electronic systems. Many functions of these systems require complex 
and computational expensive image and signal processing that must be performed 
in real-time. This performance may be only achieved with complex hardware using 
powerful processors probably containing hundreds of millions of transistors. This 
requires the manufacturing of these processors with nano-scaled feature sizes that 
makes them, unfortunately, less reliable; i.e., they are more vulnerable to various 
physical defects during their lifetime.  
Therefore, solutions are needed that allow for building dependable embedded 
systems and processors, even when the nano-scaled hardware becomes less reliable. 
I.e., already the development process of the processor must take into account that 
some defects will occur during the operational phase. In order to make sure that 
the processor can continuously provide the desired functionality even in the 
presence of some defects, fault tolerance techniques like self-test and self-repair 
capabilities can be included into the processor. These techniques enable the 
processor to handle occurring physical defects autonomously in the field by some 
kind of reconfiguration. This targeted scenario is shown in figure 1-1. After 
manufacturing and test, the processor is in use and runs a user application that 
uses the computational resources of the processor, for example C1 to C6. When a 
defect affects a particular component of the processor, for example C3, then the 
user application is interrupted. A self-test is performed in order to localize the 
defective component. The self-repair is used for reconfiguring the processor, such 
that the defective component is not used anymore. If this reconfiguration is 
successful, then the execution of the user application is resumed, for example by a 
restart of the system. Please note that such a scenario also covers situations where 
the misbehavior of a defect component is masked for some time by appropriate 
fault tolerance techniques without interrupting the user application. Then, the user 
application is interrupted some time later, when there is enough time for 
performing the time consuming self-test and self-repair functionality. 
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part of the embedded system
Manufacturing + Test
Processor
ST
C3
C4 C6
C2
SR
C5
C1
Running User Application
Processor
ST
C3
C4 C6
C2
SR
C5
C1
Defect occurs
part of the embedded system
C1 to C6 are active processor 
components used by the user 
application
Self-Test + Self-Repair
part of the embedded system
Processor
ST
C3
C4 C6
C2
SR
C5
C1
Self-test (ST) localizes defect in 
C3 and self-repair (SR) takes C3 
out of operation.
part of the embedded system
Processor
ST
C3
C4 C6
C2
SR
C5
C1
Resuming User Application
User Application is running 
without using C3
 
Figure 1-1: Targeted autonomous self-test and self-repair scenario. 
The scenario in figure 1-1 takes consecutive defects in multiple processor 
components into account. I.e., a processor that has been successfully reconfigured 
due to an occurred defect can handle another defect that occurs some time later, 
provided that there are sufficient computational resources available. The focus of 
this thesis is on software-based methods for providing the self-repair and self-test 
capability in such a processor and in such a scenario. Thereby the capability of 
handling defects in multiple small components of the processor allows for an 
efficient usage of the computational resources in the presence of multiple defects, 
because the extent of a defect can be limited in most situations to a small 
component containing the defect.  
1.1 Dependable and Reliable Systems 
First, some fundamental definitions for various terms, which are related with 
dependable systems and used throughout this thesis, are provided. According to 
[15] the dependability concept first appears in the 1830 in the context of Babbage's 
Calculating Engine, where it was first stated that  
“The most certain and effectual check upon errors which arise in the 
process of computation, is to cause the same computations to be made 
by separate and independent computers; and this check is rendered still 
more decisive if they make their computations by different methods” 
[16].  
In this text the problem of trusting in the result of a computation is addressed. 
Exactly the same issue is addressed by the term Dependability, whose definition 
has evolved over the past decades. A condensed definition, which can be also found 
in a similar way in many textbooks and papers, is given by Laprie [103]:  
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Definition 1-1 (Dependability): 
Dependability is defined as that property of a computer system such that reliance 
can justifiably be placed on the service it delivers. The service delivered by a 
system is its behavior as it is perceptible by its user(s); a user is another system 
(human or physical) which interacts with the former. 
In other words, the dependability of a system depends on how much the user 
trusts in the correctness of the output (or produced data) of the system. In many 
situations this also implies that it is expected that the system continuously delivers 
an output within a certain time. According to [14] there are three issues that will 
affect the trust in the correctness and continuity of the outputs. They are shown 
as the first level of the dependability tree in figure 1-2. 
Dependability
Impairments
Means
Attributes
Fault
Error
Failure
Fault Avoidance
Fault Removal
Fault Tolerance
Fault Forecast
Reliability
Availability
Safety
Maintainability
Confidentiality
Integrity  
Figure 1-2: Dependability tree adopted from [102] and [140]. 
The confidence in the correctness of the output is reduced by Impairments. These 
are faults, errors, and failures, which have a negative impact on the 
trustworthiness. On the other hand, the confidence is improved, if it is known that 
the system includes methods for handling faults or it has been developed by using 
methods to avoid certain types of faults. These means have a positive impact on 
the dependability, and they can be used to overcome the negative impact of 
impairments. For example, a software program that has been formally verified is 
more trusted than a software program that has been tested only. Finally, the 
attributes are measures to quantify the positive and/or negative impact of means 
and/or impairments. Their usage will also contribute to the confidence that is put 
on the system, because, for example, they allow for comparing different versions of 
a system. Based on this comparison it can be decided which solution is trusted 
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more. The next three subsections will give clear definitions for impairments, 
means, and attributes. 
1.1.1 Faults, Errors, and Failures 
This section reviews the relationship between faults, errors, and failures, which is a 
cause-effect relationship. I.e., a fault may cause an error, and an error may cause a 
failure. This relationship requires the system to be considered as a hierarchically 
organized one. I.e., there is a top-level system, which is composed of various sub-
systems, and each sub-system may be composed of zero or more sub-systems again. 
1.1.1.1 Failures 
Definition 1-2 (Failure, adopted from [102]): 
A failure occurs when the delivered service of the top-level system deviates from 
the correct service.  
I.e., some of the functionality of the system is performed incorrectly, and this can 
be observed at the outputs of the top-level system. This may affect the behavior of 
the user of the top-level system. Thereby, the user may be another system. Please 
note that the definition does not refer to the specification of the system. Therefore, 
it also covers mistakes in the specification or missing aspects in the specification. 
According to the cause-effect relationship, a failure is the effect of an error. 
1.1.1.2 Errors 
Definition 1-3 (Error): 
An error occurs in a system, if at least one of its sub-systems has a failure. 
Thus, an error can be seen as incorrect data or behavior that can be observed 
inside a system, but the incorrect data or behavior may be not observable outside 
of the system. I.e., the system does not necessarily have a failure. An error is either 
latent or detected [14]. An error is detected, if the system is aware of its presence. 
It is latent if it is present, but not detected, yet. An error may propagate inside 
the system from one sub-component to another, finally maybe appearing at an 
output of the top-level system. Thus, an error may be the cause of other errors or 
of a failure. Please note that an error in a (sub-) system may be introduced from 
outside, i.e., the system receives erroneous inputs. According to the cause-effect 
relationship, an error may be the effect of a fault. 
1.1.1.3 Faults 
In the literature various meanings for the term fault can be found. A very general 
definition that is used in the fault tolerance community is given in [14]. 
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Definition 1-4 (Fault, from [14]): 
A fault is the adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error. 
This definition also covers the situation that the fault is located outside the system 
boundaries. Such faults are called external faults. For example, some kind of 
radiation interacts with a system and changes the state of a memory cell. The 
fault (the radiation) has caused an error (the wrong value in the memory cell). 
Internal faults, on the other hand, originate from inside the system boundaries. For 
example, a manufacturing flaw of the device is an internal fault that may cause an 
error. Thereby a fault is called active when it causes an error, otherwise it is called 
dormant [14]. These situations, where faults are originated only inside the system, 
are also covered by another widely used definition from the fault tolerance 
community. 
Definition 1-5 (Fault, from [140]): 
A fault is a physical defect, imperfection, or flaw that occurs within some 
hardware or software component. 
In this definition the fault is clearly located inside the system, because it is stated 
that the fault is located either in a hardware or software component of the system. 
Moreover, according to definition 1-5 each physical defect is considered as a fault. 
However, in the test community there is usually a difference between a defect and 
a fault, which is expressed by definition 1-6.  
Definition 1-6 (Fault, from [187]): 
A fault is a representation of a defect reflecting a physical condition that causes a 
circuit to fail to perform in a required manner. 
The difference is that in definition 1-5 a (physical) defect (either a hardware defect 
or software defect) is the same as a fault, while in definition 1-6 a fault is an 
abstracted representation of a physical hardware defect. For example, consider a 
NAND-gate whose output is connected to ground, due to some manufacturing 
flaw. This physical defect is already a fault, according to definition 1-5. However, 
in an abstracted representation of the circuitry, for example as net-list at gate-
level, it is not possible to reflect accurately all aspects of the physical defect. 
Therefore, an abstracted representation of the defect is needed for representing it 
in the model of the circuitry. This abstraction is provided by the fault model. The 
objective of a fault model is to reflect the behavior of physical defects as accurately 
as possible for test purposes, while maintaining the computational complexity, for 
example for fault simulation and test pattern generation, as low as possible [187]. 
For this reason a fault model specifies: 
• all possible sites for faults in the model of the circuitry and  
8 
Chapter 1 
• all states of a fault. 
The probably most widely used fault model for decades at logic level is the single 
stuck-at fault model [53]. Possible sites of faults in that model are primary output 
and input signals, internal gate inputs and outputs, fan-out stems, and fan-out 
branches. Only a single fault is allowed in the circuitry model, when the single 
stuck-at model is used. Each fault has either the state stuck-at-0 (SA0) or stuck-at-
1 (SA1), meaning that the corresponding signal has always the logic value 0 (SA0) 
or the logic value 1 (SA1). The stuck-at fault model is used for the development of 
the self-test presented in chapter 5. Many other fault models exist for reflecting 
more accurately other aspects of a defect at various abstraction layers [128, 187]. 
However, for fault handling in reliable systems it is not necessary to consider a 
fault as a representation of a defect at a particular abstraction layer. Rather, 
particular properties of the defect are important, which remain the same even at 
different abstraction layers. They are introduced in the next section. Hence, the 
terms fault and defect are used interchangeably in the context of fault handling. 
1.1.1.4 Fault Classes 
The presented self-repair methods in this thesis do not rely on a specific fault 
model. But they rely on specific properties of faults. Eight viewpoints for 
characterizing all possible faults that may affect a system have been presented in 
[14]. These viewpoints are listed as elementary classes in figure 1-3.  
 Elementary class Property Description 
F
au
lt
 C
la
ss
ifi
ca
ti
on
 
Phase of creation or 
occurrence 
Development faults Occur during system development 
Operational faults Occur during operational phase 
Persistence  
Permanent faults  Presence is continuous in time  
Temporary faults Presence is bounded in time  
System boundaries 
Internal faults Originate inside system boundaries 
External faults Originate outside system boundaries 
Dimension 
Hardware faults originate in or affect hardware 
Software faults affect software (program and data) 
Phenomenological 
cause 
Natural faults Caused by natural phenomena 
Human-Made faults Result from human actions 
Intent 
Deliberate faults Result of a harmful decision 
Non-Deliberate faults Introduced without awareness 
Capability (of the 
developer) 
Accidental faults Introduced inadvertently 
Incompetence faults Result from lack of professional competence 
Objective 
Malicious faults Introduced with objective of causing harm 
Non-Malicious faults Introduced without malicious objectives 
Figure 1-3: Classification of faults taken from [14]. 
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Each elementary class uses two mutual exclusive properties for the 
characterization of a fault, such that each fault is characterized by a combination 
of eight properties from eight different elementary classes. Thereby not all of the 
256 possible combinations are meaningful. In [14] 31 meaningful combinations were 
identified, and only five of them are of particular interest for this thesis. These are 
exactly those faults that have a natural cause; i.e., they are not human-made. 
Therefore, they are also non-deliberate (intent), accidently introduced (capability), 
and non-malicious (objective). Moreover, natural faults will be always hardware 
faults (dimension), because software faults are human-made. According to the 
remaining elementary classes, natural faults can be further distinguished as shown 
by the tree in figure 1-4. 
Natural Fault
Development Operation
Temporary Permanent
Intern Extern Intern Extern
Temporary Permanent
Intern
Phase of creation or 
occurrence
Persistance
System boundaries
Manufacturing 
Faults
Temporary 
Faults
Permanent 
Operational Faults
 
Figure 1-4: Grouping of fault classes to manufacturing faults, temporary faults and permanent faults. 
According to their phase of creation, natural faults are introduced either during 
the manufacturing phase (development faults) or when the system is in operation 
(operational faults). The persistence of development faults is always permanent, 
while operational faults can be of temporary or permanent persistence. The 
persistance of a fault characterizes the time that a fault is present in the system. 
Permanent faults remain in existence indefinitely long [140]. Temporary faults will 
be present only for a short time period. After that time period they disappear. If 
the temporary fault is an external fault, then it is often called a transient fault. 
These are typically faults that are caused by some kind of external radiation or 
electromagnetic interference. Internal temporary faults are often named as 
intermittent faults. Intermittent faults are also faults with a short duration, but, in 
contrast to transient faults, they appear repeatedly. In many cases they are caused 
by some kind of manufacturing flaw or aging effect in combination with a 
particular internal system state or environmental conditions, e.g. the temperature 
of the system.  
Each leaf of the tree figure 1-4 represents a combined fault class. They are grouped 
into  
• Manufacturing faults, 
• Temporary faults, and 
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• Permanent operational faults. 
It can be noticed that manufacturing faults and permanent operational faults have 
almost the same properties, except for the phase of their creation. Therefore, they 
are grouped together to the class of permanent faults. Although the self-repair 
methods presented in this thesis will primarily target for permanent operational 
faults, they can be also used for handling manufacturing faults. Then, it may 
become possible to improve the yield or to relax the demands for production 
testing as it is claimed in the ITRS roadmap [3] for the future.  
1.1.1.5 Natural Causes of Faults 
This section will briefly review some natural causes for temporary and permanent 
faults. 
Causes for Manufacturing Faults 
Faults belonging to the group of manufacturing faults are introduced during the 
development phase of the system. They do affect hardware components only and 
their persistence is permanent. They are created by flaws and variations during the 
manufacturing process of the integrated circuit, including: 
• pollutions of the waver, 
• crystal imperfections in the bulk, 
• missing contacts and shorts due to flaws during the metallization process, 
• oxide defects resulting in oxide shorts and gate oxide pinholes, 
• imperfections due to lithography problems and 
• improper doping in the transistor channel due to stochastically effects [171]. 
Especially stochastically effects play an important role for manufacturing nano-
scaled circuits, because they are hardly controllable during the manufacturing 
process. By such effects the distribution of device parameters becomes wider. For 
example, the random dopant fluctuation is a deviation of the expected doping 
density in the channel area of a field-effect transistor. In 40 nm devices no more 
than 100 doped atoms are expected along the channel of the transistor [114]. Even 
a small deviation in the doping profile will change significantly the threshold 
voltage of the transistor, which can have a significant impact on the delay of the 
logic circuit [114]. Also in Intels FinFET technology, which is used in 22 nm 
technology and below, the random dopant fluctuation has a strong impact [44].  
The exhibited misbehavior of the circuit is a delay fault, i.e. the correct signal 
arrives, but not in time. Because such statistical variations during the 
manufacturing process cannot be avoided, the circuits are designed with timing 
and voltage margins [12]. These margins will degrade the achievable performance 
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of the circuit. But reducing these margins may cause more devices to fail due to 
delay faults. Including fault tolerance techniques in devices with reduced margins, 
may increase the yield at the cost of a degraded performance of only some devices. 
An example for such an approach is the RAZOR-latch [56]. The goal is to 
eliminate the need for voltage margins by correcting delay faults that will occur in 
some processors at low supply voltage levels when dynamic voltage scaling is used 
for power-saving reasons. The RAZOR-latch allows for detecting delay faults 
during runtime, such that the fault can be handled in those devices that have a 
slow path due to some parameter variations. 
Causes for Temporary Faults 
External temporary faults are caused by single event effects like energetic particles 
that hit the circuitry or by other electrical sources that do not permanently 
damage the circuitry. Energetic particles include alpha particles [68], protons [127] 
and neutrons [68, 72]. Faults from electrical sources include electromagnetic 
interference, power supply noise and radiation [189]. When the fault flips the value 
of a memory element, then it is called a single-event-upset (SEU). Special 
techniques for masking SEUs have been developed [122, 173]. When the fault 
affects a signal in the combinatorial logic, then it is called a single-event-transient 
(SET). The erroneous signal in the combinatorial circuitry may be not latched or 
it is turned back into the correct signal by the driver of the gate or wire. Special 
techniques were developed for protecting memory elements from latching SETs 
[122]. Errors induced by SEUs and SETs are also called soft-errors. For 65 nm 
technology it is reported that only 11% of the soft-errors affect the combinatorial 
part of typical microprocessors. 49% will affect the sequential parts of the circuitry 
and 40% unprotected SRAMs [122]. Thereby, soft-errors make up the biggest 
portion of operational faults compared with permanent faults. The portion ranges 
from 75% to 99.9% [139]. This ratio depends at least on the environmental and 
operational conditions of the system. E.g., a processor that is operated in high 
altitudes will have higher probabilities for transient faults than the same processor 
at sea level. For this reason the ratio between transient and permanent faults will 
differ for these two processors, assuming a constant probability for permanent 
faults. 
Causes for Permanent Faults 
Of particular interest for this thesis are permanent faults that arise during the 
operational phase of the processor. These permanent faults either have an internal 
or an external origin (see figure 1-4). External permanent faults are caused by a 
single-event effect that causes a permanent damaging of the system. Well known is 
the single-event latch-up (SEL). This effect is caused by the passage of an energetic 
particle through a sensitive region of a transistor, which induces parasitic effects 
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that create a short between power and ground. The high current flow locally 
creates high temperatures that may cause local metal melting and destroys the 
local structures.  However, not in every case the local structure is destroyed, but, 
at least the power supply must be interrupted in order to resume to normal 
operation [51]. Another single-event effect is caused by energetic ions that will 
cause a single-event gate rupture [131]. This effect permanently damages the gate 
insulator layer of a transistor, such that the current flow from source to drain is no 
longer controllable [154].  
There are also various reasons for the occurrence of internal permanent faults in 
nano-scaled CMOS circuits during their operational phase. They are subsumed as 
aging effects. Hot carrier injection (HCI) and negative bias temperature instability 
(NBTI) are non-destructive aging effects. HCI is an effect where electrons are 
highly accelerated by the electrical field in the channel of a n-channel field effect 
transistor (FET). They undergo impact ionization, which generates electron-hole 
pairs. The carrier of the higher energy (hot carrier) becomes trapped in the gate 
oxide film of the FET [57, 99]. By accumulating hot carriers in the gate oxide film, 
the threshold voltage of the transistor deteriorate, which finally makes the 
transistor slower. NBTI occurs in p-channel FETs, when a negative gate bias is 
applied [8]. Holes from the silicon surface of the channel are trapped in the 
interface of the silicon and the gate oxide film. There, the holes disassociate 
hydrogen atoms from the silicon atoms. The hydrogen ions are caught in the gate 
oxide film and cause a positive charge there [99]. This also changes the threshold 
voltage of the transistors and the transistor becomes slower, too. The occurrence of 
both effects in a processor will not destroy the affected transistors. But both effects 
may cause delay faults. Delay margins may be introduced during the system 
design in order to avoid the activation of a delay fault3. However, the delay from 
aging may accumulate with other delay effects, e.g., caused by the random dopant 
fluctuation effect. This requires either very large worst-case margins resulting in 
non-optimal performance yield for most processors, or methods that act 
dynamically; e.g., a dynamic frequency scaling of the processor with respect to 
aging effects as proposed in [117]. 
Beside degradation effects like HCI and NBTI, there are also destructive effects 
like time-dependent dielectric breakdown (TDDB) and electro migration (EM) that 
will cause permanent faults. TDDB is a degradation of some insulator layer within 
the circuitry. This can be either a thin gate oxide film of a field effect transistor or 
an insulator material between wires. In the latter case the resistance between both 
3 A delay fault is activated, when the correct signal arrives too late to be latched in a memory 
element.  
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wires is decreased, which may cause a short [1]. When TDDB affects the dielectric 
film between the gate and the channel of a FET, then the transistor is no longer 
controllable by the gate [18]. The failure mechanism can be partly controlled by 
process parameters, such that it will not appear within the expected operational 
life time of the system. However, variations during the manufacturing process (e.g., 
due to stochastical effects) may produce disturbances in the gate oxide films, 
which will accelerate the TDDB effect, finally yielding in a permanent fault during 
the operational phase [1].  
Electro migration is a mechanism affecting interconnects. Electrons flowing 
through the wire, collide with metal atoms, and may force them to migrate [107]. 
By this, voids in the metal wire occur that increase the resistance of the wire or 
even completely disconnect it. The migrated material is settled in other sites and 
may cause there a short. This effect is increased by further shrinking the feature 
size, because current density increases [49]. Multiple vias can be used as backup for 
connecting wires [1]. In some special cases the effect of EM is reversible [5], but 
this solution cannot be applied universally, because it requires an inversion of the 
current flow. Very similar to EM is stress migration, where metal atoms migrate 
due to mechanical stress caused by thermal expansion of the material [175]. Finally 
it should be noted that models for NBTI, HCI, and EM contain the temperature 
as an important factor [112, 177]. Thus, the presented aging effects strongly 
depend on the temperature and stress profile of the system, and the temperature 
and stress profile depends on the executed user application. Therefore, controlling 
the stress profile of the application will help to control the temperature profile, 
which finally can delay the aging effects [184]. 
1.1.2 Means 
The purpose of the means in figure 1-2 is the improvement of our confidence in the 
dependable system. The classification of faults as shown in figure 1-3 helps to 
develop means that can rely on particular properties of faults belonging to certain 
fault classes. The means fault avoidance, error removal, and fault tolerance are 
related in figure 1-5 with the faults introduced in particular stages of the life-cycle 
of a processor-based system. The life cycle starts with the development phase, 
which is further divided into the stages shown as arrows in the upper part of figure 
1-5. The impairments during these stages of the development phase come from 
specification faults, design faults, implementation faults and manufacturing faults. 
For example, implementation faults may be introduced into the source code of a 
software- or hardware-component, when programming languages or hardware 
description languages are used. Manufacturing faults will occur in the hardware 
components due the reasons already described in section 1.1.1.5, and they will 
occur in software components probably due to flaws in the used compiler.  
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Figure 1-5: Life-cycle of a system related with impairments and means. Impairments are related by dotted lines with life-
cycle phases. Means against impairments are related with them by solid lines. 
1.1.2.1 Fault Avoidance and Error Removal 
Fault avoidance techniques are employed during the development phase, in order 
to avoid the introduction of development faults into the system (see figure 1-5). 
These techniques include, for example, review processes, standardized specification- 
and design processes, and many other quality control methods [140]. However, at 
least it is the objective of fault avoidance techniques to keep the number of latent 
development faults in the system as low as possible. In larger systems it is very 
likely that some development faults cannot be avoided, no matter how carefully 
fault avoidance techniques are applied. Therefore, error removal techniques are 
used as another mean for minimizing the presence of latent faults in the 
manufactured device by removing detected faults. For example, the verification 
and test of software components, as well as the manufacturing test of dies are used 
for error detection. Detected implementation faults in the software components can 
be fixed. Detected manufacturing faults in hardware components not. Either the 
defect die is rejected or it is sold with degraded functionality. For memory units 
the fabrication with redundancy is state of the art, such that faulty bit-lines can 
be replaced with redundant backup elements [106, 126]. 
1.1.2.2 Fault Tolerance 
No matter how much effort is spend during the development phase on fault 
avoidance and error removal, there is a very high probability that faults remain 
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undiscovered until the system is in operation (in software and hardware 
components). For example, there are dozens of design faults in AMD and Intel 
cores [4]. Moreover, permanent operational faults will be introduced into the 
system during the operational phase by aging and single event effects already 
described in section 1.1.1.5. When these dormant faults and the operational 
permanent faults become active during the operational phase, then an error occurs 
in the system. Means for handling these errors are called fault tolerance 
techniques. They are incorporated into the system during the development phase, 
but they become active during operational phase (see figure 1-5). In general, fault 
tolerance is defined as follows: 
Definition 1-7: (Fault Tolerance [140]) 
Fault tolerance is the ability of a system to continue to perform its task after the 
occurrence of faults. The ultimate goal of fault tolerance is to prevent system 
failures from occurring. 
The first practical fault tolerance techniques have been developed in the late 1940's 
and early 1950's when the computers were built from very unreliable relay and 
tubes [15]. Since then it is well accepted that fault tolerance is achieved by 
redundancy. In [94] it is stated: 
“All of fault tolerance is an exercise in exploiting and managing 
redundancy”. 
Thus, the broad variety of fault tolerance techniques is classified according to the 
managed redundancy type.  
 
Figure 1-6: Classification of redundancy. 
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This classification is shown figure 1-6 and embraces hardware redundancy, 
information redundancy, time redundancy and software redundancy. Software 
redundancy is typically used for detecting and handling specification, design, 
implementation, and manufacturing faults in software components. Faults affecting 
the hardware components of a system are handled either by information, time, or 
hardware redundancy. 
Software redundancy  
The basic concept of software redundancy, except for single-version programming, 
is diversity. I.e., multiple programs that compute the same function are developed 
independently from each other4. The system runs several of these programs and 
compares the outputs. Existing software-redundancy approaches vary in the way 
how these diverse programs are developed, activated, and when their results are 
compared. In N-version programming [40] N different versions of the program are 
implemented and run in parallel. Their outputs are compared and the result is 
selected by a majority vote. N different versions of a program are also available in 
N-self-checking programming [104]. Each of them is capable of performing an 
acceptance test. The voter only votes on accepted outputs. In the recovery-block-
approach [143] N different versions of a program and a single centralized 
acceptance test are available. A program is only invoked, if the acceptance test of 
the previously invoked programs has failed. I.e., the result of the first program 
whose output is accepted is used. 
Information Redundancy 
Information redundancy is based on redundancy in data. Usually it is applied for 
detecting errors that occur during transmitting or storing data. In its simplest 
form, data is just replicated in the system. However, the most widely used 
information redundancy technique is error control coding [64]. In general error 
control coding is the mapping of the original data word into a code word by 
adding redundancy. Therefore, the binary code word has usually more bits than 
the original binary data word. The code is the set of all code words. After 
transmitting or storing a code word, the original data word is reconstructed from 
the received word by a decoding process. When this decoding process can detect 
and correct errors in the received word, then the code is called an error correction 
code (ECC). When errors can be detected, but not corrected, then the code is 
called an error detection code (EDC). In general, the error detection is based on 
4 It is interesting to note that this concept of diversity has been already described in the context of 
Babbage's Calculating Engine (see the quotation on page 5). 
17 
                                      
Dependable and Reliable Systems 
checking whether the received word is a code word or not. If the received word is a 
code word, then it is assumed that no error has been occurred. Therefore, errors 
that corrupt a code word in such a way that another code word originates cannot 
be detected.  
The usage of ECCs and EDCs for protecting memories and processor registers 
against transient faults is state of the art in current designs of server processors 
[172] or embedded processors for avionic [66]. However, these techniques cannot be 
applied in a straight forward manner as fault tolerance techniques for arbitrary 
combinatorial logic that performs some kind of operation f(x1,…,xn) on the input 
operands x1,…,xn, because the operation usually changes the data words x1,…,xn. 
Special codes will be employed for this purpose, where the encoding can be 
considered as a homomorphism h, and a simple checker-function f h exists, such 
that 
 
1 1
( ( , , )) ( ( ), ( ))h
n n
h f x x f h x h x  . (1-1) 
I.e., concurrently to the computation of the result by function f, a reference value 
is computed by the checker-function f h based on the encoded operands [13]. 
Whether or not f has performed correctly, is checked by encoding the result of f 
with the homomorphism h and comparing this value with the result of the checker 
function. As an example consider an arithmetic code for an adder [94] with 
f(x1, x2) = f 
h(x1, x2) := x1 + x2, and h(y) ≔ 3  y. The Berger code has been also 
used as error detection code for arithmetic logic units (ALU) [110] and floating 
point arithmetic units [137]. However, the draw-back of such an approach is that 
each operation f in the ALU requires a corresponding operation f h that should be 
much simpler to implement in hardware. Unfortunately this is not the case for the 
Berger code and the arithmetic code. In [137] overheads of more than 100% are 
reported for the checker-unit, when the Berger code is used. Also the presented 
arithmetic code needs a complete adder in the checker-unit. Therefore, the 
checker-unit has at least the same size as the original unit for f. This means that a 
simple duplication of the original unit will be more beneficial in these cases, 
because the duplicated unit can perform exactly the same operation as the original 
unit, and therefore additionally serve as backup-unit. However, in the next section 
it is shown that the presented type of encoding may be useful in combination with 
time redundancy. 
Time Redundancy 
The fundamental concept of time redundancy is to perform the same computation 
multiple times by using the same hardware components. The results obtained by 
multiple computations are either compared with each other or will undergo an 
acceptance test. This is conceptually very similar to software redundancy, when 
the hardware component is a processor that executes a piece of software. The 
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difference to software redundancy is that in each run the same piece of software is 
executed. Thus, time redundancy cannot be used for detecting software faults. The 
intention of time redundancy is the detection of temporary faults. The detection of 
permanent faults is not possible by using the simple concept of re-execution, 
because the computations are performed on the same piece of hardware. However, 
detecting permanent faults is possible by the combination of time redundancy with 
encoding. For encoding a homomorphism h, as presented in the previous section 
about time redundancy, is used. Because the computations of f and f h (see 
equation (1-1)) must be executed by the same component, the homomorphism h 
must be selected in such a way that  
 
1 1
( ( , , )) ( ( ), , ( ))
n n
h f x x f h x h x   
holds. RESO (re-computation with shifted operands) is a popular approach that 
uses this technique [133, 134]. There, shift operations are used as encoding 
function. Another form of encoding is the bit-wise inversion of operands [140]. I.e., 
for function f must hold 
 
1 1
( , , ) ( , , )
n n
f x x f x x  . 
Such a function f is called self-dual [140]. The advantage of using time redundancy 
for detecting permanent faults is the little hardware overhead needed for the 
implementation. However, this comes at the cost of at least a doubled execution 
time. Moreover, the concept cannot be used in a universal fashion, because for 
each function f that should be checked with time redundancy for permanent faults 
a dedicated encoding function h is needed. 
Hardware Redundancy 
Hardware redundancy employs redundant hardware components. According to 
figure 1-6 it is further divided into active and passive redundancy. Passive 
hardware redundancy does not perform fault isolation; i.e., a defect component is 
not taken out of operation and a fixed configuration of N  + redundant 
components in the system is maintained. Computations are performed in parallel 
on all N components. The components receive the same inputs and their results 
are compared with each other. In a double modular redundancy (DMR) system 
(N = 2), as shown in figure 1-7 (a), the comparison allows for error detection only. 
For N > 2 a majority vote can be performed, and the result that is delivered by 
the majority of the components is selected as output of the voter. Figure 1-7 (b) 
shows the well known triple modular redundancy (TMR) system (N = 3), which 
has been already proposed in the 1950's by von Neumann in order to built more 
reliable relay networks [186].  
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Figure 1-7: (a) DMR system with redundant components a and b. (b) TMR system with redundant components a, b and c. 
Passive redundancy is typically used for handling temporary faults, because the 
static configuration of the system allows for fast error detection and error 
handling. On the other hand, components containing a permanent fault are not 
isolated. Thus, an erroneous result of such a component is only masked by the 
voter. This is sufficient for handling temporary faults, because it is very likely that 
the temporary fault will disappear, before another temporary fault appears. 
Therefore, a method to handle a single error at any point in time is sufficient. 
However, in nano-scaled systems it becomes likely that permanent faults 
accumulate over time and appear together with a temporary fault, leading to a 
situation where faults are present in multiple components of the system. Handling 
of n faults in n different components requires at least n + 2 redundant components 
in the system, assuming that all faulty components will produce pairwise different 
results. At least 2n + 1 redundant components are needed without this 
assumption. In both cases the handling of multiple faults will create a strong 
hardware and power consumption overhead, which is not acceptable for many 
embedded systems. 
Active hardware redundancy is typically used to overcome this overhead problem 
by fault isolation when handling multiple permanent faults. If active hardware 
redundancy is used in a system, then the configuration of the system is changed, 
depending on its current fault state, such that permanently faulty components are 
isolated; i.e., they are taken out of operation. This fault isolation requires a more 
complex administrative organization, including the error detection, the localization 
of the component containing the fault, and the reconfiguration of the system, such 
that the defect component is taken out of operation. These administrative steps 
can be performed either when the system is on-line or when the system is off-line. 
In on-line mode, the system delivers its normal service (e.g., the processor executes 
the user application). For this reason concurrent error detection can be used for 
error detection. By concurrent error detection transient faults and permanent 
faults that appear during the execution of the user application can be detected. 
Passive hardware redundancy, information redundancy, or time redundancy may 
be used for this purpose. Thereby the concurrent error detection may be also used 
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for fault localization. For example, in sub-system level TMR [94], the sub-systems 
of a system are tripled. Each tripled sub-system receives three identical inputs and 
produces three outputs by using three voters. The three outputs are used as inputs 
of other tripled sub-systems. Implementing this redundancy scheme for a large 
number of very small sub-systems allows for fine-grained on-line fault localization 
at sub-system level, but at the expense of a large overhead due to the large 
number of voters and redundant components. 
 
Figure 1-8: Implementation of fault tolerance when active hardware redundancy is used. 
Fault handling is the process of fault localization and reconfiguration. In on-line 
mode, fault handling is performed concurrently with error handling. Thereby, error 
handling is the process of masking errors in the running application until fault 
handling is completed (see upper part of figure 1-8). The combination of passive 
and active redundancy techniques for fault and error handling in on-line mode 
yields hybrid hardware redundancy schemes. Examples of such systems are NMR-
with-spares, triple-duplex, or pair-and-spare systems [94, 140]. In all of these 
systems there is enough redundancy available such that a defect component can be 
replaced without interrupting the normal service of the system. This is, of course, 
at the expense of hardware overhead, which is for example, for triple-duplex more 
than six times of the original size of the system.  
In the off-line mode the system is powered on, but it does not perform the normal 
services. For example, the processor is in idle-mode or the user application has 
been not started after power on. Then, most of the resources of the system can be 
used for preemptive error detection and fault handling (see lower part of figure 
1-8). Preemptive error detection is used for the detection and localization of 
permanent faults in off-line mode. Built-in self-test (BIST) or software-based self-
test (SBST) may be used for this purpose. Compared with on-line test methods, 
more time for test and fault localization is available in the off-line mode, because 
the system does not have to deliver its service continuously. The development of 
Fault Handling (on-line mode)
Fault Handling (off-line mode)Error Detection
Self-Repair
System 
is 
off-line
System 
is 
on-line
Concurrent Error 
Detection
Preemptive Error 
Detection
Error Handling
Fault 
Localization
Fault isolation and 
reconfiguration
System 
is 
on-line
Fault 
Localization
Fault isolation and 
reconfiguration
System 
Reinitialization
21 
Dependable and Reliable Systems 
such a diagnostic test is the topic of chapter 5. Furthermore, some parts of the 
error detection and fault handling may be done in on-line mode, but then the 
system changes into the off-line mode (shown by the dotted arcs). For example, 
concurrent error detection may be used for detecting temporary and permanent 
faults during the runtime of the application. After detecting an error, the system 
switches into off-line mode for performing a fine-grained but time consuming 
reconfiguration. Thereby the fault localization delivers information about the 
defective component to the method used for reconfiguration and fault isolation. It 
is sufficient to locate a defective component at that granularity level that is used 
by the subsequent reconfiguration step. For example, if the subsequent 
reconfiguration step only allows the replacing of complete processors in a multi-
processor system, then it is sufficient to locate the defective processor. Which 
particular component inside of the processor is faulty is not of interest for the 
reconfiguration. There are two basic strategies for replacing a faulty component 
during reconfiguration. Either  
• the functionality is allocated to spare components that were not in use 
before, or  
• the functionality is allocated to components that were already in use before. 
In the latter case, the system is usually affected by performance degradations, 
because other components that were already in use must overtake some 
functionality of the faulty component. As a consequence, the system needs more 
time for providing its service or the accuracy of the results is reduced [135, 159]. In 
the former case, the system performance is not degraded (see also the classification 
in figure 1-6). Sometimes this is also referred to as self-repair, while the latter case 
is named graceful (performance) degradation. In this thesis the term self-repair is 
used for the fault isolation and reconfiguration process, no matter whether the 
performance is affected by the reconfiguration or not. Distinguishing between 
reconfiguration methods with and without performance degradation is not always 
reasonable, because the same reconfiguration method may cause for some faults a 
performance degradation and for other faults not. The software-based self-repair 
method presented in chapter 3 is such a method. There, different faults may cause 
different reconfigurations of the system. Thereby, one of these reconfigurations will 
cause a performance degradation and another reconfiguration will not.  
When the reconfiguration step replaces the defective component by a spare 
component, then this spare component may be in a cold standby or in a hot-
standby mode. Cold standby means that backup components are not powered. In 
hot standby, backup components are powered. Usually, replacing a faulty 
component with a hot standby component is accomplished within a shorter time 
than replacing it with a cold standby component [140]. On the other hand, hot 
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standby components may suffer from degrading effects like aging that do not affect 
cold standby components, and they need extra power.  
When the reconfiguration is done in off-line mode, then a final recovery step is 
needed in order to bring the system back into an operational mode. This recovery 
may be a simple restart of the system. But it can be also a more complex roll-back 
of the system state, up to a previous faultless state taken at a checkpoint. When 
the reconfiguration is done in on-line mode, then the system is already in 
operational mode. For this reason a recovery is usually not needed. However, in 
this case the system may switch into off-line mode after some time, in order to 
perform a more sophisticated reconfiguration (shown in figure 1-8 by the backward 
arrow). By the more sophisticated reconfiguration the system is adapted in an 
optimized way to the current fault state, such that the required functionality is 
provided in the best way, given the current fault state. The motivation for such an 
adaptation comes from the on-line fault handling step that will bring back the 
system as quick as possible into an operational state. For this reason the 
reconfiguration is often performed in a coarser grained manner. For example, a 
complete processor is taken out of operation during on-line reconfiguration. For the 
sophisticated reconfiguration in off-line mode more time is available for a diagnosis 
of the defect processor. If possible, the reconfiguration is performed for the sub-
components of the processor such that the processor can be used again for 
executing particular user applications. This allows for a better utilization of all 
functioning components in the system. On the other hand, the more sophisticated 
off-line diagnosis and reconfiguration require more time and computational 
resources than available in the on-line reconfiguration step.  
1.1.2.3 An Orthogonal Classification of Fault Tolerance Techniques 
The typical classification of fault tolerance methods shown in figure 1-6 refers to 
the type of redundancy. However, the redundancy in a system must be managed 
somehow. For this reason an orthogonal classification of fault tolerance methods, 
which is shown in the vertical direction of figure 1-9, refers to the management of 
redundancy.  
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Figure 1-9: Classification of fault tolerance methods according to the kind of administration. 
The management can be done at different system layers. Thereby, hardware based 
management methods are used for administrating redundancy at switch level, gate 
level, or architecture level. Software-based methods are used for the management 
at firmware level, operating system level, middleware level, or application level. 
For example, the hardware redundancy in a TMR system can be managed either 
by hardware – then the voter is implemented as a hardware structure – or by 
software; then the voter is implemented as a piece of software that compares the 
results of three hardware components. In the latter case software is used for 
administrating hardware redundancy, and in the former case hardware is used for 
administrating hardware redundancy. In the same manner the encoder and decoder 
for the administration of information redundancy can be implemented either in 
software or in hardware. Time redundancy can be also administrated in software, 
e.g. by creating checkpoints and repeating the execution of a piece of software, but 
also by a re-execution of instructions that is controlled by hardware [41]. The 
software-based self-repair presented in chapter 3 uses software for the 
administration of hardware redundancy. 
Cross-layer approaches were proposed recently that employ the managing of 
redundancy at various levels [48, 50, 79]. This can be very helpful for handling 
faults at a level where they can be handled best with respect to time- and power-
constraints [79]. Moreover, faults can be handled with various granularities. I.e., if 
the management at a particular level cannot handle the occurred fault(s), then the 
management at another level may perform the reconfiguration. The proposed 
software-based self-repair approach in chapter 3 can be seen as part of such a 
cross-layer approach. The hybrid approaches in chapter 4 provide some 
applications of coupling hardware-based administration of redundancy with 
software-based administration at different system layers. 
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1.1.3 Attributes 
The attributes shown in the dependability-tree in figure 1-2 allow for the 
quantification of the negative impact of faults, errors, and failures and the positive 
impact of fault prevention, fault removal, and fault tolerance on the dependability. 
This quantification is part of the fault forecasting by evaluating probabilities for 
the occurrence of failures under given assumptions about the occurrence of faults 
[15]. The most relevant attribute for the quantification of the impact of fault 
tolerance methods is the reliability. Strongly connected with the reliability is the 
mean time to failure.  
1.1.3.1 Reliability  
An improvement of the reliability increases the probability that a systems 
performs correctly within a specified period of time. This attribute may be used for 
characterizing the impact of fault tolerance methods on systems with a specified 
mission time. 
Definition 1-8 (Reliability, taken from [140]): 
The reliability of a system is a function R(t) of time t  , defined as the 
conditional probability that the system performs correctly throughout the interval 
of time [t0,t], given that the system was performing correctly at time t0. 
The reliability can be determined empirically by considering a sufficiently large 
number N of identical systems that are functioning correctly at time t0. All of these 
systems are taken into operation at time t0. Sometime later, at time t ≥ t0, the 
number F(t) of failed systems and the number C(t) of correct functioning systems 
is determined. Now the reliability R(t) is simply 
 
( ) ( )
( )
C t N F t
R t
N N
  . (1-2) 
It is important to notice that the reliability is defined only for systems that run 
correctly throughout the time interval [t0,t]. I.e., a system that has failed within 
this time interval is considered to be faulty forever. Nevertheless, the reliability 
definition applies to fault-tolerant systems that support self-repair functionality. 
The important fact of the given reliability-definition is how the term “performs 
correctly” is defined. At a first glance it means that the system does not produce a 
failure. I.e., an error inside the system is allowed to occur, as long as this error is 
not propagated to the outside of the system. This, for example, applies to systems 
employing fault masking. However, even in systems that allow failures to occur, 
the reliability-definition applies, if this conforms to the specification of the system 
and the system is able to recover autonomously to operational state. I.e., a faulty 
output may be accepted, but the system must be able to return to normal 
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operation after (off-line) fault handling; probably by a restart. The system does no 
longer perform correctly, when the self-repair capability is exhausted, and an 
autonomous fault handling is not feasible anymore.  
In this situation a repair function may be applied to bring the system back into an 
operational mode. Please note that there is a fundamental difference between self-
repair and repair. The self-repair is accomplished autonomously by the system. A 
repair process is performed by an external entity that removes a faulty component 
physically from the system and replaces it by another one. For systems in which a 
failure is handled by a repair process, the attribute reliability is no longer 
meaningful, because then the system was not performing correctly all the time. 
Such systems are typically characterized by the attribute availability. The 
availability is a function of time, A(t), defined as the probability that a system is 
operating correctly and is available to perform its functions at time t [140]. The 
availability differs from the reliability in that way that a particular point in time, 
t, is considered, instead of a time period. This attribute applies for example to 
servers that provide some internet service.  
1.1.3.2 Mean Time to Failure 
The mean time to failure (MTTF) expresses the expected time for a single system 
until it stops providing the correct service. In order to determine the MTTF 
empirically, consider a sufficiently large number N of systems placed into operation 
at time t0 = 0, and all of them performing correctly at time t0 = 0. Let ti be the 
first point in time when system i does not perform correctly, whereby i   - {0}. 
Then the total runtime TRTN of all the N systems together is  
 
1
:
N
N i
i
TRT t

  . 
The mean time to failure is now obtained by 
 
1
:
N
N i
N
i
TRT t
MTTF
N N
   . (1-3) 
In order to obtain the relationship between reliability and mean time to failure, 
suppose that the variables ti are given in ascending order. That is: ti < ti+1 for all 
1 ≤ i < N. Now recall that ti is the first time that system i has failed. Thus, the 
number of correct functioning systems in the time interval [ti, ti+1) is given by C(ti) 
as it was defined in section 1.1.3.1. Therefore, the total time that all functioning 
systems are running within this interval is (ti+1 - ti)  C(ti). The total runtime 
TRTN that all the systems are running together can be also defined by summing 
up the total runtimes within all the time intervals [t1, t2),…, [tN-1, tN): 
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


   . 
Now the definition of the reliability from formula (1-2) is used to replace C(ti): 
 
1 1
1 1
0 0
: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N N
N i i i i i i
i i
TRT t t R t N N t t R t
 
 
 
         . 
Using the definition of MTTFN in equation (1-3) yields: 
 
1
1
0
: ( ) ( )
N
N i i i
i
MTTF t t R t



   . 
For very small time intervals (ti+1 – ti) this becomes approximately the area 
underneath a continuous reliability function R(t) within the interval [0,tN], and for 
N  ∞ the MTTF becomes 
 
0
: ( )MTTF R t dt

  . (1-4) 
From equation (1-4) follows that reliability and mean time to failure will not 
necessarily have a simple correlation. As an example consider a system A and a 
system B that is a TMR system composed of three identical components A. The 
reliability function of A is given by RA(t) and the reliability function of B by RB(t): 
 0.1( ) t
A
R t e    2 0.1 3 0.1( ) 3 2t t
B
R t e e        
Both functions are plotted in figure 1-10. It can be noticed that for t < 7 system B 
has a better reliability than system A. I.e., the probability that system B has a 
failure within the time interval [0,7] is lower than for system A. For t > 7 this 
situation changes. Then it is more likely for System B to have a failure than for 
system A. According to equation (1-4) the mean times to failure (MTTF) for both 
systems are given by: 
 0.1
0
10t
A
MTTF e dt

      2 0.1 3 0.1
0
3 2 8,3t t
B
MTTF e e dt

         
System B has a shorter MTTF than system A. Thus, one may prefer system A 
prior system B, when it is the goal to have a system with a long life time. 
However, when the mission time for the system is known in advance to be less 
than 7, and the probability that the systems fails within its mission time should be 
as low as possible, then system B is favorable.  
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Figure 1-10: Reliability plot for system A and system B. 
The reason for the lower MTTF of B, although B contains more redundancy, is 
that the computation of the MTTF takes the full life time (t →  in equation 
(1-4)) of all systems into account. In figure 1-10 this fact can be noticed for t > 7. 
In the beginning, for t < 7, more systems of type B survive. When computing the 
MTTF only for the time interval [0,7], then system B will also have a better mean 
time to failure than system A. But for t > 7 more systems of type A than systems 
of type B will survive. By this the MTTF of system A will outperform the MTTF 
of system B. But from a practical point of view, the time period for t > 7 is of 
very little interest, because the probability that a system has survived up to this 
point in time is only 50%. Moreover, a mission time T that is of practical relevance 
would be much lower than 7 in this example, such that the probability that a 
system has survived until time T is much higher than 50%. For example, the 
reliability requirement for highly reliable flight control systems is 0.999999 for 
T = 5 hours [146]. 
Thus, when a fixed mission time T is known, then it is expected that the fault 
tolerant system has a higher reliability than the original system during the full 
mission time. This can be expressed, for example, by the reliability improvement 
factor (RIF) that is defined as: 
 
1 ( )
1 ( )
A
B
R T
RIF
R T



, 
where RA is the reliability of the non-fault tolerant system and RB is the reliability 
of the fault tolerant system [100]. The RIF should be larger than one for a 
reliability improvement. When the mission time is not known, then the mission 
time improvement factor (MTIF) may be used for evaluating the benefit of the 
used fault tolerance method [100]: 
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T
MTIF
T
 . 
Thereby TB is the time, when system B reaches a prior specified reliability R; i.e. 
R = RB(TB), and TA is the time when system A reaches the specified reliability 
value R; i.e. R = RA(TA).  
1.1.3.3 Reliability Modeling 
The reliability was introduced in equation (1-2) based on empirical observations 
given by N, C(t), and F(t), where F(t) is the number of non-operational systems at 
time t, C(t) is the number of operational systems at time t, and N = F(t) + C(t) is 
the total number of systems at any time t ≥ 0. This equation can be further 
converted into  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 1
C t N F t N F t F t
R t
N N N N N
      . (1-5) 
In order to perform a fault forecasting without an empirical observation, a model is 
needed for forecasting F(t) and C(t). This forecasting usually employs the failure 
rate, which is the rate of failing systems at a particular time t. Thereby, the 
relation between the failure rate, F(t), and C(t) is obtained by the differentiation 
of the continuous function F(t): 
 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
lim
h
dF t F t h F t
dt h
  . (1-6) 
( ) ( )F t h F t   is the number of failed systems within time interval h. For h → 0 
this is approximately the instantaneous number of failing systems at time t. When 
dividing this number by the number of systems that are operational at time t, 
which is C(t), the rate (or fraction) of failed systems is obtained, which is well 
known as failure rate z(t): 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
dF t
z t
C t dt
  . (1-7) 
If z(t) is a constant function over time t, then it is commonly denoted as l. Now 
the relationship between reliability and failure rate is considered as it can be found 
in a similar manner in many textbooks, e.g. [94, 116, 140]. The deviation of F(t), 
which is also part of the failure rate function (see equation (1-7)), is related with 
R(t) by computing the deviation of both sides of equation (1-5) 
 
( )
1
( ) 1 ( )
F t
d
NdR t dF t
dt dt N dt
         . (1-8) 
This formula can be also written as 
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·
dR t dF t
N
dt dt
   (1-9) 
Replacing in equation (1-9) the deviation of F(t) with equation (1-7) yields the 
relation between the failure rate and the deviation of the reliability: 
 
( )
( )
( )
N dR t
z t
C t dt
   . (1-10) 
From equation (1-5) it is known that  
 
1
( ) ( )
N
R t C t
 , (1-11) 
Replacing N/C(t) in equation (1-10) with 1/R(t) yields: 
 
1 ( )
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( ) ( )
dR t
z t
R t d t
   . (1-12) 
This can be written as the differential equation: 
 
( )
( ) ( )
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dR t
R t z t
d t
   . (1-13) 
The general solution of this equation with R(0) = 1 is given by 
 
( )
( )
z t dt
R t e
 . (1-14) 
Equation (1-14) describes the general relation between reliability and failure rate. 
If z(t) is assumed to be a constant l, then the relationship between failure rate and 
reliability simplifies to 
 ( ) tR t e   . 
Furthermore, according to equation (1-4) the mean time to failure becomes 
 
1
MTTF

 . (1-15) 
An increasing or decreasing failure rate z(t) is often modeled by using the Weibull-
distribution [94], which yields the failure rate function: 
 ( )z t t       (1-16) 
For β = 1 this failure rate function simplifies to the constant failure rate l. For 
β < 1 z(t) becomes a decreasing function over time, and for β > 1 it becomes an 
increasing function over time. The corresponding function for the reliability is 
 ( ) tR t e
  . 
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In order to perform a fault forecasting using such a probabilistic model, the 
assumptions about the failure rate must be validated. In industrial practice, the 
failure rate of semiconductor devices is determined by performing an accelerated 
operating life test on a large number of randomly selected devices [2]. Acceleration 
is usually achieved by operating the device at high temperatures and/or higher 
voltages for several thousand hours, which sums up to several million total device 
hours5. Based on the distribution of the observed faults within this time interval, 
the assumption about a constant, falling or increasing failure rate of the considered 
device type can be validated. Moreover, the parameters l and β can be estimated, 
based on the total number of devices put into operation, the distribution of failed 
devices over time, and the simulated operation time. For real systems it is common 
to observe a behavior of the failure rate as it is shown in the bathtub curve in 
figure 1-11.  
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Figure 1-11: Bathtub curve of the failure rate. 
Before the useful operational phase starts, the system undergoes an infant 
mortality phase with a decreasing failure rate. During this phase, manufacturing 
flaws emerge as permanent faults. This phase is overcome by stressing the devices 
using a burn-in test that is performed by the device manufacturer. The problem of 
a burn-in test is that it also stresses devices without manufacturing flaws. For 
these devices the useful operational phase may be shorten by the burn-in test. The 
problem of detecting as many faults as possible during burn-in test can be relaxed 
by including self-repair techniques, as it is claimed for example in the ITRS 
roadmap [3]. Then, the early-life failures can be handled during the operational 
phase.  
A constant failure rate is typically observed for the useful operational phase, due 
to random effects like single event latch-up. Aging effects like TDDB, HCI, NBTI 
and EM will occur more likely during the wear-out-phase. Therefore, the failure 
5 http://rel.intersil.com/docs/rel/calculation_of_semiconductor_failure_rates.pdf 
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rate increases during this time period. Nevertheless, some of the aging effects will 
already occur before the wear-out-phase starts, because their occurrence is 
promoted by manufacturing flaws like traps in the gate oxide and wider parameter 
distributions as they have been discussed in section 1.1.1.5. A very popular model 
for estimating the mean time to failure of a system is RAMP [175]. RAMP is 
based on various practically used industry models for calculating the mean time to 
failure of a component. For each aging effect a dedicated model exists that is based 
on numerous technology dependent parameters. RAMP provides a combination of 
these models, such that all of these effects are taken into account for a single 
component. The fundamental assumption is that the failure rate is constant [177], 
although it is clear that the failure rate for aging effects is not constant over timer. 
In this thesis also a constant failure rate in components is assumed. Moreover, the 
reliability R(t) instead of the mean time to failure is used for quantifying the 
benefit of the proposed fault tolerance methods, because the reliability allows for a 
better analysis over time. 
1.1.4 Reliability Estimation for Fault Tolerant Systems 
In the previous section, a probabilistic model for the forecasting of the reliability of 
a component was considered, whereby the reliability function for that component 
was defined by using the failure rate. Now fault tolerant systems are modeled, 
which are composed of multiple components, and for each component its reliability 
is given by a reliability function. I.e., the reliability of a system has to be defined 
by using the reliability functions of its components. Thereby it is allowed that 
particular components of the system do not perform correctly, because they are 
affected by a permanent fault. It is assumed that faults in different components 
appear independent from each other. In order to model permanent faults correctly, 
it is also important that non-functioning components remain faulty forever, 
because the permanent fault will never disappear. Please note that this assumption 
does not hold for modeling temporary faults, because a component affected by a 
temporary fault at time t is faulty at time t, and some time later it is working 
properly again, if the error caused by the temporary fault has disappeared. The 
considered techniques for modeling the reliability of fault tolerant systems are 
based either on combinatorial models or state-space models [146]. 
1.1.4.1 Combinatorial Models 
Basically a combinatorial model considers a fault tolerant system as a set S of 
components S = {C1,…,Cn}, for n   – {0}. Each component can be either faulty 
or faultless. Therefore, S can be partitioned into a set O of faultless components 
and a set S – O of faulty components. All possible states of the system are given 
by the set of all subsets of S, which is (S). For example, the subset O = S 
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represents the system state in which all components are faultless. Furthermore, for 
each component c  S its reliability function is denoted by Rc(t). I.e., Rc(t) is the 
probability that component c is operational at time t, and 1 - Rc(t) is the 
probability that component c is faulty at time t. Therefore, the probability that 
the system is in a particular state O at time t is given by  
 ( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
O c c
c O c S O
P t R t R t
  
    . (1-17) 
In order to obtain the probability that a system S is operational at time t the 
function ok is used. The function ok : (S)  {0,1} determines for each system 
state whether the system is still operational in this particular state or not. Now 
the reliability of S is given by: 
 
( ) and ( ) 1
( ) ( )
S O
O S ok O
R t P t
 
  . (1-18) 
As an example the TMR system in figure 1-7 (b) with a voter is considered. The 
system is given by the components S = {a,b,c,v}, where a, b, and c are three 
identical components and v is the voter. A TMR system is operational as long as 
the voter and at least two out of the three identical components are operational. 
Thus, the function ok is defined as: 
 
1,  if { , , , } { , , } { , , } { , , }
( ) :
0,  otherwise
X a b c v X a b v X a c v X b c v
ok X
        
. 
According to equation (1-18) the probabilities P{a,b,c,v}, P{a,b,v}, P{a,c,v}, and P{b,c,v} 
must be accumulated. Thereby P{a,b,c,v} is the probability that all components in S 
are operational, P{a,b,v} is the probability that components a, b, and v are 
operational and so on. Because a, b and c are identical components, it holds: 
Ra(t) = Rb(t) = Rc(t), and in the following R(t) is used for Ra(t), Rb(t), and Rc(t). 
The result of equation (1-18) is the well known formula for TMR systems as it can 
be found in many text books: 
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  
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    
    
     
 (1-19) 
Please note that this formula applies only to TMR-systems that are affected by 
permanent faults or by temporary faults that cause a permanent error. If the TMR 
approach is used for handling temporary faults only, and it is assumed that the 
components are never affected by permanent faults and the temporary fault 
disappears together with the caused error before the next temporary fault occurs, 
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then the reliability of the system is equal to the reliability Rv(t) of the voter for 
the following reason: When a single temporary fault affects one of the components 
a, b, or c, then the system is operational, because the voter is faultless. Moreover, 
such a fault will disappear together with the caused error before another 
temporary fault appears6. I.e., the affected component is operational again, such 
that the TMR-system remains operational as long as the next temporary fault only 
affects one of the components a, b, and c again. Only temporary faults that affect 
the voter will cause a failure of the TMR-system. 
The presented combinatorial approach is very general, but it requires the 
consideration of all possible system states. For a larger number of components this 
may becomes infeasible. Therefore, various approaches exist in order to simplify 
the representation of the system states. Among them are M-of-N systems, 
reliability block diagrams, fault trees, and reliability graphs. Some of them are 
briefly reviewed in the next sections.  
M-of-N Systems 
An M-of-N system is composed of N identical components. At least M of them 
must operate properly for a functioning M-of-N system. For example, the TMR-
system (without the voter) is a 2-of-3 system. The reliability of such a system is 
computed by  
 
,
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))
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i N i
M N
i M
N
R t R t R t
i


        
 . (1-20) 
Each summand in this formula represents the probability that exactly i out of N 
components are functioning. Thereby, the binomial coefficient  
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N N
i N i i
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is the number of system states with exactly i functioning components. All of these 
system states will have the same reliability, because all components in the system 
are identical. Thus, it does not matter which one of these components are the i 
functioning components. 
Reliability Block Diagram 
Traditionally, a reliability block diagram (RBD) is represented by an undirected 
graph with a source and a sink. Some examples are shown in figure 1-12. The 
nodes represent the components of the system. Edges represent dependencies 
between components regarding their operational dependencies. They do not 
6 This can be considered as a repair of the affected component. 
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represent physical connections between the components. The system is operational 
as long as there is a path from the source (typically the edge on the left side) to 
the sink (typically the edge on the right side) that contains only correct 
functioning components. A simple way for modeling a system with a RBD is the 
usage of serial and parallel composition of components, as shown in figure 1-12 (a) 
and (b). Thus, a reliability block diagram is obtained in an inductive manner, by 
consecutively applying both types of composition rules, starting with the 
elementary components of the system. Thereby each elementary component is used 
only once in the RBD. 
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Figure 1-12: (a) Serial composition of two components. (b) Parallel composition of two components. (c) Reliability block 
diagram for a TMR system obtained by a serial composition and parallel composition using single components multiple 
times. (d) Example of a non-serial/non-parallel system. 
The serial composition of two components a and b, as it is shown in figure 1-12 
(a), yields a component c that is operational if both components a and b are 
operational. The parallel composition of two components a and b, as it is shown in 
figure 1-12 (b), yields a component c that is operational as long as a or b are 
operational. The advantage of modeling a system in this way is the simple and fast 
computation of the reliability of the whole system based on the reliabilities known 
for the elementary components. For a serial composition as shown in (a) the 
reliability of component c is computed by 
 ( ) ( ) ( )c a bR t R t R t  . 
And for a parallel system as shown in (b) the reliability of the component c is 
computed by: 
 ( ) 1 (1 ( )) (1 ( ))
c a b
R t R t R t     . 
Thereby, (1 – Ra(t))  (1 – Rb(t)) is the probability that both components a and b 
are faulty. Thus, 1 – (1 – Ra(t))  (1 – Rb(t)) is the probability that both 
components are not simultaneously faulty, which means that at least one of them 
is functioning. 
The drawback of such a reliability block diagram is its limited modeling power. 
For example, using the proposed composition rules, it is not possible to model a 
TMR system [116]. In order to overcome this limitation, various modifications 
were introduced. For example, components for modeling an M-of-N system may be 
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allowed. Then a TMR system including a voter can be modeled by a serial 
composition of a 2-of-3 system with reliability R2,3(t) and a voter component with 
reliability Rvoter(t): 
 
2,3
( ) ( )
TMR voter
R R t R t  . 
By allowing the incorporation of M-of-N systems into the model, additional 
semantic information is needed in the model. I.e., for N parallel components in the 
RBD the maximal allowed number of failing components must be known. In some 
extensions of the RBD model the multiple usage of components is allowed [116]. 
This allows for modeling a TMR system as shown in figure 1-12 (c), too.  
RBDs may be also used to represent systems that are not built-up with the serial 
and parallel composition rule [94]. This yields non-serial/non-parallel system as 
shown in figure 1-12 (d). Please note that a path containing nodes a and d is not 
valid. For these systems the computation of the reliability becomes more complex, 
because the system is expanded about each module x that violates the 
serial/parallel composition rules. For such a module x a case-by-case analysis must 
be done. One new RBD is constructed for the case that x is faultless, and another 
RBD is constructed for the case that x is faulty [94]. Both cases are mutual 
exclusive. For this reason the obtained reliability functions for both RBDs can be 
added in order to obtain the reliability function for the original system. By 
performing this kind of expansion for each elementary component of the original 
RBD, the combinatorial approach described in section 1.1.4.1 is obtained. 
Fault Trees 
Fault trees are just another representation of reliability block diagrams, i.e., 
equivalence of both models can be proven [116]. The inner nodes of the fault tree 
either represent a conjunction or a disjunction of the Boolean values of their sons. 
Each leaf represents a single component of the system. Thereby, the Boolean value 
of a leaf corresponds to the operational state of the component represented by the 
leaf. Now the operational state of the system corresponds to the Boolean value of 
the root node, which is determined bottom-up, by evaluating the Boolean value of 
each inner node based on the Boolean values of its sons. It is obvious that the 
conjunction is equivalent to the serial composition in the reliability block diagram, 
and that the disjunction is equivalent to the parallel composition in the reliability 
block diagram. Thus, a fault tree just represents the composition of the RBD by 
making the application of serial and parallel composition rules explicitly visible. 
The repeated usage of components, as it is possible in reliability block diagrams, is 
modeled in fault trees by having multiple leafs representing the same component. 
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1.1.4.2 State-Space Models 
In state space models, each fault state of the system is represented explicitly. 
Moreover, events – for example, a component becomes defect or becomes repaired 
– are modeled by state transitions. A widely used model is the Markov model, 
which is represented by a directed graph with nodes V and edges E. Each node 
i  V represents a particular fault state of the system, and it is labeled with 
li  . li represents the constant rate with which system state i is left. The edges 
represent events that cause such a state transition. When the system leaves state i, 
then a transition into state j  i with (i,j)  E occurs with probability pij. For this 
reason, each edge (i,j) is labeled with pij  , 0 ≤ pij ≤ 1. Because a state i may 
have various successor states, for each state i must hold: 
 
( , )  and 
1
ij
i j E i j
p
 
 . 
Please note that pij only denotes the probability of entering state j, when state i 
was already left. Therefore, ij ≔ li  pij is the rate of systems that will leave state 
i and enter state j. The following simple example is a Markov model of a TMR 
system without a voter. The TMR system is composed of three identical 
components, each of them having the constant failure rate l.  
 
3 2 1
p32=1 p21=1λ3=3λ λ2=2λ λ1= 0
 
Figure 1-13: Markov model of a TMR system. 
State 3 represents the system state in which all three components are operational. 
The reliability of such a system is given by e-3lt. Therefore, it has a constant failure 
rate of 3l. If a failure occurs, then the system changes into state 2, representing a 
situation where 2 out of 3 components are operational. In this state the failure rate 
of the two remaining components is 2l. In state 1 at most one component is 
operational, which is equivalent to a system failure. Because there is no repair 
function, the system will never leave state 1. In this model each state has at most 
one successor state. Therefore, each edge must be labeled with 1.  
The semantic of the Markov model is given by a special stochastic process, which 
is an infinite number of random variables X(t) that are indexed by continuous 
time t, t   and t ≥ 0 [94]. The discrete state of the system at a particular time t 
is given by the value of X(t)  V. Because V is a set of discrete states, there is a 
particular time for each state transition of the system. The infinite set 
{tk  | k  } should contain those points in time, when the state of the system 
changes. In order to derive from a Markov model the reliability function of the 
modeled system, the probability that the system is in state i at a particular time t 
must be known for each state i  V. Let Pi(t) denote this probability. The 
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important property of the Markov model, which simplifies its analysis, is that the 
probability of being in state X(tn) at time tn only depends on the probability of 
being in a state X(tn-1) at time tn-1. This property is used in equation (1-21) for 
determining Pi(t) by considering only the immediate predecessor states of state i: 
 
( )
( ) ( )i
i i ji j
j i
dP t
P t P t
dt
 

    . (1-21) 
The deviation of Pi(t) in equation (1-21) is the variation of the probability of being 
in state i. This variation is obtained by taking into account the rate of leaving 
state i, assuming that the system is in state i at time t (the first summand in 
equation (1-21)), and the rate of moving into state i from any of its predecessor 
states j, assuming the system is in state j at time t (second summand in equation 
(1-21)). Now, for each state i in the Markov model a differential equation is 
formed according to equation (1-21). This yields a set of differential equations, 
such that Pi(t) can be determined for every state i. The following differential 
equations are obtained for the TMR model in figure 1-13: 
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The solution of this set of differential equation yields for each function Pi(t) the 
probability of being in state i at time t. Solving these differential equations with 
the initial conditions P3(t) = 1 and P2(t) = P1(t) = 0 yields 
 
3
3
2 3
2
2 3
1
( )
( ) 3 3
( ) 3 2 .
t
t t
t t
P t e
P t e e
P t e e

 
 

 
 

   
    
 
Thereby the states 2 and 3 represent operational states of the TMR system. Thus, 
the probability that the system is in an operational state is the well known 
formula for TMR systems: 
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whereby ( ) tR t e   denotes the reliability of a single component in the TMR 
system with the constant failure rate l. 
This simple example has illustrated the usage of Markov models for modeling the 
reliability of systems, where all components are taken into operation at the same 
time t0 = 0. This fact was model for the example in figure 1-13 by setting l3 = 3l 
in the model, which means that a fault may affect any of the three components in 
the initial state of the TMR system. However, in systems employing active 
hardware redundancy with cold standby the spare components are powered off in 
initial state. They are only taken into operation when another active component 
has failed. During the time, when the component is powered off, a negligible failure 
rate is assumed for this component. This situation can be modeled with Markov 
models, too, as shown in figure 1-14 (a). 
2 1
0
c
1(1-c)
1'
0
1
λ λλ
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(a) (b) 
Figure 1-14: (a) Markov Model of a Fail-Stop System with cold standby adopted from [30, 94]. (b) Markov model for the 
Fail-Stop system from (a), but with hot standby. 
The model in figure 1-14 (a) represents a fail-stop system composed of two 
processors. In order to detect a fault, the first processor performs some kind of self-
checking; e.g. an acceptance test. If the acceptance test detects an error, then the 
first processor is taken out of operation, and it is assumed that the second 
processor can be taken into operation instantaneously. A switch that is used to 
select either one of the outputs of both processors is assumed to have a reliability 
of 1. The situation that not every fault of the first processor can be detected by 
acceptance tests is modeled by a fault coverage c with 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, which is the 
probability that an occurred fault is detected, and the backup processor is 
successfully taken into operation. Only one of these two processors is taken into 
operation at time t0. This initial situation is represented by state 2 in the Markov 
model. A failure within the first processor occurs with a constant failure rate l. 
Thus, state 2 is left with probability l. If the occurred fault is detected by the 
acceptance test, then the system moves into state 1 with probability c, i.e., the 
second processor is taken successfully into operation with probability c. With 
probability l  (1-c) the system will leave state 2 and move to state 0, due to a 
fault that cannot be detected. The dotted state 1' represents the negligible 
situation that the unpowered processor has a fault. It is just shown for better 
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understanding the complete model and it can be removed from the model, because 
there is no chance to reach this state. For the Markov model in figure 1-14 (a) the 
following set of differential equations is derived: 
 
2
2
1
2 1
0
2 1
( )
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( ) ( )
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( ) ( )
dP t
P t
dt
dP t
cP t P t
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Solving this set of equations using the initial conditions P2(t) = 1 and 
P1(t) = P0(t) = 0 yields 
2
( ) tP t e   
1
( ) tP t c t e      
0 1 2
( ) 1 ( ) ( )P t P t P t    (1-22) 
Thus the reliability of the system is given as Rcold(t) = P2(t) + P1(t). The same 
formula can be obtained by using the combinatorial approach as it was introduced 
in section 1.1.4.1. This is shown next, in order to clarify the difference between 
modeling hot- and cold-standby with combinatorial means. 
In figure 1-15 R(t) = e-lt of a single processor is shown, and the reliability of the 
fail-stop system with cold standby at time T should be determined.  
1
R
(t
)
t
t' 
t'e    
Te 
t' TT t'
 
Figure 1-15: Reliability plot for a single processor of the fail-stop system modeled in figure 1-14. 
It is obvious that the fail-stop system is operational at time T, if the first processor 
has survived until time T. This happens with probability e-lT and corresponds to 
P2(T) in equation (1-22) (or state 2 in the Markov model). However, the fail-stop 
system is also operational, if the first processor p1 has failed before T and the 
second processor p2 was taken successfully into operation and is still operational at 
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time T. In order to obtain the probability for this scenario, the interval [0, T] is 
divided into N very small time intervals , i.e. T = N  . Now consider an 
arbitrary time t' = n  , with 0 ≤ n < N and n   (see figure 1-15). The 
probability that p1 has survived until time t' is e
-lt'. In order to obtain the 
probability that a system will fail within the time interval [t', t' + ], the 
difference between R(t') and R(t' + ) is computed. It is assumed that the 
function e-lt is almost linear within the short interval [t', t' + ]. The slope of the 
function R at time t' is -le-lt'. Thus, the probability that p1 will fail within the 
interval [t', t' + ] is approximately   l  e-lt' (the sign in the deviation -le-lt' is 
ignored, keeping in mind that the slope is negative). Furthermore, not every fault 
in p1 may be detected by the acceptance test. This is modeled by the coverage 
factor c again. Thus, the probability that the second processor p2 is successfully 
taken into operation in the time interval [t', t' + ] is c    l  e-lt'. The 
probability that p2, if taken into operation within the interval [t', t' + ], will 
survive until time T is e-l(T-t'). Putting both together yields the probability that p2 
is taken into operation within the interval [t', t' + ] and it will survive until time 
T as: 
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 (1-23) 
Please note that equation (1-23) only takes into account a particular time t'. In 
order to obtain the probability that p1 has been successfully replaced by p2 at any 
time within the interval [0, T], the consideration presented above for t' must be 
repeated for each t' = n  , with 0 ≤ n < N. Now, recall that the interval [0, T] 
was partitioned into N very small time intervals, each of them corresponding to a 
particular time t'. Because t' can be eliminated in equation (1-23), the probability 
that p1 is successfully replaced by p2 and p2 will survive until time t is given by 
summing up the probabilities corresponding to each time interval: 
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The obtained probability corresponds to the probability of being in state 1 in the 
Markov model. 
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The Markov model for the same system, but with hot standby, is shown in figure 
1-14 (b). There, state 2 is the initial state, which is left with probability 2l, 
because both processors are taken into operation at time t0. Again, c is the 
probability that the occurred fault is detected by the acceptance test and (1-c) is 
the probabilities that the occurred fault is not detected by the acceptance. The 
reliability Rhot(T) of such a system is easily obtained by combinatorial arguments, 
similar to a TMR system: The system is operational at time T, if 
• both processors are faultless or 
• the first processor is faultless and the second one is faulty or 
• the second processor is faultless and the first one is faulty. 
The probability that both processors are working at time T is e-lT  e-lT, assuming 
a constant failure rate l. The probability that one processor is faulty and the other 
processor is faultless is given by 2  e-lT  (1 – e-lT). Taking into account that the 
fault of a single processor is detected with probability c, the system reliability is 
 ( ) 2 (1 )T T T T
hot
R T e e c e e             .  
A plot of the reliability of the hot and cold standby system is shown in figure 1-16. 
It can be observed that the reliability of the hot standby system is lower than the 
reliability of the cold standby system.  
 
Figure 1-16: Plot of the reliability functions of the hot and cold standby systems from figure 1-14 (a) and (b). 
This example has illustrated how to model permanent faults in reconfigurable 
systems with cold and hot standby. Modeling of such systems is possible with 
Markov models, but also with combinatorial approaches. Combinatorial 
approaches will become inconvenient for more complex replacement schemes as 
they are used for example in cold standby systems. Reconfigurable systems with 
hot standby, where all components of the system will age simultaneously, can be 
modeled using either Markov models or combinatorial approaches. However, the 
combinatorial approach is easier to use in these cases. The self-repair approach 
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proposed in this thesis uses hot standby. For this reason the reliability is computed 
with combinatorial approaches. 
1.2 Hardware Redundancy in Processors 
Hardware redundancy, as it is needed for implementing fault tolerance, is 
inherently available in many processors. However, the redundancy in processors is 
typically used for improving the performance by performing computations in 
parallel. According to the classification of Flynn there can be parallel data streams 
and parallel instruction streams [61]. Even for embedded systems it is common 
today to have multiple instruction and multiple data streams by having multi-core 
architectures. This provides coarse grained parallelism at thread and task level. 
But even single instruction and single data stream processors provide finer grained 
parallelism at instruction level. Thereby, the parallel execution of instructions 
takes place either by a spatial parallel execution (superscalarity) or by a temporal 
parallel execution (pipelining). For a spatial parallel execution, redundant 
hardware must be provided, as it is also needed for fault tolerance. For pipelining 
the available hardware is better utilized than in a non-pipelined architecture. I.e., 
in the ideal case, the execution of operations is divided into independent phases 
that use mutual exclusive parts of the processors hardware. When multiple 
operations are executed parallel, then they use these parts in a time multiplexed 
manner, such that each operation uses another part of the processor at the same 
time. According to these two types of parallelism, single instruction stream 
processors can be further classified into scalar/superscalar and pipelined/non-
pipelined microprocessors. The execution scheme of instructions in these four types 
of processors is shown in figure 1-17, assuming that the execution of an instruction 
is divided into the four phases fetch (FE), decode (DE), execute (EX), and write-
back (WB). 
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Figure 1-17: Classification of processors according to their type of provided parallelism. 
In a non-pipelined scalar processor architecture the execution of an instruction 
sequence is done instruction by instruction (see figure 1-17 (a)). In a pipelined 
scalar processor architecture the execution phases overlap (see figure 1-17 (b)). In 
both processor architectures most resources are not redundantly available. In order 
to obtain fault tolerant scalar processors, redundancy must be added explicitly. 
Non-pipelined superscalar processors (see figure 1-17 (c)) and pipelined superscalar 
processors (see figure 1-17 (d)) can have multiple operations in the same execution 
phase. For this reason the resources for implementing these execution phases must 
be organized redundantly in different computation domains. This inherently 
available redundancy can be also used for making non-fault tolerant superscalar 
processors fault tolerant. Two scheduling policies exist for superscalar processors, 
when assigning operations from a single instruction stream to a particular 
computation domain: 
• dynamic scheduling and 
• static scheduling. 
When dynamic scheduling is used, then the processor dynamically assigns each 
operation to a free computation domain during the execution of the application. 
This requires a dependency analysis that must be performed by the processor, 
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which increases the complexity and size of the control logic of the core. The 
software has no control about the computation domain that is used for executing a 
particular operation. If the usage of a defect computation domain should be 
avoided, as it is done in active hardware redundancy, then the administration of 
the redundant domains must be done in hardware by the processor itself, i.e., 
hardware administrated hardware redundancy must be used. 
When static scheduling is used, then the processor is relieved from dependency 
analysis. This analysis is done statically by the compiler that must schedule the 
operations in such a way that the processor knows exactly which operations can be 
executed in parallel. An example of such a processor is the Itanium processor from 
Intel [155, 156]7. This processor must not check for data dependencies, but it 
determines dynamically a computation domain; i.e., the binding of operations to 
computation domains is computed dynamically. Very long instruction word 
processors (VLIW processors) neither perform dynamic scheduling nor dynamic 
binding. This class of processor architectures has been proposed first by Fisher in 
the beginning of the 1980's together with appropriate scheduling techniques for 
parallelizing operations across basic block boundaries [59, 60]. The charm of this 
architecture is that complex administrative tasks like dependency checking are 
shifted to the compiler, which simplifies the control logic of this processor 
architecture very much. Operations that must be executed in parallel are grouped 
together by the compiler into a single very long instruction word. The binding of 
operations is either explicitly or implicitly coded in the instruction word. In 
contrast to processors that provide dynamic scheduling and binding, this allows for 
a complete software-based administration of redundant computation domains, i.e., 
software-administrated hardware-redundancy may be used. This property 
constitutes the base for the application of the software-based self-repair techniques 
proposed in chapter 3 and follows the VLIW paradigm of performing complex 
administrative tasks in software.  
1.3 Summary 
In this chapter the basic notations for dependable systems were introduced by 
considering a classification of means and impairments that affect the dependability 
of a system either in a positive or negative manner. An overview about 
fundamental fault tolerance methods that are based on redundancy for handling 
either transient or permanent faults in the field was given. Beside the well known 
classification of redundancy into hardware redundancy, software redundancy, time 
redundancy, and data redundancy, an orthogonal classification of redundancy was 
7 Also referred to as Explicitly Parallel Instruction Computing (EPIC) [156]. 
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introduced. This orthogonal classification distinguishes between the system layers 
where the administration of the redundant resources takes place, and allows for a 
classification into software-administrated and hardware-administrated redundancy.  
The self-repair methods presented in this thesis will fall into the category of active 
hardware redundancy methods, whereby in most cases the hardware redundancy 
will be administrated in software. The term self-repair was defined as the 
reconfiguration step needed for active redundancy, no matter whether this 
reconfiguration step is related with graceful performance degradation or not. The 
self-repair methods will primarily target at permanent faults that will occur during 
the operational phase of the system, no matter which physical mechanism has 
caused these permanent faults. For the evaluation of the proposed methods the 
reliability was introduced. Stochastical methods for computing the reliability of a 
fault tolerant system, whose components may fail due to permanent faults, were 
introduced. 
Although in active hardware redundancy approaches error detection and fault 
localization precedes the self-repair phase, in this thesis, first, various self-repair 
methods will be considered. By developing and analyzing these methods, it 
becomes clear at which granularity level they can work. This allows for developing 
a diagnostic self-test method that fits very well to the presented self-repair 
methods. This guarantees the required diagnostic resolution needed for the self-
repair process. I.e., it is avoided that a lot of time and resources are spend for the 
diagnosis of faults that cannot be handled by the subsequent self-repair process.  
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Hardware-Based Self-Repair 
A single statically scheduled superscalar processor architecture is used throughout 
this thesis in order to illustrate the proposed self-test and self-repair concepts. The 
processor architecture is named VARP, which means VLIW Architecture for 
Research Purposes. Different self-repair schemes presented in chapter 2 to chapter 
4 for that processor model require different extensions of the processor model. 
First, the basic non-fault-tolerant VARP processor is presented in section 2.2. 
Then, the non-fault tolerant VARP processor is made fault tolerant by applying 
hardware-administrated active hardware redundancy in section 2.3. For this reason 
the redundantly available computation domains are used for replacing each other. 
Because the redundant hardware components are administrated by hardware, it is 
a hardware-based self-repair approach. The administration component is a simple 
hardware extension that changes on-line the binding of operations to 
computational domains. This approach is able to handle multiple permanent faults 
in the computational domains of the VARP processor, but at the cost of 
performance degradation for most fault situations. Reliability and performance 
estimations are presented in section 2.4. Both, the achieved reliability 
improvement and the performance degradation are used as reference values for the 
comparison with the software-based methods presented later in chapter 3.  
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2.1 Related Work 
In order to built fault tolerant processors, codes and passive hardware redundancy 
techniques like DMR and TMR for error detection and fault masking are state of 
the art. They are used in various academic [11, 145] and commercial processor 
based systems [66, 172]. According to the classification in figure 1-9, the 
redundancy in those systems is most likely managed at hardware-level, in 
particular at architecture- and register transfer-level. Gaisler describes in [66] how 
the redundancy is employed and managed at register transfer level for making the 
memory elements of the LEON-FT core fault tolerant. For example, the cache 
memory is protected by parity bits. A detected error is corrected by accessing the 
original value in the main memory. TMR is used for fault masking in pipeline- and 
processor-registers. IBMs S/390 G5 processor uses codes and hardware-
administrated DMR techniques for recovering from temporary faults [172], too. 
DMR is also used at architecture level by having full duplicates of the instruction 
decode- and execute-units and performing cross-checks of the results. Moreover, 
check pointing of these units is supported by a special recovery unit for recovering 
from temporary faults. Also recovery from permanent faults is supported by active 
hardware redundancy. For this purpose, spare cores are available in the system, 
and transfer of checkpoints from a faulty core to a spare core is supported by 
hardware. Similar techniques were already proposed a few years earlier by Franklin 
for superscalar dynamically scheduled processors. In [62] Franklin discusses various 
strategies for detecting temporary and permanent faults in the execution units. 
The basic idea is to execute each operation twice by using the inherent hardware 
redundancy in superscalar processors. Various strategies for duplicating the 
operations are discussed. For example, the operation may be duplicated either by 
the hardware scheduler of the processor or by each execution unit itself. In the 
former case also permanent faults in the execution units can be detected. In [63] 
Franklin presents more ideas for detecting and handling faults in several other 
components of a superscalar processor, e.g. data- and address-errors in the 
instruction cache, errors in the fetch- and decode units, errors in the dynamic 
scheduler, and errors in the register file. Thereby the proposed fault tolerance 
methods are based on codes or re-execution of operations; i.e., information and 
time redundancy is employed and managed at hardware-level. Unfortunately, no 
results of an implementation in a real processor are available.  
Passive hardware-redundancy is also employed in processors at the finer-grained 
gate level. Mitra et al. have proposed fault masking techniques at gate level that 
can handle single event upsets in scan flip-flops that occur when the clock is low 
[122]. Scan flip-flops are built from two master-slave flip-flops, such that during 
normal operation information can be stored redundantly. Fault masking is 
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obtained by using a Muller-C element at the outputs of both flip-flops. A Muller-C 
element has two data inputs and a single data output. If both inputs have the 
same value, then the output will have this value, too. But when both inputs differ, 
then the Muller-C element keeps the latest output value for which both inputs 
were equal. When the stored information in the slave-latch of one of the two flip-
flops is inverted by a SEU, then the Muller-C element will keep the correct value. 
The error is corrected when the clock rises to high by overwriting the faulty value 
with the value from the corresponding master latch. This reduces the probability 
for the occurrence of SEU, but cannot totally eliminate them, because the flip-flop 
cannot handle SEU that affect a master latch when the clock is high. In this 
situation the error is detected, but recovery must be done at a higher level of 
administration, which requires a global error signal for each scan flip-flop. 
Redundant latches for error detection at gate level are used in the RAZOR flip-
flop [56], too. However, the RAZOR flip-flop has been designed for the detection of 
delay faults in processor pipelines. For this reason the redundant shadow latch will 
buffer a slightly delayed value from the combinatorial input of the previous 
pipeline stage. If the correct value arrives too late, then both values in the original 
flip-flop and in the shadow latch differ, which can be detected. In this case, an 
extra clock cycle is needed for error correction, i.e., moving the correct value from 
the shadow latch into the original flip-flop. However, this local delay must be 
propagated to all other flip-flops in the processor, which also requires a global 
administration scheme. Moreover, the protected memory elements in these 
approaches have the same data input. SET affecting the combinatorial logic 
driving this input will not be detected by these methods. For this reason a 
duplication of the combinatorial circuitry is considered in [121]. Reduction of the 
costs for duplicating the combinatorial circuitry is achieved in [173] by using a 
predictor circuit instead of a duplicated one. The predictor circuit generates a 
signature that is compared with the signature generated from the result of the 
combinatorial logic. In case of a mismatch, due to a SET, a global error signal is 
generated that forces all slave latches to keep their latest correct value, until the 
SET disappears. A major draw-back of fine-grained local fault handling is the need 
for a complex global administration scheme. Moreover it is obvious that such 
passive hardware-redundancy techniques can handle temporary faults only, 
because the error recovery mechanism relies on the assumption that the fault, 
which was the cause of the error, disappears after a short period of time.  
Because permanent faults do not disappear, they are better handled by active 
hardware redundancy that takes the faulty component out of operation. An active 
hardware-redundancy scheme for handling permanent faults at switch- and gate-
level was proposed from Kothe et al. in [96]. I.e., all gates are replicated, and 
additional transistors are used for isolating gates from supply voltage, in order to 
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handle shorts. However, such a fine-grained replication scheme requires too many 
administrative overhead for local switches. For this reason, the same group has 
proposed a reconfiguration scheme, where reconfigurable logic blocks are used as 
redundant components. The size of these reconfigurable logic blocks may range 
from simple gates to more complex combinatorial logic like adders and ALUs [90]. 
By this, the hardware-overhead for local switches is significantly reduced. 
Moreover, if the reconfiguration is done in off-line mode, then a complex global 
administration scheme for controlling the timing is not needed.  
A similar and very natural way for implementing active hardware redundancy that 
is administrated by hardware is the usage of field programmable gate arrays 
(FPGAs), which are composed of configurable logic blocks, and provide hardware-
redundancy at that granularity level. Processors may be mapped as soft-cores into 
a FPGA [58, 85, 125]. By mapping a soft core twice in a FPGA, DMR can be used 
for handling transient faults at system level. Such a technique has been used in 
[58] for the LEON core. Moreover, when a permanent fault in one of the 
configurable logic blocks of the FPGA affects the soft core, then a another 
configuration of the FPGA can be used, such that the soft core is no longer 
mapped into the faulty area of the FPGA [125]. In [77] it was shown that a 
computation of a new fine-grained configuration based on configurable logic blocks 
becomes very time consuming in the field due to the modified routing [77]. For this 
reason precompiled configuration schemes are used for example in [120] and [174] 
at the cost of larger backup areas. Moreover, a soft-core may be used for 
administration of hardware redundancy as well as configurations with multiple 
FPGAs. By this FPGAs can be used for reconfiguring each other [120]. Thus, 
FPGAs provide high flexibility but at the expense of hardware overhead, lower 
performance, and extra power. For example, implementing the VARP processor in 
a Xilinx Virtex 6 and Virtex 7 FPGA allows for a maximal clock rate of 
approximately 200 MHz [136]. The implementation of the VARP processor as a 
hard-core with a comparable feature size allows for more than 500 MHz as it will 
be shown by the synthesis results in section 2.2.3. In order to build high 
performance, low-power and low-area embedded processor based systems it is more 
beneficial to implement the processor as a hard-core with some specific 
reconfiguration facilities. 
This has been done for the dynamically scheduled superscalar Alpha 21264 
microprocessor [67] for yield improvement. Three fundamental hardware-based 
administration schemes for active hardware fault tolerance were proposed for this 
processor from Shivakumar et al. in [168]. The administration schemes were 
tailored to dedicated component types like queues, register arrays, and redundant 
execution units that can be typically found in this type of processor architecture. 
The basic idea is to use the control logic of these components for fault handling in 
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them. By this, the amount of extra control logic for administrating the redundancy 
should be reduced. The first administration scheme is for component level 
replication and can be used when components are available redundantly for high 
performance, but the system remains functional as long as at least one of them is 
operational. A permanent fault in one of these components is then treaded as if 
this component is busy all the time. This administration scheme applies in 
particular to the execution units in a dynamically scheduled processor and is 
comparable to the one proposed by Franklin in [63]. The second administration 
scheme for array redundancy is applied to components that are organized as bit 
fields, and faults in some of the bit-fields can be handled by re-routing the accesses 
to the faulty components to non-faulty components. This, for example, applies to 
register files, where the usage of faulty registers is avoided by hardware-based 
register renaming using some spare registers. Finally, the third administration 
scheme for dynamic queue redundancy is applied to queues in the processor as 
they are used, for example, in operation queues and reorder buffers. It is proposed 
to handle faults in some of the queue elements with the help of the control logic of 
the queue by treating them as occupied. Similar mechanisms were used by Bower 
et al. in [29] for handling hard faults in various components of the same processor 
architecture, when these faults occur during the operational phase in the field. 
Fault detection was implemented by using DIVA checkers [12]. DIVA checkers are 
small units added into the commit-stage of the pipeline of a superscalar processor8. 
They are used for computing the result that should be committed a second time. It 
is claimed that DIVA checkers are implemented in a more robust way than the 
rest of the core, such that a detected fault is accounted to the original units of the 
superscalar processor.  
Most of the proposed administration schemes for redundancy in superscalar 
dynamically scheduled processors target for data path elements only. However, in 
the Alpha-processor the size of the data path (integer plus floating-point slots) is 
approximately five times the size of the control logic. In a comparable VARP 
processor the ratio of data path (size of all four slots) to the control logic is 
estimated to be around 126. It is obvious that this ratio in a statically scheduled 
processor is much higher, because the control logic in statically scheduled 
processors can be much simpler than in dynamically scheduled processors, because 
the hardware-based optimizations in dynamically scheduled processors come at the 
expense of more control logic. However, fault tolerance is based on redundancy, 
and redundancy is hardly found in irregular control logic. For this reason the 
irregular control logic cannot be protected by active hardware redundancy, except 
8 Originally DIVA checker were used for dynamic verification of the components of a superscalar 
processor. In this way design fault should be detected and corrected on-line [12]. 
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redundancy is explicitly added to the control logic. Hence, fault tolerance 
techniques that try to employ the inherently available redundancy in processors 
are more beneficial for statically scheduled processors than for dynamically 
scheduled processors, because in statically scheduled processors a larger portion of 
the core area is occupied from the data path that provides inherently available 
redundancy. For this reason, techniques for hardware-based administration of the 
redundancy in statically scheduled processors are considered now. 
An active hardware redundancy scheme for pipelined scalar cores was presented in 
[149]. Because a single scalar core does not provide hardware redundancy, several 
of them are composed to a multi-core system. Faults in two or more processors are 
handled by cannibalizing a faultless core. I.e., the faulty cores replace their own 
faulty pipeline stage with the functioning pipeline stage of the cannibalized core. 
Chen et al. has proposed in [43] an active hardware redundancy scheme for a 
statically scheduled VLIW processor. This superscalar processor inherently 
contains redundant hardware in its data path. The architecture of the VLIW 
processor is very similar to one of the VARP processor. The usage of a 
permanently faulty component in the VLIW is avoided by routing operations that 
where fetched into a particular execution domain of the VLIW into another 
execution domain. For this reason, a hardware scheduler is integrated into the 
execution stage of the data path that can change dynamically the binding of 
operations. Furthermore, the results of the execution units can be compared in 
hardware. Faults are detected by a concurrent execution of operations and 
comparison of their results. Thereby the scheduler allows for a duplication and 
triplication of operations. If necessary, an operation is re-executed in order to 
localize the faulty unit. This approach is able to detect temporary and permanent 
faults in execution units. Permanent faults can be localized on-line and the usage 
of the faulty execution units is avoided. A similar approach is presented by Shyam 
in [170] for a VLIW architecture. There, the reconfiguration logic is integrated in 
the execution stage, too, in order to avoid the usage of a faulty execution unit of 
the processor. A fault is detected on-line by a special checker that checks the 
correct execution of operations by computing only a signature for the result, using 
a small watchdog-ALU. However, in [43] and [170] the scheduler respectively the 
reconfiguration logic are integrated into the execution stage. This means that 
faults that appear in a significantly large portion of the data path cannot be 
handled. For instance, faults in the decode stage of the processors will not be 
detected. At least the integration of the reconfiguration logic into an earlier 
pipeline stage is possible, but this requires a more complex administration scheme, 
especially for the recovery process after error detection, which finally increases 
significantly the size of the control logic. 
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A hardware-based reconfiguration scheme for VLIW processors that covers also 
faults in the decode-stage of the pipeline is proposed by Koal et al. in [92]. Spare 
components were added to the data path and encapsulated by a multiplexer 
network for reconfiguration purposes. Error detection and fault handling is done 
off-line. By this, a recovery scheme after error detection is not needed, because 
faults are detected off-line by preemptive error detection. I.e., after startup, a 
software-based self-test is performed. When this test fails, another configuration is 
tried and the self-test is repeated. In this way all feasible configurations are 
systematically applied until a functioning one is found. Then the user application 
is launched. Such a reconfiguration scheme can be only applied at a coarse-grained 
administration level; e.g. slot or execution unit level. Otherwise, the number of 
feasible configurations becomes too large. 
The concept of preemptive error detection in off-line mode is also assumed for the 
VARP processor in the sub-sequent sections. Moreover, the integration of a 
hardware-based re-scheduler in an early pipeline stage is demonstrated that 
dynamically allocates operations to other execution domains.  
2.2 The non-Fault Tolerant VARP Processor 
The VARP processor is a simple and self-developed VLIW processor. According to 
the classification of Flynn [61], it is a single instruction stream and single data 
stream (SISD) architecture. I.e., only a single control flow is handled by the 
processor and only a single data memory-access operation can be executed each 
time. Parallelism is provided at instruction level. The VARP processor has a four 
stage pipeline and provides redundant resources due to its superscalar organized 
data path. Operations must be scheduled statically by the compiler. The processor 
is a Harvard-architecture, i.e., it has separated busses and memories for data and 
program code. The advantage is two-fold: First, data and program memory can 
have different bit widths. This allows for an efficient instruction coding, because 
the instruction word length does not depend on the data word length. Second, 
some resource hazards in the pipeline can be avoided. In the Princeton-
architecture9, which has a shared memory for data and program code, such 
hazards will occur, because fetching a new instruction from the program memory 
may interfere with a memory-access operation. On the other hand, it is very simple 
to employ self-modifying program code in a Princeton-architecture, due to the fact 
that each program has access to the data memory, and the data memory also 
contains the program code. This principle of self-modifying code is used for the 
software-based self-repair method proposed in chapter 3. Although a Harvard-
9  Also known as von-Neumann-architecture. 
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architectures may not support this feature in such a natural way as the Princeton-
architecture does, the VARP-processors uses the Harvard-architecture, because 
this allows for avoiding hazards caused by the instruction fetch and memory-access 
operation. A schematic picture of the VARP processor is shown in figure 2-1. The 
implementation used throughout this thesis has a 16-bit data path. However, other 
versions, for example with a 32-bit data path, are also available, because various 
parameters of this processor architecture, including data path size, can be scaled 
easily. 
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Figure 2-1: The VARP Processor. 
Vertically the data path is divided into four computation domains, which are 
called slot 0 to slot 3. Each slot is composed of a fetch register, two read ports (rpL 
and rpR), two bypasses (bpL and bpR), a decode register, an execution unit, and a 
write back register. The register file is shared by all slots. It contains 64 general 
purpose registers named r0 to r63. The program counter (PC) holds the address of 
the next instruction to be fetched from the program memory. Each instruction in 
the program memory has a bit width of 104 bits. It contains 4 operations, whereby 
each operation is encoded into 26 bits. The encoding of an instruction is shown in 
figure 2-2. 
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Figure 2-2: Encoding of a VARP instruction. 
An instruction is composed of four operations. Figure 2-2 also shows their grouping 
into a single instruction. Which operation is executed by which slot is given by the 
relative position of an operation within an instruction. The coding of operations is 
very similar to the coding in a MIPS-like architecture [80]. Two types of operation 
encoding are used: R-Type and I-Type. Operations of the R-type encode two 
source register numbers (src1 and src2) and one destination register number (dst). 
Eight bits are left for encoding the opcode (opc) of an operation. Operations of I-
Type are used for encoding operations with a 16-bit immediate value. The opcode 
bit-field of I-Type operations has only 4 bits. For both operation types the upper 
four bits of the opcode encode the operation group. Their meaning is shown in 
table 2-1. A full description of the instruction set architecture is given in Appendix 
A. 
Group Meaning 
0 
Encodes up to 16 R-Type operations: Among them are a NOP (No OPeration) 
and load/store-operations for memory access. The VARP processor is a 
load/store-architecture, where data memory access is only possible via 
load/store-operations. 
1 
Encodes 16 conditional and unconditional jump operations of R-Type. Testing 
of a carry-, negative-, zero-, and overflow-flag is supported. Any general purpose 
register can serve as flag-register. Flags are explicitly set by the cmp-operation 
(see Appendix A). The branch target address is taken from a src1-register. 
12 16 arithmetic and logical operations are encoded using the R-Type format.  
2 to 11 
14 and 15 
Each group encodes exactly one operation of the I-Type. Among them are the 
load-constant operation (ldc-operation) and conditional/unconditional jumps 
where the target address is encoded as immediate value. 
13 Unused. 
Table 2-1: Opcode-grouping in the VARP instruction set architecture. 
Operation for slot 0 Operation for slot 1 Operation for slot 2 Operation for slot 3
opc1 src11 src21 dst1
26 Bit 26 Bit 26 Bit 26 Bit
8 Bit 6 Bit 6 Bit 6 Bit
opc1 immediate dst1
4 Bit 16 Bit 6 Bit
R-Type
I-Type
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Horizontally the data path is divided into the four pipeline stages fetch, decode, 
execute, and write-back. They are organized very similar to the ones of a MIPS-
like processor [80]: 
• Fetch (FE): The instruction is loaded from the program memory. 
• Decode (DE): The instruction is decoded into control signals, if necessary 
operands are read from the register file. 
• Execute (EX): The required operation is executed by an execution unit 
(EU). For this purpose each execution unit contains various operators, for 
example adder, multiplier, etc. 
• Write-Back (WB): The result is written back to the specified processor 
register.  
When an instruction is fetched from the program memory, then each operation is 
stored in the fetch register of their corresponding slot k. Thereby the values of the 
bit fields of each operation (see figure 2-2) are stored into the corresponding bit 
fields of the fetch register (see figure 2-1). The bit field nop-Sigk in figure 2-1 is set 
to 1, if and only if the fetched operation for slot k is a NOP. This signal is used in 
the execution stage for generating the load-signals for the destination registers. All 
fetched operations of one instruction are processed in lock-step manner 
simultaneously in the processor pipeline.  
During the decode stage the register values are provided. For this reason the 
values of the bit fields src1k and src2k in the fetch register of slot k are used as 
control signals for the left and right read port of slot k. The functions of the left 
read port (rpL) and right read port (rpR) of slot k are formally given by 
 
0 1 63
( , , ,..., ) :
kL k src1
rp src1 r r r r  and 
0 1 63
( , , ,..., ) :
kR k src2
rp src2 r r r r , 
where r0 to r63 are the values of the registers in the register file. The left bypass 
(bpL) and right bypass (bpR) of a slot are used to select either the output value of 
the corresponding read port, or, if necessary, a value from the execution or write-
back stage of the processor. The values generated in the execution stage are named 
ex0, …, ex3, and the values from the write-back stage are named wb0, …, wb3 (see 
figure 2-1). Then the function of the left bypass is given by 
 
1
,  if :  
( , , , , , , ,
{0,1,2, 3} :
, , , , :
,  if :
, , , , )
,  otherwise
i i i
L src 0 3 0 3
j
0 3 0 3
i i i
0 3 0 3
src1
wb i dstWb src1 vWb
bp src1 r ex ex wb wb
j dstEx src1
dstEx dstEx dstWb dstWb
ex i dstEx src1 vEx
vEx vEx vWb vWb
r
           
 
 
 
. 
Thereby, rsrc1 is the register value provided by the corresponding read port rpL. 
dstEx0,…,dstEx3 and dstWb0,…,dstWb3 are the destination register addresses of the 
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corresponding values ex0,…,ex3 and wb0,…,wb3. vEx0,…,vEx3. vWb0,…,vWb3 are the 
valid bits of these values. The value that is selected by the left bypass in slot k is 
moved into the bit field val1k of the corresponding decode register and the value 
selected by the right bypass is moved into the bit field val2k. Furthermore, the 
values of the bit fields opck and dstk of the fetch register are moved during the 
decode stage into the bit fields opck and dstExk of the decode register. 
The operation encoded in the bit field opck of the decode register is executed by 
the execution unit (EU) during the execution stage. Thereby val1k is used as left 
and val2k as right operand of the operation. The result of an arithmetic or logic 
operation in EU k is stored in the write-back register of slot k (bit field resultk) 
together with the number of the destination register (bit field dstWbk). Beside 
arithmetic and logic operations, the EUs also perform branch and memory 
operations. For this purpose the EU generates appropriate values that can be 
loaded into the registers PC, MAR and MBR of the control path. All execution 
units are homogeneous. I.e., each execution unit is capable of executing branch and 
memory operations. This provides the required redundancy for self-repair purposes. 
Please note that it is the task of the compiler to make sure that at most one 
memory-operation and at most one branch operation is executed at the same 
time10. Moreover, execution unit k generates the load-signals for slot k (ld-sigk) for 
all feasible target registers. These four load-signals are: 
• ld-dstk: this bit is one, if the operation generates a result that should be 
written into the register encoded in the bit field dstWbk. The ld-dst signals of 
all slots are also used as valid-bits vEx and vWB for the bypass. 
• ld-pck: this bit is one, if the executed the operation is a branch operation 
that has generated a new value for the PC, meaning that the program 
counter must be loaded with the result generated by execution unit k. 
• ld-mark: this bit is one, if the result of the execution unit must be loaded 
into the memory address register (MAR-register). I.e., the executed 
operation has generated a memory address. 
• ld-mbrk: this bit is one, if the result of the execution unit must be loaded into 
the memory buffer register (MBR-register).  
Please note that the nop-signal from the decode register is used for masking all of 
these load-signals. By this, a fault in the fetch- or decode-register that changes the 
opcode of a fetched NOP into the opcode of another operation, will not cause 
writing into any register.  
10 In principle the processor architecture supports multiple branch-operations in a single instruction. 
But, then the branch conditions must be mutual exclusive. 
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The instruction set of the processor is defined in such a way that each operation is 
executed within one clock cycle by an execution unit. For arithmetic operations, 
bit operations, and branch operations this can be done without any difficulty. 
However, a data memory access is assumed to take two clock cycles. Data memory 
access is either done by a load- (reading from memory) or by a store-operation 
(writing to the memory). Both operations are carried out in the execution stage. A 
dedicated memory stage, as for example in the MIPS-architecture, is not required, 
because the VARP architecture does not support address arithmetic. In order to 
perform a two clock cycle memory access with single cycle operations, the load- 
and store-operations are divided into two separated operations shown in figure 2-3. 
ld0 [Rx],Ry 
ld1 [Rx],Ry 
 
st0 Ry,[Rx] 
st1 Ry,[Rx] 
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 2-3: (a) Memory load-operation. (b) Memory store-operation. 
The ld0-operation moves during the EX-stage the value of register x into the 
memory address register (MAR). The expected value is provided by the data 
memory one clock cycle later as input to all execution units. The ld1-operation, 
which is executed after the ld0-operation, stores this value into the write-back 
register. In a similar way the st0-operation moves the address and data value into 
the MAR and MBR. The st1-operation finally resets some control signals of the 
data memory. Please note that the ld0-, ld1-, st0-, and st1-operations may be 
executed in different slots.  
Due to the organization of the pipeline and the used Harvard-architecture, neither 
resource nor data hazards will occur in the pipeline. Control hazards, due to a 
taken branch, are solved by discarding the instructions in the fetch and decode 
stage of the pipeline. When a branch is not taken, then the correct instructions 
were already fetched, and the operation of the pipeline simply continues.  
2.2.1 Processor Model 
In [157] a formal model of a VARP-like processor has been introduced for design 
space exploration. A simplified version of that model is now used for introducing a 
fault state model for the VARP processor11. An instance of the 16-bit VARP 
processor is characterized by the parameters (R, N, ), where: 
11 The model is simplified in that sense that the VARP processor is a non-clustered homogeneous 
VLIW architecture; i.e., only a single centralized register file is provided and all execution units 
support the same operations, provided that there is no fault in an execution unit. 
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• R   is the number of registers in the register file. 
• N   is the number of slots. 
•  is the set of operations supported by each execution unit. 
Now the components of a VARP processor, as it is shown in figure 2-1, are 
represented by the following sets. The set REGS Í  with  
 REGS := {0,…,R–1} 
is the set of all registers in the register file. The set SLOTS Í  with  
 SLOTS := {0,…,N–1} 
is the set of all slots. Each slot k is composed of two read ports, two bypasses, 
three pipeline registers and a single execution unit. The execution units are 
represented by the set EUS Í . It is equal to the set of slots: 
 EUS := SLOTS. 
Execution unit k belongs to slot k. A VARP processor with N slots has 2N read 
ports and 2N bypasses. Therefore read ports are represented by the set RPS Í  
and bypasses are represented by the set BPS Í , whereby 
 RPS = BPS := {0,…,2N–1}. 
Thereby, read port/bypass 2k is called left read port/bypass of slot k and provides 
the left operand for execution unit k. Read port/bypass 2k+1 is called right read 
port/bypass of slot k and provides the right operand for execution unit k.  
The fault states of these components are specified by using various fault state 
functions. The fault state function  
 fsPipe : SLOTS → {0,1}  
reflects the fault state of the pipeline registers of a slot. Thereby fsPipe(k) = 1 
means that the pipeline registers of slot k are faultless. If fsPipe(k) = 0, then there 
is a fault in a pipeline register such that the operation encoding is changed by this 
fault. The fault-state of an execution unit is expressed by the function  
 fsEU : EUS   - {NOP} → {0,1}, 
where fsEU(k,t) = 1, if and only if an operation of type t   - {NOP} is executed 
correctly by execution unit k. For example, suppose the execution unit in slot 1 
contains an adder and a multiplier, and the output of the execution unit is 
obtained by selecting the output of one of these two operators with a multiplexer. 
Then, a fault in the adder will not affect the behavior of the multiplier. Therefore, 
the fault state can be defined as fsEU(1,adder) ≔ 0 and fsEU(1,multiplier) ≔ 1. 
The fault state of a read port is given by the fault state function 
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 fsRP : RPS  REGS → {0,1}. 
Thereby fsRP(p,r) = 1, if and only if register r can be accessed correctly through 
read port p. The fault state of the bypass is given by two functions 
 fsBPex : SLOTS  BPS→ {0,1} and 
 fsBPwb : SLOTS  BPS  → {0,1}. 
Thereby fsBPex(s,b) = 1, if and only if a value is correct forwarded from the EX-
stage of slot s through the bypass b. Similar, fsBPwb(s,b) = 1, if and only if the 
forwarding from the write-back stage of slot s through bypass b is working 
properly. Finally the state of the register file is defined by the function  
 fsRF : REGS → {0,1}. 
Here, fsRF(r) = 1, if and only if a value can be stored correctly in register r by an 
arbitrary slot. The fault state of the control path is given by the fault state 
function  
 fsCP :  → {0,1},  
which is a constant function with arity 0. Thereby fsCP = 1, if and only if the 
control path is faultless. The composite fault state function  
 fsSlot : SLOTS → {0,1}  
reflects the fault state of the slots. Thereby, fsSlot(k) = 1 means that slot k can be 
used for executing some operations distinct from a NOP. fsSlot(k) = 0 means that 
only a NOP can be executed correctly in slot k. The fault state function fsSlot is 
derived from the previously specified fault state functions. How the function fsSlot 
is obtained from the other fault state functions depends on the granularity level for 
which the fault state of the VARP processor is specified. 
Definition 2-1 (Fault State of the VARP Processor): 
The fault state of the VARP processor is given by a set of fault state functions 
that reflect the fault state of particular components of the VARP processor. 
The granularity levels are given in table 2-1. Their meaning is specified with the 
help of a fault-tree-like hierarchical representation of the VARP processor in figure 
2-4. This representation considers the processor as the top-level system composed 
of the two sub-systems control path and data path. The data path is further 
divided into more sub-systems. Thereby sub-systems may be also represented by 
their provided functionality. For example, the read port contains sub-components 
that must be operational for reading a particular register trough this read port. 
The bypass has sub-components that must be operational in order to allow for 
selecting a value from a particular pipeline stage (EX-stage and WB-stage) or from 
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the read port (register). Inner nodes of the tree represent components whose 
functioning depends on the functioning of other sub-components, while a leaf 
represents an atomic component or its function. Thereby the fault state of a leaf is 
given by the annotated fault-state function. Similar to fault-trees, the fault state of 
inner nodes is derived from the fault states of their sons. Then, it can be 
determined bottom-up whether or not the processor is functional. 
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Figure 2-4: Hierarchical organization of the components of the VARP processor. 
In the simplest case the fault state of an inner node is determined by a conjunction 
or disjunction of the fault states of the sons. For example, a non-fault tolerant 
VARP processor is only operational, when all its components are faultless. Thus, 
all atomic components must be operational (i.e., their fault state is 1), and the 
operational state of each inner node is determined by a conjunction of the 
operational states of its sub-components. I.e., all components of the processor are 
non-fault tolerant. The third column of table 2-1 shows for each granularity level 
the fault tolerant nodes of the tree. These fault tolerant nodes have redundantly 
available sub-components that can replace each other, if one of them becomes 
faulty. In most cases the fault state of a fault-tolerant node is determined by a 
disjunction of the fault states of its sons. I.e., it is sufficient that at least a single 
son is functioning. However, in some situations a particular subset of the sons 
must be functioning. The fault state of nodes not listed in the third column of 
table 2-1 is determined by a conjunction. Based on this information and the 
bottom-up evaluation, the fault state function fsSlot is derived from the other fault 
state functions. The fault state functions, which are sufficient for characterizing 
the fault state of the VARP processor at a particular granularity level, are listed in 
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the second column of table 2-1. Please note that the function fsCP is not listed 
there, because fsCP = 1 is mandatory for having an operational VARP processor. 
Granularity Level 
Characterized by Fault 
State Functions 
Fault tolerant nodes of the 
tree in figure 2-4 
Slot Level fsSlot IS 
Execution Unit Level fsSlot, fsEU IS, EU 
Read Port-Level fsSlot, fsEU, fsRP IS, EU, RP, LRP, RRP 
Bypass-Level fsSlot, fsEU, fsRP, fsBPex, 
fsBPwb 
IS, EU, RP, LRP, RRP, 
DI, BP, LBP, RBP 
Register-Level fsSlot, fsEU, fsRP, fsBPex, 
fsBPwb, fsRF 
IS, EU, RP, LRP, RRP, 
DI, BP, LBP, RBP, RF 
Table 2-2: Granularity Levels for Self-Repair. 
At slot level, only the node IS is considered as fault tolerant. Hence, each slot 
forms a redundantly available component, and only slots can replace each other. 
However, all sub-components of an operational slot must be faultless. I.e., a single 
fault in one of the sub-components of a slot implies that this slot is not operational 
anymore. Thus, a fault state at slot level is sufficiently characterized by the fault 
state function fsSlot. Whether or not the node IS is operational depends on the 
number of slots that are allowed to be faulty. If faults can be handled only in a 
single slot, then three sons of the node IS must be operational. If fault can be 
handled in up to three slots, then the fault state of the node IS is determined by a 
disjunction. The slot level is the most coarse-grained level for fault handling. 
At execution unit level, a slot can be still operational when its execution unit has 
some faults. But at least a single operation distinct from a NOP must be 
executable in that execution unit, and all other sub-components of that slot must 
be faultless. For this reason, the operational state of the node EU in figure 2-4 
(only shown for slot 2) is determined by a disjunction of the operational states of 
the operators in that execution unit. The fault state of the processor at that 
granularity level is characterized by the fault state functions fsSlot and fsEU. Both 
functions are needed, because a slot k may be operational, i.e., fsSlot(k) = 1, 
although there is an operator t in EU k, which is faulty, i.e., fsEU(k,t) = 0. 
Furthermore, a slot may be faulty, although all operators of the corresponding 
execution unit are faultless. Such a situation occurs for example, if a read port in 
that slot is faulty. 
At read port-level, a slot is operational as long as some data from the register file 
can be provided to the execution unit by at least a single read port. However, at 
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read port level, the bypass must be faultless. For this reason, the operational state 
of the node data input (DI) is determined by a conjunction, while the operational 
state of the nodes RP, LRP, and RRP is determined by a disjunction. The fault 
state of the read ports is given by the fault state function fsRP. 
At bypass-level also the bypasses are allowed to have faults. A slot is operational 
as long as some data can be provided to its execution unit; either from the register 
file or from other slots via bypasses. For example, a slot is considered as 
operational, even when both read ports and a single bypass of that slot are not 
operational. Then, at least a single operand for the execution unit can be provided. 
However, this may imply that operations with two operands cannot be executed in 
that slot. These operations must be specified as faulty by the fault state function 
fsEU. 
The register-level additionally allows for tolerating faults in the registers of the 
register file. By this, the register file is operational as long as there is some 
operational register. Registers are considered as faulty, either because writing into 
them is not possible or the stored information is changed due to fault in the 
register. Please note that a fault in a register is equivalent to faults in all read 
ports when reading this register: 
 ( ) 0 : (2 , ) 0 (2 1, ) 0fsRF r k SLOTS fsRP k r fsRP k r           
The proposed granularity levels in table 2-1 are listed from coarse-grained to fine-
grained. They are used throughout this thesis for specifying the granularity-level 
for fault handling by means of self-repair. The finer-grained the level, the smaller 
are the components that are allowed to be non-operational. As a consequence, a 
fault handling method for finer-grained levels allows for more components to be 
faulty without losing the functionality of the processor.  
2.2.2 Programming and Simulation Model of the VARP Processor 
Programming of the VARP processor is supported by a configurable assembler and 
an experimental compiler. In this thesis only the assembler has been used. 
Exploring the available instruction level parallelism of a program is the task of the 
compiler or the assembler programmer. Thus, already the assembler code is 
parallelized code that is just a more readable representation of the binary encoding 
of an instruction that is shown in figure 2-2. Formally each instruction w is a total 
function  
 :w SLOTS OPS  
that maps each slot to an operation from the set OPS. This mapping is also called 
binding, because each operation is bound to a particular slot by instruction w. The 
set OPS is the set of all VARP-operations, and is given by 
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      :OPS                   . 
This reflects the fact that each operation has a particular type t   and at most 
three other arguments, which are natural numbers. The type t is also denoted as 
opcode. For each operation type t there must be an operator of the same type in 
each execution unit of the VARP processor. Given an operation m  OPS, the 
function type(m) returns the type of m. The meaning of an argument of an 
operation m depends on the type of m. An argument x may be a register number 
or an immediate value. If x is a register, then x  REGS must hold. The notation 
rx is used to indicate that the argument x is a register. If x is an immediate value, 
then 0 ≤ m < 216 must hold. For example (add, 4, 5, 6)  OPS is a legal operation, 
representing an add-operation with source registers r4, r5 and destination register 
r6. For convenience this operation is also written as add r4, r5, r6. An instruction 
w for the VARP processor is composed of four operations. For convenience this can 
be also written as w = (a, b, c, d), which means that w(0) = a, w(1) = b, w(2) = c, 
and w(3) = d. In order to denote that an instruction w contains a particular 
operation a, the notation a  w is used, meaning there exists an i  SLOTS, such 
that w(i) = a.  
A program p for the VARP processor is now considered as a sequence of 
instructions, where p(i) denotes the i-th instruction in this sequence, with i  . A 
basic block is defined as follows: 
Definition 2-2 (Basic Block): 
Let p be a program. A basic block b in p is a sequence of instructions of maximal 
length, such that the only instruction of this sequence that is the target of a 
branch operation is b(0), and the only instruction that may contain a branch 
operation is the last instruction in b. 
In order to fully utilize the available parallelism of a VLIW processor sophisticated 
scheduling techniques are employed by compilers [59, 84, 111, 113]. These 
techniques are based on global code motion; i.e., operations are moved across basic 
block boundaries. For example, trace scheduling uses information about frequently 
used paths in the program in order to constitute traces from the basic blocks along 
these paths. During scheduling, a trace is treated similar to a simple basic block, 
but it may contain branch operations for leaving the trace from the middle. 
However, the instruction sequence obtained by trace scheduling or other 
scheduling techniques can be separated into ordinary basic blocks according to 
definition 2-2. These basic blocks constitute the base for some scheduling 
techniques used during the software-based self-repair. I.e., basic block information 
is retrieved either from the assembler code or from the binary code and is 
independent from the scheduling algorithm used by the compiler. 
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Simulating a piece of binary code is done either by using an instruction set 
simulator – then the simulation is instruction accurate – or by running the 
assembler program using a cycle accurate VHDL model of the VARP processor. In 
both cases, the model of the program memory is initialized with the binary code 
for simulation; see figure 2-5.  
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Figure 2-5: Tool chain and simulation environments for the VARP processor. 
The VHDL model of the VARP processor is synthesizable. Synthesis results are 
reported in the subsequent section. 
2.2.3 Reliability of the non-Fault Tolerant VARP Processor 
The VHDL processor model has been synthesized using the Cadence RTL 
Compiler and the 45 nm NangateOpenCellLibrary12 in order to obtain the cell area 
of each component of the VARP processor. Table 2-3 shows in a hierarchical 
manner the cell area and the number of instances of each component.  
Component 
Processor 
 
Slot 
Control 
Logic 
Register File 
 
Pipeline Registers 
Read Port Bypass EU  Register 
 FE DE WB 
Instances of components 1 4 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 64 
Cell area per component 28811 4748 791 199 446 146 1153 240 1171 539 9280 145 
Cell area relative to the 
processor area 100% 16,48% 2,75% 0,7% 1,5% 0,5% 4,00% 0,83% 4,07% 1,87% 32,20% 0,50% 
Table 2-3: Cell area of various components of the 16-bit VARP processor in µm². 
12 http://www.nangate.com/ [last access: 14/01/20] 
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The full VARP processor requires a cell area of 28811 µm², which is the sum of the 
cell area of four slots, the register file, and the control logic. It can be noticed that 
the control logic (Ctrl) is very small (less than 2%) compared with the remaining 
data path of the processor. The size of a single slot is the sum of the sizes of two 
read ports, two bypasses, a single execution unit, and the pipeline registers. The 
size of the register file is the size of 64 registers, including the logic for writing 
these registers, but without read ports. Table 2-3 also shows in the last row the 
size of each single component in relation to the full processor area. 
Based on these figures, the reliability of the non-fault tolerant VARP processor is 
computed, assuming a constant failure rate l for a single cell area. Because all cells 
must be faultless in the non-fault tolerant VARP processor, the processor can be 
considered as a serial composition of all of its cell areas, yielding the reliability 
function 
  28811 28811( ) i i
i
t t
NFT
R t e e        (2-1) 
that is plotted in figure 2-6 for various failure rates li. In order to make the time 
scale of the reliability diagram meaningful, suppose that the failure rates were 
obtained by an accelerated life time test that was performed for 50.000.000 cells, 
each of them occupying a cell area of 1 µm². Furthermore, the accelerated 
simulation corresponds to 87.000 operational hours of the gates. I.e., a single time 
unit of the time axis in figure 2-6 represents 87.000 hours, which are approximately 
ten years. Then, for example, an observed constant failure rate of l1 = 5  10-7 
means that running 50.000.000 cells for ten years, yields 50.000.000  l1 = 25 
faulty cells after ten years. Using this failure rate for a single cell area, the 
probability that a VARP processor is running after ten years is approximately 
0.985. For RNFT4 with l4 = 1  10-5, this probability is only 0.75. A similar 
reliability function Rreal is obtained by using the parameters proposed in [176], 
where a failure rate of 4  10-6 for a processor is assumed using a time unit of one 
hour, which yields a MTTF of approximately 30 years. This shows that the used 
failure rates l1 to l4 can be considered as somewhat realistic. 
66 
Chapter 2 
 
Figure 2-6: Plot of the reliability functions of the VARP processor for various failure rates, whereby t = 1 represents 10 
years.  
2.3 Hardware-based Rebinding in the VARP Processor 
Now a simple hardware extension for the VARP processor is presented that allows 
for the reconfiguration of the VARP processor in the presence of single or multiple 
permanent faults in its slots. It is assumed that the fault state of the VLIW core is 
given at execution unit level by the fault state functions fsEU and fsSlot. Please 
recall that fsEU(k,t) = 1 means that operation of type t can be executed in slot k. 
The problem of detecting and locating permanent faults is discussed later in 
chapter 5.  
2.3.1 The Rebinding Logic 
The reconfiguration is based on the dynamic rebinding of operations to other slots 
– similar to the work of Chen in [43], where operations are dynamically scheduled 
into other slots. However, in contrast to the work of Chen, the rebinding of 
operations is performed by a simple rebinding logic that is added into the decode-
stage of the VARP processor at the output of the fetch registers (see figure 2-7). 
First concepts for this rebinding logic were developed and implemented in [123]. 
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Figure 2-7: VARP-Core with rebinding logic. 
Basically the rebinding logic is a multiplexer network, which is shown in more 
detail in figure 2-8. It can be considered as a simple dispatcher that can map the 
content of each fetch register or a NOP into any slot. Moreover, the fault state of 
the processor and the opcode, which is stored in each fetch register, are accessible 
for the rebinding control logic. The fault state of a slot is provided by a fault state 
register fsrslot. Let fsr(i) denote the i-th bit of a fault state register fsr, then 
fsrslot(k) = fsSlot(k) for all k  SLOTS. In a similar way for each k  SLOTS there 
is a fault state register fsreuk for which holds: fsEU(k,ti) = fsreuk(i), where 
 - {NOP} = {t0,…,tm} is the set of operation types supported by each execution 
unit. If the core is not faulty, then each multiplexer i in the rebinding logic selects 
the input from fetch register i. I.e., each operation is executed in that slot to which 
it was fetched, and all operations of an instruction are executed in parallel. No 
delay occurs during the execution. 
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Figure 2-8: Details of the rebinding logic. 
If k ≥ 1 operations of the current instruction in the fetch registers cannot be 
executed in their originally assigned slot, then the rebinding control stalls the 
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fetching of a new instruction for k rebinding cycles. The current instruction is 
maintained in the fetch register and the multiplexer network is controlled in such a 
way that the non-executable operations are executed sequentially during the k 
rebinding cycles. Each of them is allocated dynamically to a slot that can execute 
this operation and it is replaced in the fetch register with a NOP. By this 
rebinding scheme the rebinding logic is kept simple, because it does not parallelize 
operations dynamically. Figure 2-9 illustrates the situation that two operations 
cannot be executed in the slot to which they were fetched. Only the pipeline 
registers of the VARP processor are sketched in figure 2-9. Suppose the four fetch 
registers contain the operations a, b, c and d. Furthermore, by the fault state 
functions it is determined that operation a cannot be executed in slot 0 and 
operation c cannot be executed in slot 2. In figure 2-9 (a) the first rebinding cycle 
is shown. Fetching of a new instruction is stalled, operation a is allocated to slot 1, 
and a is replaced in the fetch register with a NOP. 
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Figure 2-9: Example for fault handling by using the rebinding logic. (a) First rebinding cycle for operation a. (b) Second 
rebinding cycle for operation c. (c) Release cycle. (d) Normal operation continuous. 
The values of the pipeline registers after the first rebinding cycle are shown in 
figure 2-9 (b). The second rebinding cycle is used for rebinding operation c. The 
result of the second rebinding cycle is shown in figure 2-9 (c). Each rebinding cycle 
inserts dynamically a new instruction into the decode stage. Each of these 
instructions contains exactly one of the non-executable operations from the fetch 
register, whereby this operation o has been allocated to a slot k with 
fsEU(k,type(o)) = 1 and fsSlot(k) = 1. Rebinding only a single operation per clock 
cycle simplifies the design of the rebinding control. After rebinding both operations 
the release cycle follows in figure 2-9 (c). During the release cycle the remaining 
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operations of the stalled instruction are executed. These operations can be 
executed in parallel, because they are executed in their originally assigned slots. 
Furthermore, during the release cycle the next instruction is fetched. Figure 2-9 
(d) shows the values of the pipeline registers after finishing the release cycle. 
Please note that the release cycle may only execute NOPs. This is always the case, 
when all non-NOP operations of an instruction must be bounded to other slots.  
2.3.2 Correctness of the Approach 
Now it is shown that the rebinding cycles do not change the meaning of the 
executed program. For this reason this section will go into some details that were 
not mentioned above, and it will clarify some restrictions that must be respected in 
order to maintain the meaning of the program. Basically the rebinding logic may 
change the schedule of the program by executing operations sequentially that were 
scheduled in parallel. When changing the schedule, two types of dependencies in a 
program must be respected in order to maintain the meaning of the program [10]: 
• Data dependencies and 
• Control flow dependencies. 
In the following it is shown that the sequential execution during rebinding cycles 
does not violate dependencies in the program. 
2.3.2.1 Control Flow Dependencies 
Control flow dependencies arise from conditional branches in the program. An 
instruction a is control flow dependent on a conditional branch in instruction b, if 
the execution of a depends on whether b takes the branch or not [10]. In 
particular, when the processor executes a branch in instruction b, the instruction a 
that follows instruction b must not be executed when the branch is taken, except b 
branches to a. In order to show that all control flow dependencies are respected, it 
is shown that the sequence of executed instructions is not affected by rebinding 
cycles. There are two types of control flow related operations in the instruction set 
of the processor: 
1. Operations that write a value into the program counter (PC). These are 
branch operations that branch to a particular target address. They will be 
referred to as Write PC-operations (WPC-operations). 
2. Operations that read the value of the PC. These operations do not 
immediately affect the control flow, but the value may be used by other 
operations for branching, e.g. for returning from a function call. These 
operations will be referred to as Read PC-operations (RPC-operations).  
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First, consider the situation that there is no control flow related operation in the 
pipeline or a branch operation that does not take the branch. Then a non-
executable instruction in the fetch register will cause the rebinding logic to stall 
incrementing the PC until the release cycle is performed. Thus, the sequential 
fetching of the original instruction sequence is maintained. 
Second, consider the situation that a rebinding cycle is performed, when a RPC-
operation is in the pipeline. The behavior of the RPC-operation is not affected by 
rebinding cycles, because for each fetched instruction the corresponding value of 
the PC is buffered in the fetch register, too. When the instruction is moved to the 
decode register, then the buffered PC value is moved into the decode register, too, 
such that it can be used in the execution stage from the RPC-operation. Thus, the 
RPC-operation uses the same value as in the original instruction sequence. 
Finally, consider the situation that a WPC-operation enters the pipeline. The 
normal execution of a WPC-operation is shown in the upper part of figure 2-10. A 
WPC-operation generates the new address a during execution stage (clock cycle t). 
This value is written to the PC at the end of the execution stage, such that the 
PC is equal to the new address a in clock cycle t+1. Moreover the reset signals for 
the fetch- and decode registers are generated in clock cycle t, such that the pipeline 
registers will have the values shown for clock cycle t+1 in the upper part of figure 
2-10.  
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Figure 2-10: Buffering of the new PC address. 
Both actions, generating reset signals and writing into the PC, must be delayed, 
when a WPC-operation is executed during a rebinding cycle. First consider the 
situation shown in the middle of figure 2-10, where a non-executable instruction w 
has been fetched (sketched by the shaded operation). This is the same situation as 
illustrated in figure 2-9 (a). Moreover, a WPC-operation from a preceding 
instruction w' is in the decode register. The WPC-operation enters the execution 
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stage, when the first rebinding cycle is performed for w during clock cycle t. Such a 
situation is not critical, because the WPC-operation in w' will reset the pipeline in 
the case that the branch is taken, and the non-executable instruction w has no 
effect. Thus, updating the PC and resetting the pipeline must be permitted for the 
first rebinding cycle. 
Now consider the situation that the WPC-operation belongs to the non-executable 
instruction w in the fetch register. Two sub-cases exist. First, the WPC-operation 
is assigned to another slot during a rebinding cycle. Second, the WPC-operation 
remains in the fetch register until the release cycle is performed. The latter case is 
not critical, because instruction w will enter the execution stage after the release 
cycle. Then the branch operation is executed just like during normal execution and 
no further action is required. The first case is shown in the lower part of figure 
2-10. The branch target address and the reset signal for the pipeline registers must 
be buffered when the WPC-operation enters the execution stage during a release or 
rebinding cycle. The buffered PC value and the reset signals are send to their 
designated receivers, one clock cycle after the release cycle. This is the point in 
time, when the PC would have been updated during normal execution of w. Please 
note that the instruction fetched in clock cycle t+2 is dropped from the fetch 
register due to the reset. Hence it does not matter whether this instruction is an 
executable one or not.  
It can be summarized that WPC-operations executed during the first rebinding 
cycle are executed in the regular way. Generated values/signals of a WPC-
operation that is executed during a rebinding cycle, except the first one, or during 
a release cycle are buffered. The first clock cycle after the release cycle is used for 
sending the buffered values/signals to their designated receivers. 
2.3.2.2 Data Dependencies 
Data dependencies arise from the access of two operations a and b to the same 
data location, where at least one of both operations must be a write-operation. 
Moreover, a and b must belong to distinct instructions. Data dependencies can be 
distinguished into three categories: 
• True-dependency: b depends on a, if a writes to a location that is read by b. 
• Anti-dependency: b depends on a, if a reads from a location that is written 
by b. 
• Output-dependency: b depends on a, if a writes to a location that is written 
by b, too. 
From the considerations in the previous section follows that the execution order of 
all instructions is maintained even when rebinding cycles are created. As a 
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consequence, data dependencies between different instructions will be maintained, 
too. This can be easily understood by looking at operation a in figure 2-11 (a). 
Each dependency from operation a to an operation in a successive instruction is 
maintained, because operation a and all other operations from cycle 1 are executed 
before an operation from a successive instruction is executed, no matter whether 
rebinding-cycles are introduced or not. 
However, due to the rebinding cycles, new dependencies between the operations of 
a non-executable instruction may occur that were not present before, because the 
operations are executed in a sequential order. This situation is shown in figure 2-11 
(b). There a feasible execution order for the operations from cycle 2 in figure 2-11 
(a) is shown. Operation add r3,r6,r7 is executed after operation add r1,r2,r3. This 
creates a new true-dependency between both operations, and the operation 
add r3,r6,r7 would use a wrong value, because it reads the value stored by 
operation add r1,r2,r3 in register r3. Figure 2-11 (c) shows another execution order 
of the operations from cycle 2 that generates a new anti-dependency. However, this 
anti-dependency is not critical, because the correct value is read from register r3 
before r3 is redefined. Please note that new output dependencies will not occur. If 
a new output dependency would occur, then two operations within the same 
instruction must define the same destination register, which is not allowed. 
Add r1,r2,r3 NOP Add r3,r6,r7 NOP
a b c d
e f g h
cycle 1
cycle 2
cycle 3
 
(a) 
Add r1,r2,r3
Add r3,r6,r7 NOP
a b
e f g h
cycle 1
rebinding cycle
cycle 4
release cycle
NOP NOP NOP
NOPNOP
c d
True-Dependency
 
(b) 
Add r1,r2,r3
Add r3,r6,r7
NOP
a b
e f g h
cycle 1
rebinding cycle
cycle 4
release cycle
NOP NOP NOP
NOPNOP
c d
Anti-Dependency
 
(c) 
Figure 2-11: (a) Original instruction sequence. (b) Instruction sequence from (a) with rebinding cycles generating a new 
true-dependency. (c) Instruction sequence from (a) with rebinding cycles generating a new anti-dependency. 
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No hardware extension is included in the VARP processor for handling the 
situation shown in figure 2-11. Rather this problem is solved at software-level by 
following the paradigm of VLIW processors, where complex administrative tasks 
are shifted to the compiler. In order to avoid the occurrence of new true- and anti-
dependencies, each instruction in the program must have the no-input-is-output 
property: 
Definition 2-3 (no-input-is-output property): 
An instruction w has the no-input-is-output property, if and only if for each pair 
u, w of operations with u  w, v  w and u  v holds: the destination operand of 
u is distinct from all source operands of v. 
I.e., it is not allowed for an operation to write a register that is read by another 
operation within the same instruction13. This property must be guaranteed by the 
compiler or assembler programmer when generating the schedule for the user 
application. At least it should be stated that the sequential execution of operations 
due to rebinding cycles may cause values to be read from the register file instead 
of from the bypass. However, this is not a problem, because the source of an 
operand is determined dynamically.  
2.3.2.3 Memory and Multi-Cycle Operations 
Considering only dependencies is not fully sufficient, because the sequential 
execution of operations during rebinding cycles may change the timing of the 
communication of the core with its environment. In the VARP processor this may 
affect memory operations. Please recall that memory operations were divided into 
two consecutive single cycle operations (st0, st1 and ld0, ld1). In both cases the 
rebinding cycles may change the timing during the execution of two single cycle 
operations. For example, the ld1 operation may not be executed one clock cycle 
after the execution of the ld0 operation. For this reason the single cycle 
implementations of all multi cycle operations of the processor core must be 
designed in such a way that the time between two operations, which are expected 
to be executed consecutively, can be prolonged without changing the behavior of 
the operations. For the memory interface of the VARP processor this is 
guaranteed in the following way: 
• The load-operation is split into the ld0- and ld1-operation. The ld0-operation 
moves a memory address into the MAR-register during the execution stage. 
The memory guarantees that the expected value can be read from the 
memory output in the next clock cycle. However, the value is provided as 
13 Memory-operations must not be considered, because reading and writing to the same memory 
location by a single instruction is not possible. 
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long as the address in the MAR does not change. This means that the 
expected value can be also read some clock cycles later. 
• The store-operation is split into the st0- and st1-operation. The st0-operation 
moves the address and data value into the MAR- and MBR-register, 
respectively, and enables the write signal for the memory. The st1-operation 
disables the write-signal. If both operations are not executed consecutively, 
the behavior does not change, except that the memory stores the expected 
value multiple times at the same memory address.  
2.4 Results 
The presented hardware-based reconfiguration performs an on-line rebinding of 
operations. But the method is only dedicated for handling permanent faults that 
were detected off-line, because no techniques for concurrent error detection and 
error handling are included, as it has been done for example in the work of Chen 
et al. [43]. Multiple permanent faults can be handled either at slot level or 
execution unit level. At execution unit level, the correct execution can be 
guaranteed as long as each operation type can be executed at least in one slot, 
which must not be the same slot for all operations. By this finer-grained fault 
handling, the on-line rebinding provides more flexibility than an off-line 
reconfiguration scheme, as it was proposed for example from Koal et al. in [92], 
where all operations of a defect slot will be allocated to the same spare slot. But 
this flexibility comes at the cost of performance degradation. The impact of the 
hardware-based rebinding on the runtime and on the reliability of the VARP 
processor is discussed in the following two sub-sections. 
2.4.1 Performance Degradation  
A particular fault state of the VARP processor is given by the fault state functions 
fsSlot and fsEU. In order to evaluate the impact of various fault states on the 
runtime of various user applications, fault states that affect the same number of 
slots are grouped into a single fault state class. 
Definition 2-4 (k-slot-fault): 
A k-slot-fault is a set of fault states, where exactly k slots, 0 ≤ k ≤ |SLOTS|, are 
faulty, i.e., |{i | i  SLOTS and fsSlot(i) = 0}| = k. 
For example, consider a 1-slot-fault. This fault state class represents four different 
fault states of the VARP processor, where each fault state corresponds to exactly 
one faulty slot. Similar, a k-operator-fault is defined.  
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Definition 2-5 (k-operator-fault): 
A k-operator-fault is a set of fault states, where exactly k   operators are 
faulty, i.e., |{(i,t) | i  SLOTS and t   and fsEU(i,t) = 0}| = k, and the 
remaining components of the slots are faultless. 
Please note that fault states belonging to the same k-operator-fault class may 
affect operators in the same execution unit as well as in different execution units.  
If a k-slot-fault, with 0 ≤ k < |SLOTS|, is handled at slot level, then the proposed 
hardware-based rebinding may cause a worst case runtime of the application of up 
to 
 ( ) ( 1) 100%
slot
wcrt k k    (2-2) 
This worst case only occurs, when in each instruction k operations must be 
allocated to another slot. Then k rebinding cycles and a single release cycle are 
needed for each fetched instruction, whereby the release cycle corresponds to the 
normal execution of the instruction.  
When k-operator-faults, are handled at execution unit level, then the worst case 
runtime  
 
( 1) 100%,  if 
( )
( 1) 100%,  otherwiseeu
k k SLOTS
wcrt k
SLOTS
      
 (2-3) 
is obtained. If k operators in distinct execution units are faulty, then at most k 
operations per instruction must be rebound, which requires k rebinding cycles plus 
a single release cycle. The worst case runtime is bounded by the number of slots, 
because at most |SLOTS| operations per instruction can be rebound to another 
slot, which requires |SLOTS| rebinding cycles plus a release cycle that will only 
execute a NOP-instruction.  
For real applications both worst-case scenarios will rarely occur, because the 
runtime overhead strongly depends on the schedule of the application. In table 2-4 
a brief charachterization of various benchmark applications is given. Most of them 
are single loop kernels of various filter algorithms (auto regression filter, discrete 
cosine transformation, fast fourier transformation, elliptic wave filter) taken from 
[101]. The operations of each benchmark program were classified into mul-, add- 
and sub-operations. Moreover, the number of operations in each benchmark 
program as well as the critical path lengths are shown. In [157] for each of these 
benchmark programs a schedule was generated that can be executed efficiently on 
the non-fault tolerant VARP processor. I.e., the lengths of these schedules were 
optimized, such that the average number of operations per instruction is high. By 
the average number of operations per instruction it can be noticed that a large 
amount of instructions contain four operations. It is obvious that such schedules 
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with many operations executed in parallel will cause a higher runtime overhead 
after rebinding than schedules with a lower average number of operations per 
instruction, as they can be found in more control flow dominated parts of an 
application. 
Name add sub mul 
total 
operations 
critical path 
length 
schedule 
length 
Average number of operations 
per instruction 
ARF 12 0 16 28 8 8 3.5 
DCT-DIF 17 12 12 41 7 11 3.7 
DCT-DIT 24 12 12 48 7 14 3.4 
DCT-LEE 17 12 20 49 9 14 3.5 
EWF 26 0 8 34 14 14 2,4 
FFT 8 17 13 38 4 10 3.8 
SWIM1 12 8 6 26 4 8 3.5 
SWIM2 6 3 6 15 5 5 3.0 
Table 2-4: Characterization of benchmark programs used for performance evaluation. 
Different fault states of the VARP processor usually cause different runtime 
overheads for the same benchmark. Because each k-slot-fault and each k-operator-
fault represents various fault states, table 2-5 reports the best-case and worst-case 
runtime overhead obtained for all the fault states belonging to a particular k-slot-
fault respectively k-operator-fault.  
 k-slot-fault k-operator-fault 
 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=1 k=2 k=3 
 best worst best worst best worst best worst best worst best worst 
ARF 163% 200% 250% 300% 350% 388% 100% 163% 125% 225% 163% 288% 
DIF 182% 200% 273% 300% 373% 391% 100% 182% 100% 245% 100% 300% 
FFT 190% 200% 280% 300% 380% 390% 100% 170% 100% 240% 100% 300% 
EWF 129% 193% 171% 271% 250% 314% 100% 193% 100% 250% 107% 286% 
DIT 157% 200% 243% 300% 343% 386% 100% 164% 100% 214% 107% 257% 
LEE 179% 200% 257% 293% 350% 371% 100% 179% 100% 257% 100% 300% 
Average: 167% 199% 246% 294% 341% 373% 100% 175% 104% 239% 113% 289% 
Table 2-5: Best-case and worst-case runtimes for the benchmark programs from table 2-4. 
In most cases the worst-case runtime of the presented benchmark programs for k-
slot-faults is close to the theoretical worst-case wcrtslot(k). This is due to the fact 
that the benchmarks provide a high amount of instruction level parallelism, such 
that most slots have to execute an operation in each clock cycle. For the same 
reason, also for 1-operator-faults the worst-case runtimes in table 2-5 are close to 
the theoretical worst case in equation (2-3), because the schedules of these 
benchmarks have at least one slot that executes only operations of a single type. 
When the corresponding operator in that slot is faulty, then all of these operations 
must be allocated to another slot. It can be noticed that for k > 1 the worst-case 
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runtime for k-operator-faults will not adhere the theoretical worst-case so closely, 
because in most other slots a mix of at least two operation types is available.  
As a consequence, the worst-case runtime can be reduced at the cost of increasing 
the best-case runtime, when the original schedule contains for all slots a similar 
operation mix. I.e., for each operation type (including the NOP) the numbers of 
operations of that type in each slot should be almost equal. Then for each k-slot-
fault and each k-operator-fault the worst-case and best-case will be almost equal. 
This, for example, allows for a better prediction of the performance degradation of 
real time applications in the presence of faults. 
2.4.2 Reliability Analysis 
The proposed hardware-based rebinding is able to handle various combinations of 
multiple faults. When faults are handled at execution unit level, then the system 
remains operational for a given application as long as each operation of the 
application can be executed at least in one slot. This fact makes the reliability 
estimation very complex, because the number of operational system states becomes 
very large. When faults are handled at slot level, then the system is operational as 
long as there is at least a single faultless slot. The reliability function for the latter 
case also provides a lower bound for the reliability of the system, when faults are 
handled at execution unit level.  
In order to determine the reliability function for the case that faults are handled at 
slot level, the components of the VARP processor are partitioned into non-fault 
tolerant components and fault tolerant components. When a non-fault tolerant 
component fails, then the whole processor fails. When a fault-tolerant component 
fails, then the system can continuous to provide its service, as long as the 
functionality of the failed component can be replaced by another component. The 
partitioning is shown in table 2-6 together with the cell area of each component.  
Component 
Fault Tolerant VARP processor with hardware-based rebinding 
 
Fault Tolerant Part of a Slot 
Fetch 
Reg 
Control 
Logic 
Rebinding 
Logic 
Register File 
 
Pipeline Registers Read 
Port 
Bypass EU  Reg 
 DE WB 
Instances of components 1 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 4 1 1 1 64 
Cell area per component 30281 4549 592 446 146 1153 240 1171 199 539 1470 9280 145 
Reliability function - 
Rslot(t) 
= 
e-4549lt 
- - - - - - 
Rfr(t) 
= 
e-199lt 
Rctrl(t)
= 
e-539lt 
Rrl(t) 
= 
e-1470lt 
Rrf(t) 
= 
e-9280lt 
- 
Table 2-6: Cell area in µm² and reliability function for each component of the fault tolerant VARP processor with 
hardware-based rebinding, assuming a constant failure rate l. 
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The fault tolerant components are shaded gray. The table also shows the synthesis 
results for the rebinding logic, which makes up a portion of 4.8% of the full 
processor area. Assuming a constant failure rate l for a single cell area, each single 
component can be considered as a serial system of all its cells, leading to the 
reliability functions shown in table 2-6 for these components. 
The operational dependencies between the fault tolerant components and the non-
fault tolerant components of the VARP processor are modeled by the RBD in 
figure 2-12. 
Control
Logic
Register 
File
Slot 0
Slot 1
Slot 2
Slot 3
Fetch 
Register
Rebinding 
Logic
 
Figure 2-12: RBD for modeling the operational dependencies between components of the fault tolerant VARP processor. 
The non-fault tolerant components from table 2-6 are composed into a serial 
system. The four slots form a parallel system, which means that at least one of 
them has to work properly. This yields the following reliability function Rhwr(t) for 
the fault tolerant VARP processor: 
 
4
12085 4549 4
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 (1 ( )) )
(1 (1 ) )
hwr ctrl rf fr rl slot
t t
R t R t R t R t R t R t
e e    
      
   
. (2-4) 
A plot of this reliability function for l = 1  10-5 is shown in figure 2-13. There, it 
can be compared with the reliability functions plotted in figure 2-6 for the non-
fault tolerant VARP processor. Comparing Rhwr with RNFT4 – both are plotted for 
the same failure rates l = l4 – shows that the reliability of the fault tolerant 
VARP processor is improved. The reliability improvement factor RIF ranges in the 
plotted time interval from 2.3 to 2.0. Moreover, the fault tolerant system has a 
better reliability than the non-fault tolerant VARP processor with a failure rate of 
l3 = 5  10-6. This means, by applying hardware-based rebinding for fault handling 
at slot level, a more than two times bigger failure rate l is acceptable to achieve 
the same reliability as in a system without hardware-based rebinding.  
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Figure 2-13: Reliability plots from figure 2-6 and of the fault tolerant core with hardware rebinding (Rhwr). 
Another interesting observation can be made by comparing the reliability function 
Rhwr1(t) 
   30281 12085 4549 3 45491( ) 4 1t t t thwrR t e e e e                  
with the reliability function Rhwr(t). Rhwr1 is the reliability function for a fault 
tolerant VARP processor that can tolerate only 1-slot-faults. I.e., the processor is 
considered as operational as long as at most one slot is faulty. Both functions are 
plotted in figure 2-14. 
 
Figure 2-14: Reliability plot for fault handling at slot level when 3 slots are allowed to fail (Rhwr), 1 slot is allowed to fail 
(Rhwr1) and execution unit level (RhwrEU). 
The graphs of both function lie very close together, which means that the 
reliability of a VARP processor that can handle faults in up to 3 different slots is 
not much higher than the reliability of a VARP processor that can handle faults 
only in a single slot. In particular, when comparing Rhwr and Rhwr1 the RIF ranges 
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for the plotted time interval between 1.0004 and 1.15. However, especially for 
those times, when Rhwr(t) > 0.99 and Rhwr1(t) > 0.99, the RIF is below 1.009. The 
reason for this situation is that the probability of having two or three faulty slots 
by such a low failure rate is very low. Thus, for low failure rates in many 
situations handling of faults in a single slot may be sufficient. 
Furthermore, in figure 2-14 the reliability function for fault handling at execution 
unit level is plotted (RhwrEU). This graph was determined in a numerical way by 
using the general combinatorial model presented in section 1.1.4.1. For the 
evaluation it was assumed that the execution units of the VARP processor are 
composed of two operators p and q of almost equal size. The VARP processor was 
considered as operational as long as at least one functioning operator p and one 
functioning operator q is available. Each of these operators must be in a slot where 
the remaining components (read ports, pipeline register, etc.) are functioning, but 
both operators can be in different slots. A C-program was used for computing all 
functioning system states and their probability of occurrence. The result is that 
the reliability function RhwrEU is almost equal to the reliability function Rhwr. I.e., 
the reliability improvement achievable by fault handling at execution unit level is 
almost the same as the reliability improvement achievable with fault handling at 
slot level.  
However, handling of faults in multiple components (e.g. multiple slots) becomes 
essential for higher failure rates. For a high failure rate, the probability increases 
that a single processor is affected by multiple faults. But, handling of multiple 
faults will be not effective, if the size of the non-fault tolerant components in the 
system is too big. In such a situation the probability is very high that one of the 
multiple faults affects one of the non-fault tolerant components. Hence, the system 
fails. For this reason figure 2-15 shows the reliability plot for a VARP-like system, 
in which only 2% of the processors cell area – which is approximately the size of 
the control logic – is assumed to be non-fault tolerant. For the remaining area of 
the processor it is assumed that it is organized in four slots that can replace each 
other until at least a single slot is functioning. The reliability is plotted for a 
failure rate of l = 1  10-3, which is 100 time larger than the failure rate used for 
the plots in figure 2-14. Even higher failure rates are predicted, for example, in 
[49]. It can be noticed that fault handling in single slots (Rhwr1) increases the 
reliability very much compared with a non-fault tolerant system (RNFT). Moreover, 
fault handling in up to three slots is for such a high failure rate much more 
beneficial than fault handling in a single slot only. This can be observed by 
comparing the reliability plot Rhwr (up to three slots are allowed to fail) with Rhwr1 
(only a single slot is allowed to fail). However, even for high failure rates a finer 
grained fault handling at execution unit level will not further improve the 
reliability. This can be observed by comparing the reliability plot Rhwr (faults are 
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handled at slot level) with RhwrEU (faults are handled at execution unit level). Both 
graphs are almost equal. 
 
Figure 2-15: Reliability plots for very high failure rates in a VARP-like processor where only 2% of the processor area 
belongs to non-fault tolerant components. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter the non-fault tolerant VARP processor was introduced, which is 
used throughout this thesis for the demonstration of the proposed self-repair 
techniques. A simple model of that processor, which characterizes its key features, 
was introduced together with various fault state functions that are used for 
specifying the fault states of the VARP processor at different granularity levels. 
Techniques from literature for hardware-based administration of hardware 
redundancy were reviewed. Some basic concepts of these approaches were used for 
making the non-fault tolerant VARP processor fault tolerant by introducing a 
rebinding logic in the decode stage of the pipeline. This allows for handling 
multiple permanent faults at slot level and execution unit level during the runtime 
of the application by allocating operations dynamically to other slots. Nevertheless 
the approach is an off-line approach, because no concurrent error detection and 
fault localization is provided by the rebinding hardware. I.e., permanent faults 
must be detected and localized off-line. An appropriate test method is presented in 
chapter 5.  
Synthesis results for the non-fault tolerant and the fault tolerant VARP processor 
were presented together with reliability plots for various failure rates. The 
reliability of the fault tolerant VARP processor is significantly improved in 
comparison with the non-fault tolerant VARP processor. However, it turned out 
that the reliability cannot be further improved significantly, neither by lowering 
the fault handling granularity from slot level to execution unit level, nor by 
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handling faults in multiple slots instead of handling them in a single slot only. This 
is due to the fact that the probability of having multiple faults in a processor is 
low, if the failure rate is low. But for high failure rates, fault handling in multiple 
slots will increase significantly the reliability of a VARP-like processor, compared 
with fault handling for a single slot only. However, this requires that the non-fault 
tolerant part of the processor is very small. By using hardware administrated 
hardware redundancy this cannot be guaranteed, because usually the 
administrative hardware components are error prone by themselves and belong to 
the non-fault tolerant part of the processor system. Even the proposed very simple 
rebinding logic consumes about 5% of the processor area. Moreover, the simple 
rebinding strategy increases the runtime overhead during the execution of the user 
application by almost 100% even for handling faults only in a single slot. The next 
chapter will show that with software-based methods both draw-backs, the 
additional hardware-overhead for administration logic and the runtime overhead, 
can be eliminated. 
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 Chapter 3  
Software-Based Self-Repair in a 
VARP Processor Environment 
This section presents software-based approaches for handling permanent faults in 
the data path of a VARP processor by means of dynamic hardware redundancy 
[158, 161, 162]. Thereby the redundant hardware, which is provided by the 
superscalar data path of the VARP processor, is administrated by software such 
that the amount of additional hardware for administrating the hardware 
redundancy is reduced. First, a coarse grained approach is introduced in section 
3.2 that works at slot- and operator-level. This approach does not need any 
hardware in the processor core itself for reconfiguring the data path. The 
reconfiguration is done in software by modifying the binary code of the user 
program in the program memory of the processor, such that the usage of faulty 
components in the data path is avoided during the execution of the user program. 
The modification of the program is carried out by a self-repair routine. It is shown 
that under particular conditions this self-repair routine can be executed by the 
faulty processor itself. The presented software-based solution in this section can be 
used to replace the hardware-based rebinding technique presented in chapter 2. In 
section 3.3 it is shown that the granularity level of the coarse grained approach 
can be refined without introducing too much complexity in the self-repair routine. 
Finally, the reliability improvement and performance degradation of the VARP 
processor implementing the software-based techniques is compared with the VARP 
processor that uses the hardware-based rebinding scheme from chapter 2. 
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3.1 Related Work 
This section reviews software-based techniques for administrating hardware 
redundancy in processors. As shown in figure 1-9, the administration can be 
implemented at firmware-level or above. It is obvious that in multi-core systems 
the scheduler of the operating system can be used for avoiding the usage of faulty 
processor cores. Such a strategy is easy to implement, but it works at a very 
coarse-grained level. I.e., a single fault in a component of the core prevents the 
usage of the core. Firmware-level solutions were proposed that allow for fault 
handling at a finer-grained level. In [35] a software-based virtualization layer 
between the operating system and the hardware of the OPENSparc multi-core 
processor with eight cores is proposed. This virtualization layer is notified by the 
decode stage of a core, if a component that is needed by the currently decoded 
instruction is faulty. Then the virtualization layer is responsible for allocating and 
executing this instruction to another core. A similar idea is proposed in [87]. There 
a virtual machine is used that emulates instructions, whose needed execution 
resources are defect. Emulation is done in software with the help of other 
functioning resources. For example, floating point operations can be emulated with 
the help of integer units. However, in both approaches the problem of executing 
the virtualization software is not discussed. A very similar idea of emulating 
operations for single core microprocessors, but at firmware-level, was proposed by 
Benso et al. in [19, 20]. There, microprocessors are considered, whose data path is 
controlled by microcode. The usage of faulty data path components, when 
executing a particular assembler operation, is avoided by using another microcode 
sequence. However, statically scheduled superscalar processors like a VLIW usually 
do not use microcode. Moreover, changing the microcode sequence for a single 
operation may also change the timing of that operation, which disturbs the lock 
step execution with the other operations executed in parallel.  
Not all abstraction layers shown in figure 1-9 must be available in an embedded 
system. For example, an operating system, a middleware layer or a firmware layer 
may be missing. Then hardware redundancy must be managed by the user 
application. Among others, this can be achieved by software implemented 
hardware fault tolerance (SIHFT), which is based on a duplication of code and 
data of the user application. The duplication can be done either at source code 
level or compiler-assisted. Furthermore, a correct control flow can be checked by 
introducing signatures for basic blocks, and checking whether or not the control 
flow enters a basic block from a legal control flow predecessor [9, 71, 109, 129]. In 
the work of Rebaudengo et al. code and data is duplicated at source code level 
[144]. This allows for the detection of temporary faults only, because duplicated 
operations may be executed by the same computational domain. Such an approach 
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must be classified as a kind of data- and time redundancy. However, when the 
duplication of operations is done by the compiler, as it is proposed by Bolchini et 
al. in [24] and other authors in [23, 82] for VLIW processors, then the compiler has 
control about the scheduling of operations, and the compiler can schedule the 
original operation and its duplicate into different slots. Then also permanent faults 
can be detected. However, SIHFT techniques, including the work of Bolchini, 
usually target for temporary faults only. Permanent faults are either not detected, 
because time redundancy is used as in the work of Rebaudengo, or permanent 
faults are detected, but the faulty component cannot be isolated from the system, 
as it is the case in the work of Bolchini. 
In order to perform fault isolation, active hardware redundancy must be used. 
Some early work regarding software administrated active hardware redundancy for 
superscalar data paths was published by Guerra et al. [74, 75, 76] and Karri et al. 
[88, 89]. The targeted processor model is an application specific programmable 
processor (ASPP), which is simply an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) 
that is partitioned into an application specific data path and a control path. The 
data path is tailored to a small set of applications by means of high level synthesis 
and has some similarities with the data path of a VLIW architecture. The data 
path of the ASPP provides parallelism at instruction level, and it is controlled by 
a statically scheduled program. For each application various fault tolerant 
schedules are generated during the development phase of the system. Each of them 
only utilizes a particular subset of the available data path components. Thereby 
permanent faults in the other data path components can be tolerated. If necessary, 
spare components are added to the data path, such that a priori specified set of 
faulty components can be tolerated. All pre-computed fault tolerant schedules 
must be stored in the program memory. Reconfiguration is done during the 
operational phase by selecting an appropriate schedule that does not use the 
currently faulty components of the ASPP. This approach is suitable for very small 
applications, and it becomes impractical for larger applications, because for many 
fault states of the processor, separate schedules are needed that become very long 
for large applications.  
The L/U-reconfiguration scheme presented in [34, 130] for a similar ASIC 
architecture overcomes the problem of computing all schedules in advance. Only a 
single schedule is generated for a superscalar data path. This schedule is adapted 
during the operational phase to particular fault states, using the scheme shown in 
figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1: Example of L/U-reconfiguration. 
The original schedule is generated in such a way that it can be partitioned into a 
lower and upper part, as shown in figure 3-1 (a) by the bold line. Operations in 
the same row are executed in parallel, and operations in the same column are 
executed by the same computational domain. A computational domain corresponds 
to a slot in the VLIW architecture. If one of the computational domains fails then 
the upper and lower part of the original schedule are re-arranged as shown in 
figure 3-1 (b). By this, the required number of computational domains is reduced 
by one. This allows for fault handling at slot level, while the former mentioned 
work of Karri and Guerra allows also for fault handling at execution unit level.  
A software administrated hardware redundancy scheme that is better suited for 
processor based systems that execute very large applications is presented by 
Meixner et al. in [118]. There a multi-processor system composed of simple RISC 
cores is considered, in which a master core is used for "detouring" a user 
application running on another core, when a fault is detected on that core. 
Detouring means that the user application is adapted in such a way that the usage 
of faulty components of the core is avoided. For this reason, the master core is 
running some kind of compiler that can compile the user application anew by 
taking into account the current fault state of the processor. Various detours are 
proposed. For example, some of them are based on redundancy available from bit-
level parallelism. By this, a 32-bit addition can be divided into two 16-bit 
additions, and both 16-bit additions are carried out on a faulty 32-bit adder by 
using either the functioning lower or upper part of the adder. Other detours are 
proposed for faults in the register file and for faults in the bypass. Compared with 
the L/U-reconfiguration scheme, the detouring approach allows for a finer grained 
reconfiguration, but at the expense of a much more complex administration. In 
contrast to the on-line approaches that use a virtualization layer at firmware- or 
operating system layer, the detouring of user applications must be done in off-line 
mode. Details about the complexity of the compiler application running on the 
master core are not provided. Moreover, the proposed detours do not explicitly 
take advantage of the properties of statically scheduled superscalar processor 
architectures. This is done for the first time in the work of Schölzel [161] in order 
to reduce the complexity of the compiler-like application. In [161] various 
adaptation schemes for a user application running on a VLIW core are presented. 
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However, instead of a compiler-like program, a very simple self-repair routine is 
used. This routine only implements some simple adaptation techniques for the user 
application that can be performed easily in the field by the VLIW processor itself. 
Thus, in contrast to the detouring-approach, the self-repair approach can be used 
for single core systems, too. In the subsequent section a version of the self-repair 
approach for coarse grained fault handling is described in more detail. 
Furthermore, as already published in [162], it is shown that this granularity can be 
lowered without increasing the complexity of the self-repair routine too much.  
3.2 Coarse-Grained Software-Based Self-Repair 
The software-based self-repair approach is intended to be used in statically 
scheduled superscalar processors for handling permanent faults. As an example, it 
is applied to the non-fault tolerant VARP processor as shown in figure 2-1. I.e., a 
rebinding logic as it was added to the VARP processor in chapter 2 is not 
available. For this reason, the software-based self-repair performs this rebinding 
directly in the program memory of the VARP processor. This idea is illustrated in 
figure 3-2.  
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-2: Concept of the software-based self-repair approach. (a) Faultless core with original user application in the 
program memory. (b) Faulty core with adapted user application in the program memory. 
The compiler generated schedule of the user application is modified in the field by 
a simple self-repair routine. The self-repair routine is a program in the program 
memory that is used in off-line mode. I.e., when the user application is not 
running, a diagnostic self-test must be performed first in order to determine the 
fault state of the processor. The self-repair routine adapts the binary code of the 
user application to this fault state of the processor. Hence it is not necessary to 
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keep pre-computed schedules in the program memory. Rather the program in the 
program memory is modified permanently by the self-repair routine14.  
In figure 3-2 (a) a small fraction of the original compiler generated schedule for a 
faultless data path is shown. The data path has four issue slots and the schedule is 
divided into basic blocks according to definition 2-2. Now suppose that there is a 
fault in slot 0 of the VARP processor; i.e. fsSlot(0) = 0. In figure 3-2 (b) the 
adapted schedule of the user application is shown for this case. The schedule has 
been adapted by the self-repair routine in such a way that the defect slot is no 
longer used. I.e., all non-NOP operations from slot 0 were moved into other slots, 
and slot 0 executes only NOPs. Thereby, the assignment of operations to basic 
blocks is maintained. Please note that this kind of reconfiguration will only work, 
when the fault in slot 0 has a benign behavior. That is, the execution of a NOP 
operation in slot 0 does not affect the execution of operations in faultless slots15. 
Moreover, the length of the basic block k in figure 3-2 (b) is incremented by 1. 
This has various implications on the target address of branch operations. These 
implications are discussed in section 3.3.3. Now two alternative implementations of 
the self-repair routine are introduced. The first one is the software-based rebinding 
that will not increase the length of the basic blocks. With software-based 
rebinding, faults are handled at a coarse-grained level like slot- or execution unit 
level. The second implementation of the self-repair routine is the software-based 
rescheduling that may increase the length of some basic blocks, but it handles 
faults at finer grained levels like read port and bypass level. 
3.2.1 Software-Based Rebinding 
For each instruction w of the user application, the software-based rebinding 
computes a new binding w' for the operations in w. I.e., w' contains the same 
operations as w, but some of them are maybe allocated to different slots. By this, 
the length of the user application and each basic block remains unchanged. In 
order to perform the adaptation for the whole user application, instruction by 
instruction is transferred from the program memory into the data memory of the 
VARP processor. For each instruction a new binding is computed, and the 
14 Obviously it is required that the program memory is not a ROM. It is supposed that this 
restriction is not to strong because a rewriteable memory is used anyway; for example, for more 
flexibility when updating the software. 
15 An example of a malicious fault (non-benign fault) is a stuck-at fault that holds the write-enable 
signal for the destination register in slot 0 at 1. In this situation slot 0 writes a 0 in each clock cycle 
into register 0.  
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modified instruction is written back into the program memory. This process 
continues until all instructions of the user application are processed.  
Whether or not an operation w(k) from instruction w can be executed in slot k is 
determined by the fault state of the processor, given by the fault state functions 
fsSlot and fsEU. The rebinding algorithm will be explained in the subsequent 
sections only for fault handling at execution unit level. Fault handling at slot level 
is easily mapped to fault handling at execution unit level by considering all 
operators of an execution unit as faulty. 
In the subsequent sections it is explained in detail how the instruction transfer 
between data- and program memory is accomplished, how the new binding is 
computed for an instruction w, and how the self-repair routine can be executed 
properly by a faulty VARP processor. 
3.2.2 Transferring Instruction Words 
The VARP processor is connected to the program and data memory as shown in 
figure 3-3 (a). There is an address bus pmemAddr from the core to the program 
memory and a data bus called instruction from the program memory to the core. 
In a similar way there is an address bus dmemAddr and a bidirectional data bus 
dmemData for connecting the core with the data memory. This bus structure 
causes three problems when transferring instructions from the program memory 
into the data memory of the original VARP processor:  
• The VARP processor has no special instruction for accessing its program 
memory as data.  
• Suppose there would be such an instruction. Then a resource hazard will 
occur, when the program memory is accessed by this data transfer operation.  
• The bit width of an instruction word is different from the bit width of a data 
word. 
In order to overcome these three problems, the transfer of instruction words from 
the program into the data memory and vice versa is organized by an arbiter that is 
integrated into the system as shown in figure 3-3 (b). The arbiter encapsulates the 
access of the processor to the data and address busses of both memories. By using 
the arbiter, a transfer of instructions between both memories can be done without 
a modification of the processor core.  
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Figure 3-3: Memory bus system. (a) Original configuration. (b) Configuration with arbiter for instruction transfer. 
The arbiter can run in three modes:  
• Normal-mode: program and data memory can be accessed simultaneously by 
the VARP core. The arbiter simply forwards the signal pmemAddr to the 
program memory bus and the signals dmemAddr, dmemCtrl, and dmemData 
to the data memory bus. The instruction that is located in the program 
memory at address pmemAddr is forwarded to the core. 
• Read-mode: The arbiter transfers an instruction from the program memory 
to the data memory. In this mode the VLIW-core can neither access the 
program nor the data memory. For this reason, the instruction-bus 
permanently delivers NOP-instructions to the core, no matter which 
instruction is located in the program memory at the current address 
pmemAddr.  
• Write-mode: The arbiter transfers an instruction from the data memory to 
the program memory. The rest of the behaviour is the same as in the read-
mode. 
The VARP core must be able to initiate an instruction transfer from the program 
memory to the data memory and vice versa. In order to do so, a simple protocol is 
used for the communication between the core and the arbiter that can be 
implemented with the available load- and store-operations of the VARP processor. 
With this approach no modification in the core itself is needed.  
When the arbiter is in normal mode, then it listens to the data transfer on the bus 
dmemAddr. If the arbiter detects a read- or a write-access to a special data 
memory address (for example 0xFFFF), then it switches either into the read- or 
into the write-mode. It switches into the read-mode, when the processor tries to 
read from the address 0xFFFF, and it switches into write-mode, if the processor 
tries to write to address 0xFFFF. The complete behaviour is shown in the state 
chart in figure 3-4. 
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Normal Mode awaitRawaitW
dmemAddr=0xFFFF
dmemCtrl=read
dmemAddr=0xFFFF
dmemCtrl=write
read from x
instruction
dmemCtrl=write
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part of instr
read from y+1
part of instr
write to x
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Figure 3-4: State chart of the arbiter. 
When the access to address 0xFFFF was detected by the arbiter, then it is either 
in the awaitW- or in the awaitR-state, and it awaits a memory write operation of 
the core by listening on the busses dmemAddr and dmemData. Suppose that the 
core writes value x to address y. Then this write operation is not forwarded by the 
arbiter to the data memory. Rather, x is used by the arbiter as the program 
memory address from/to which an instruction must be read/written. Respectively, 
y is used as data memory address from/to which an instruction must be 
read/written. When the arbiter has received both values x and y, then it initiates 
the instruction transfer. The instruction transfer takes 17 additional clock cycles. 
In read mode the instruction from the program memory address x is read by the 
arbiter. Each operation in that instruction is partitioned into four parts; each part 
has 16 bit. These four parts contain the opcode and the register numbers encoded 
in each operation. They are written for all four operations of an instruction to data 
memory addresses y to y+15. There they can be accessed easily by the subsequent 
rebinding routine. When the arbiter is in write mode, then, in a similar way, the 
instruction parts located at data memory addresses y to y+15 are composed to an 
instruction word, which is then written back to address x in the program memory. 
The partitioning of an instruction becomes necessary, because each instruction of 
the VARP processor is 104 bits wide, but the data memory has a bit width of 16 
bits only. An example of this partitioning is shown in figure 3-5 for the instruction 
transfer from program memory address 0x10 to data memory address 0x56. 
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Figure 3-5: Example of an instruction transfer and the alignment of the 104 bit instruction word in the 16-bit data memory 
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How to implement the simple protocol for transferring instructions from the 
program into the data memory and vice versa is shown in the instruction 
sequences in figure 3-6. There an instruction transfer from the program memory 
address x = 0x10 to the data memory address y = 0x56 and vice versa is initiated. 
ldc 0xFFFF, R0 
ldc 0x0056, R2 
ldc 0x0010, R3 
ld0 [R0],R0 // switch into read mode 
ld1 [R0],R0 
st0 R3,[R2] // submit addresses 
st1 R3,[R2] 
nop  // read instruction 
nop  // write to y 
nop  // write to y+1 
nop  // write to y+2 
nop  // ... 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop  // write to y+15 
ldc 0x1000, r9 // continuous normal 
  // operation 
 ldc 0xFFFF, R0 ldc 0x0056, R2 
ldc 0x0010, R3 
st0 R0,[R0] // switch into write mode 
st1 R0,[R0] 
st0 R3,[R2] // submit addresses 
st1 R3,[R2] 
nop  // read from y 
nop  // read from y+1 
nop  // write to y+2 
nop  // ... 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop 
nop  // read from y+15 
nop  // write instruction 
ldc 0x1000, r9 // continuous normal 
  // operation 
(a)  (b) 
Figure 3-6: (a) VARP-code for moving an instruction from program memory address 0x10 to data memory address 0x56. 
(b) VARP-code for moving an instruction from data memory address 0x56 to program memory address 0x10. 
The first load-operation in figure 3-6 (a) accesses the data memory address 
0xFFFF. This switches the arbiter into the awaitR-state. The next store-operation 
tells the arbiter that the instruction should be read from address 0x0010 in the 
program memory and stored in the data memory starting at addresses 0x0056. 
When the arbiter has received this information, the transfer starts. The transfer 
takes 17 clock cycles, because 16 data words must be stored in the data memory 
and one clock cycle is needed for reading the instruction. Note that the VARP core 
cannot read instructions or data while the transfer of an instruction is in progress. 
In order to avoid stalling the VARP processor, which may require modifications of 
the core, the arbiter delivers NOP-instructions to the VARP processor as long as 
the transfer is in progress. In order to make sure that the NOPs that the VLIW 
receives from the arbiter will really match with the instructions in the program 
memory, the listing in figure 3-6 (a) contains 17 NOPs after the initiation of the 
instruction transfer. By this the VARP processor behaves as if it would read these 
NOPs from the program memory although the program memory is not accessed by 
the arbiter. The assembler code in figure 3-6 (b) has the same structure, but it 
initiates the write mode of the arbiter. Note that both code examples only show 
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the code for a single slot of the VARP processor. The remaining slots execute 
NOPs. 
3.2.3 The Rebinding Algorithm 
Once an instruction w was moved from the program memory into the data 
memory, it can be modified there. This is accomplished by the rebinding 
algorithm. The goal of this algorithm is to find an instruction w', which is a 
permutation of the operations from instruction w, and each operation in w' is 
executed by an execution unit of the VARP processor that works properly on that 
operation. For example, consider a VARP processor with five slots and an 
execution unit configuration as it is shown in figure 3-7 (a). The instruction in 
figure 3-7 (b) cannot be executed properly in that data path, when the multiplier 
in execution unit 4 is faulty. But the instruction in figure 3-7 (c) with permutated 
operations can be executed properly. Thus, by computing such a permutation, the 
usage of a faulty component in the data path is avoided. Note that in this example 
the VARP processor does not have homogeneous execution units. This may reflect 
a situation in which already some operators of a homogeneous data path are 
faulty.  
- + - + * - + + *
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4  
(a) 
+ - - + *  
(b) 
- * - + +  
(c) 
Figure 3-7: (a) Data path of a five issue VARP processor. (b) Original Instruction. (c) Instruction with permutated 
operations. 
Definition 3-1 (Legal Permutation): 
Given an instruction w, then a legal permutation of w is an instruction w' with 
the following properties: First, w' contains the same operations as w. Second, for 
all k  SLOTS: fsEU(k,type(w'(k))) = 1 and fsSlot(k) = 1; i.e., operation w'(k) can 
be executed correctly in slot k. 
By constructing this legal permutation some of the operations in w may be 
allocated to other slots of the VARP processor. The computation of a legal 
permutation can be done efficiently. In order to show this, it is assumed that at 
most one operation per instruction cannot be executed by its assigned execution 
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unit16. When such an operation exists in w, then the corresponding execution unit 
is denoted as f (faulty). The problem of finding a legal permutation for instruction 
w and a given fault state can be modeled by a rebinding graph that is derived from 
w. A rebinding graph R is a directed graph (N,E), where N = EUS is a set of nodes 
and E Í N  N is a set of edges. The nodes represent the execution units in the 
data path. An edge (u,v) represents the possibility that operation w(u), which is 
executed on execution unit u, can be executed on another execution unit v, too; i.e. 
fsEU(v, type(w(u)) = 1 and fsSlot(v) = 1. Thus, there is an edge (u,v) from node u 
to node v, if and only if: 
• execution unit u executes an operation of type t in instruction w and 
• execution unit v has an operator of type t and 
• the operator of type t in execution unit v is not faulty, i.e. fsEU(v,t) = 1 and 
fsSlot(v) = 1, and 
• u  v. 
Consider as an example the rebinding graph in figure 3-8 that is constructed for 
the data path configuration from figure 3-7 (a) and the instruction from figure 3-7 
(b). It is assumed that the multiplier in EU 4 is faulty. Thus there is no edge from 
node 1 to node 4. 
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4
 
Figure 3-8: Example of a rebinding-graph. 
But the multiplication that is executed on EU 4 can be executed on EU 1, too. 
Thus, there is an edge (4,1). The subtraction that is executed on EU 1 can be 
executed on EU 0 and EU 2, too. Hence, there are the edges (1,0) and (1,2) in the 
rebinding graph.  
In order to compute the permutation, let G Í N be a set of functional units that 
contains only the faulty EU f and all EUs that execute a NOP in the given 
instruction w. G is called the goal. The problem is solved by finding a rebinding 
16 This restriction is relaxed later on. However, it is allowed that multiple operators of the EU are 
faulty. 
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path v0,v1,…,vn in the rebinding graph, with the source node v0 = f and a sink node 
vn that belongs to the set G. 
Definition 3-2 (Rebinding Path): 
Consider a rebinding graph (N,E) constructed for instruction w and fault states 
fsSlot and fsEU. A sequence of nodes v0,v1,…,vn  N is a rebinding path, if n > 0 
and v0 = f, vn  G and (vi,vi+1)  E for all 0 ≤ i < n, and each node in the path is 
unique, except for the case vn = f. 
The permutation w' is obtained by shifting each operation that is executed by an 
EU on that path along one edge on that path to the successive EU. Hence, the 
permutated instruction w' is obtained by: 
• w'(vi+1) ≔ w(vi), for all i   and 0 ≤ i < n, 
• w'(v0) ≔ w(vn), if vn  f and 
• w'(k) ≔ w(k), for all k  N and k Ï {v0,v1,…,vn}. 
As an example, consider again the rebinding graph in figure 3-8. There G = {4}, 
because the instruction in figure 3-7 (b) does not contain a NOP operation. A path 
that starts at source node 4 and ends at a sink node in G is 4, 1, 0, 4. Now each 
operation from the instruction in figure 3-7 (b) must be shifted along one edge on 
that path. I.e., operation * is shifted from EU 4 to EU 1, operation – is shifted 
from EU 1 to EU 0 and operation + is shifted from EU 0 to EU 4. By doing this, 
the permutation that is already shown in figure 3-7 (c) is obtained. 
Theorem 3-1 
Given an instruction w that contains only one operation that cannot be executed 
by their corresponding EU and a rebinding graph constructed for w. Then, shifting 
operations along an existing rebinding path in the rebinding graph computes a 
legal permutation. 
Proof: 
It is provided by the construction of the rebinding graph that an operation that is 
shifted along one edge on the path can be executed on the EU to which it is 
shifted. The first node on the rebinding path is the faulty execution unit. From 
that execution unit the only non-executable operation in instruction w is shifted 
away. Furthermore, the sink node of the path is either an EU that executes a NOP 
or the first node of the rebinding path from which the executed operation has been 
shifted away. In both cases the sink node is free for executing the operation that is 
shifted on it.  
à 
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Theorem 3-2 
For each legal permutation w' of instruction w a rebinding path in the rebinding 
graph for w exists, such that w' is obtained by shifting the operations along that 
path.  
Proof: 
Let f be the faulty EU that cannot execute operation w(f). Consider the 
permutation w' of w and let {v0,v1,…,vn} be the set of EUs for which holds 
w'(vi)  w(vi). That is, these EUs execute in w another operation than in w'. 
Because w' is a legal permutation, w'(f) cannot execute operation w(f). Thus, it 
must hold f  {v0,v1,…,vn}. Without loss of generality let v0 = f. Moreover, let 
x0 = w(f), x1 = w(v1), x2 = w(v2), …, xn = w(vn) be the operations executed by the 
execution units v0,…,vn in instruction w. Furthermore, let u0,…,un be the execution 
units for which holds x0 = w'(u0), x1 = w'(u1), …, xn = w'(un). Then operation x0 is 
executed in w' by EU u0, operation x1 is executed in w' by EU u1, and so on. This 
means that x0 was shifted from EU v0 to EU u0, operation x1 was shifted from v1 to 
u1, and so on. Thus v0,v1,…,vn is the path of interest. 
à 
From theorem 3-1 and theorem 3-2 follows that there exists a legal permutation w' 
of w, if and only if there is a rebinding path in the rebinding graph for w with 
source node f and a sink node from G. 
In order to avoid the computation of a rebinding graph for each instruction of the 
user application, a super rebinding graph is now introduced that accumulates all 
possible rebinding graphs, and allows for a faster computation of a permutation 
without the construction of a particular rebinding graph for each instruction. A 
super rebinding graph S = (N,E) is given by a set of nodes N = EUS, where each 
node represents an execution unit of the data path and a set of directed edges 
E Í N    N that are labeled with operations. An edge (u, o, v) from source 
node u to destination node v is labeled with operation o if and only if, both 
execution units u and v can execute an operation of type o. This super rebinding 
graph is constructed only once for the faultless processor architecture. An example 
of such a super rebinding graph for the data path configuration in figure 3-7 (a) is 
shown in figure 3-9 (a).  
98 
Chapter 3 
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4-
-
+
+
+
-
+
+
*
+
 
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4-
-
+
+
+
-
+
+
*
+
 
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4-
-
+
+
+
-
+
+
+
 
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 3-9: (a) Super rebinding graph for the data path configuration in figure 3-7 (a). (b) Intermediate super rebinding 
graph from (a) for the situation that the multiplier in EU 4 is defective. (c) Super rebinding graph for the degraded data 
path in which the multiplication in EU 4 is faulty. 
In order to use the super rebinding graph for computing the permutation of an 
instruction, it must be adapted to the fault state of the processor given by fsEU 
and fsSlot. For simplicity it is assumed again that there is only a single faulty 
execution unit. Again, the faulty unit is denoted by f. If operators {o1,…,om} in f 
are faulty, then all ingoing edges of node f that are labeled with o1,…,om must be 
deleted from the super rebinding graph S. By this modification it is avoided that 
an operation of type o1,…,om is moved along such an edge to node f. This yields an 
intermediate super rebinding graph S' that is used for computing the permutation 
of all instructions of the user application according to the current fault state of the 
processor. An example of such an intermediate super rebinding graph is shown in 
figure 3-9 (b). There the ingoing edges of node 4 labeled with a multiplication were 
removed, due to a fault in the multiplier of EU 4. 
The rebinding graph R that is constructed for a given instruction w is a sub-graph 
of such an intermediate super rebinding graph S'. This can be easily validated for 
the nodes of R, which are isomorphic to the nodes of S'. Moreover, if there is an 
edge (u,v) in R, then there is an operation p = w(u) in w with a particular type 
o = type(p) that is executed by execution unit u. Moreover, execution unit v is 
able to execute p, too. Thus, in S' there is also an edge (u, o, v).  
Moreover, each outgoing edge of node u in S' that is labeled with o is also found in 
R. Thus, the rebinding graph R is easily obtained from S' by deleting for each 
node n all outgoing edges that are not labeled with type(w(n)). For this reason, the 
problem of finding a path in the rebinding graph R can be also solved in the 
intermediate super rebinding graph S' by considering only those edges of S' that 
can be also found in R. For each node n of S', these are exactly those outgoing 
edges of a node n that are labeled with type(w(n)). Please note that it is not 
necessary to remove all the other edges from S'. For this reason S' can be used for 
computing the permutation of all instructions without being reconstructed for each 
instruction. 
In order to find a rebinding path for a given instruction w in the intermediate 
super rebinding graph S' a breadth-first-search (bfs) is performed. The pseudo code 
for the bfs is given in listing 3-1.  
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1 function bfs(w, f, S') 
2  foreach i  N do  
3    level[i] ≔ undefined;  
4  od 
5  from[f] ≔ undefined 
6  currLevel ≔ 0; 
7  level[f] ≔ currLevel; 
8  do  
9    foreach u  EUS do 
10      if level[u] = currLevel then 
11        foreach v  EUS do 
12          if (u,type(w(u)),v)  E then 
13            if level[v] = undefined then 
14              level[v] ≔ currLevel + 1; 
15              from[v] ≔ u; 
16            fi 
17            if type(w(v)) = NOP or f = v then 
18              return (v,from);    // success 
19            fi 
20          fi 
21        od 
22      fi 
23    od 
24  while(∃u  EUS with level[u] = k+1) 
25 return (failed,from)     // no success 
Listing 3-1: Breadth-first-search algorithm bfs that searches for a rebinding path. 
The function in listing 3-1 receives an instruction w, the faulty execution unit f, 
and the intermediate super rebinding graph S'. The bfs starts at the faulty node f, 
which gets the level 0. For all other nodes the level is undefined. Having the nodes 
with level k, a node v gets the level k+1, if and only if  
• there is a node u in S' with level k and 
• v has no level assigned and 
• there is an edge (u, o, v) in S' and 
• execution unit u executes an operation of type o in instruction w, i.e., 
type(w(u)) = o.  
For each of the nodes v that is assigned to level k+1, the node u, from which v has 
been reached, is reminded by setting from[v] := u in line 15 of listing 3-1. The bfs 
stops, if a node is reached that belongs to the goal G or no node can be assigned to 
level k+1. In the latter case no legal permutation exists, and, in the former case, a 
path can be constructed with the reminder array from. An example of the 
application of the bfs-search to the intermediate super rebinding graph from figure 
3-9 (b) is shown in figure 3-10. There, the values level[n] and from[n] are annotated 
in each node n. 
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EU 2
level = 2
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Figure 3-10: Example for the bfs-algorithm. 
The bfs will start at level 0 in node 4. Please note that from[4] is undefined at that 
time. Then, node 1 gets the level 1 and from[1] is set to 4. The bfs continuous at 
level 1 in node 1. Then nodes 0 and 2 will get level 2. Moreover, the from-attribute 
of both nodes is set to 1. Finally, at level 2, the node f = 4 is reached from node 0. 
At this time, the from-attribute of node 4 is set to 0. 
With the reminder from the path is reconstructed and a legal permutation w' for 
instruction w is computed. Let v  G be the first node of the goal that is reached 
with the bfs. This node is returned by listing 3-1 together with the reminder as 
pair (v, from). Then the path is reconstructed from the sink to the source node f 
by using the backward links in the reminder from. The permutation is computed 
by moving each operation on that path from execution unit from[n] to execution 
unit n. The simple loop for computing the permutation is shown in listing 3-2. 
function permutate(w, (v,from), f) 
  for each i  EUS do w'(i) ≔ w(i); od 
  temp := w(v); 
  do 
    w'(v) := w(from[v]); 
    v := from[v]; 
  while(f  v) 
  w'(v) := temp 
   
Listing 3-2: Computation of a legal permutation. 
If a legal permutation was computed for each instruction of the user application, 
then the intermediate super rebinding graph must be updated to become a super 
rebinding graph reflecting correctly the current fault state of the processor. For 
this reason, all outgoing edges of node f that are labeled with a faulty operator 
o1,…,om are removed. For example, in figure 3-9 (b) all outgoing edges of node 4 
that are labeled with a multiplication must be deleted. The resulting intermediate 
super rebinding graph is shown in figure 3-9 (c). After this step the super 
rebinding graph is valid for the current fault state of the processor, because it 
reflects correctly the situation that any operation of type o1,…,om cannot be 
executed on EU f. Therefore, another fault that occurs later on can be handled, by 
using this super rebinding graph during the execution of the self-repair algorithm. 
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From this property follows immediately that faults that occur simultaneously in 
different execution units can be handled as consecutive faults in an arbitrary order. 
Let f1,…,fn denote the execution units that become defective in a VARP processor, 
and let S0 denote the super rebinding graph for the non-faulty processor. For each 
faulty EU fi a corresponding intermediate super rebinding graph S'i is constructed. 
Thereby S'i is obtained from the super rebinding graph Si-1 by removing all ingoing 
edges of the node fi that are labeled with a faulty operator from fi. For each 
i  {1,…,n}, the super rebinding graph Si reflects accurately the fault state of the 
processor regarding the faults in the execution units f1,…,fi. The super rebinding 
graph Si is obtained from S'i by removing all outgoing edges of fi that are labeled 
with the faulty operators of fi. In order to compute a legal permutation of an 
instruction w, for each faulty execution unit fi the bfs- and permutate-algorithms 
must be executed using the corresponding intermediate super rebinding graph S'i. 
I.e., after computing the legal permutation for a single instruction, the super 
rebinding graph S0 must be restored for computing the legal permutation of the 
next instruction in the user application. This is avoided by maintaining all 
intermediate super rebinding graphs during the adaptation of the user application. 
The complete software-based rebinding algorithm is shown in listing 3-3. Thereby 
w an instruction and fsEU the fault state of the processor. 
function rebind(w, fsEU) 
 
  Let f1,…,fn be the faulty execution units in the processor (determined by fsEU) 
  Construct intermediate super rebinding graphs S1', S2',…, Sn' from S0 
  for k=1 to n do 
    (v,from) := bfs(w,fk,Sk') 
    if v = failed then 
      exit() 
    fi 
    w = permutate(w, (v,from), fk) 
  od 
  return w; 
 
Listing 3-3: Software-based Rebinding algorithm. 
A major limitation of the presented rebinding algorithm is that it will only work 
for instruction set architectures in which all operations are single-cycle operations. 
The reason for that limitation is that the rebinding is computed for each 
instruction separately. A rebinding of an operation made in a particular instruction 
does not affect the binding of operations in other instructions. But if there is a 
multi-cycle operation that needs n clock cycles for being executed, then this 
operation is executed in n consecutive instructions by the same slot. Thus, 
changing the binding of this operation in one instruction also affects all other 
instructions. A solution for overcoming this limitation is presented section 3.3 by 
using a more complex rescheduling algorithm. 
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3.2.4 Executing the Repair Routine  
Now it is described how the software-based rebinding algorithm from listing 3-3 is 
executed by the VARP processor, even when the VARP processor is faulty. In 
order to make sure that the rebinding algorithm is executed properly under most 
fault situations, there are four versions sr0, sr1, sr2 and sr3 of the rebinding 
algorithm. Thereby the version sri uses only slot i of the VARP
17 processor. I.e., all 
non-NOP operations are executed in slot i, while all other slots execute only NOP 
operations. Thus, the rebinding routine can be executed properly as long as at 
least a single slot of the VARP processor is faultless. In order to determine the 
fault state of the VARP processor, suppose a self-test program is used, similar to 
the one used in the work of Koal [92]. This test program is also available in four 
different versions tp0,…,tp3. Thereby, tpi executes operations only in slot i for 
determining the fault state of slot i. When tpi does not terminate, then some faults 
during the execution of some control flow operations occurred. In order to cope 
with this problem without modifying the VARP core, the arbiter is involved in the 
startup process of the VARP processor. 
The arbiter already has access to the program memory of the VLIW core, and it 
gets control about the reset signal of the VARP processor. In order to invoke the 
test program tpi, the arbiter writes a jump instruction for a branch to the first 
instruction of tpi into the program memory at address 0x0. Then the arbiter resets 
the VARP processor that will now jump to the first instruction of tpi. If tpi 
terminates, then the test program sends the fault state produced by the self-test 
routine to the arbiter, simply by writing it into a particular memory address by 
using a similar protocol as for initiating the read- and write-mode of the arbiter. 
Moreover, the arbiter uses a timer for observing the runtime of each self-test 
program. When the arbiter receives a fault state that indicates a fault in slot i or 
the runtime is exceeded, then slot i is considered as faulty from the arbiter. 
Using this principle, the arbiter invokes all test programs. After that it determines 
a faultless slot i according to the received fault states. Then, a branch operation 
that jumps to the first instruction of the rebinding routine sri is written into 
program memory address 0x0, and a reset signal is send to the VARP processor. 
Thus, the VARP processor executes sri that can check the fault state. The fault 
state is available at a reserved data memory addresses, such that it can be easily 
accessed with the memory operations of the VARP processor.  
17 Please recall that each slot can execute branch and memory operations. 
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3.2.5 Fault Tolerant Code Generation 
As it can be noticed in listing 3-2 the proposed rebinding algorithm will not always 
be successful in finding a legal rebinding.  For example, consider the instruction in 
figure 3-11 that should be executed in the given data path. This is the same data 
path configuration as in figure 3-7 (a). As in the previous example, it is assumed 
that the multiplier in EU 4 is faulty. Then there exists no legal permutation of the 
operations. This follows immediately from the fact that the multiplication must be 
executed by EU 1, but EU 1 must execute a subtraction, because the three 
subtract operations can be executed only by EU1, EU2, and EU3.  
- + - + * - + + *
EU 0 EU 1 EU 2 EU 3 EU 4  
- - - + *  
Figure 3-11: Example of a not permutable instruction. 
In such a situation the rebinding algorithm will fail to find a legal permutation. In 
order to avoid the occurrence of this situation in the field, it must be ensured that 
the rebinding algorithm will always find a legal permutation. For this reason, each 
instruction must be created in such a way that, for a specified set of fault states of 
the VARP processor, the rebinding algorithm is able to find a legal permutation. 
I.e., already the compiler or assembler programmer that generates the binary code 
of the user application must take care of these specified fault states. In order to 
specify this set of fault states in a compact way, the classification of fault states 
into k-slot-faults and k-operator-faults from definition 2-4 and definition 2-5 
respectively is used. 
3.2.5.1 Slot Faults 
Please recall that a k-slot-fault is a fault state where exactly k slots of the VARP 
processor are faulty.  
Definition 3-3: (≤m-slot-fault) 
Any k-slot-fault is also an ≤m-slot-fault for m  SLOTS, if k ≤ m. 
This means that up to m slots cannot be used anymore for executing operations, 
when the VARP processor is affected by a ≤m-slot-fault. In such a situation the 
rebinding algorithm will find a legal permutation if and only if there are at least m 
NOP operations in each instruction, such that these NOP operations can be 
scheduled to the defective execution units. This property is defined as the m-unit-
fault property. 
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Definition 3-4: (m-unit-fault property) 
An instruction w has the m-unit-fault property, if it contains at least m NOP 
operations. 
This limitation can be easily incorporated into the scheduling algorithm used by a 
compiler for a VLIW processor, such that each instruction of the generated binary 
code has the m-unit-fault property. The compiler simply generates the code for a 
VLIW architecture with |SLOTS| – m slots and not for a VLIW architecture with 
|SLOTS| slots. Thus, m slots in each instruction are unused and the rebinding 
algorithm will always find a legal permutation for each ≤m-slot-fault in the field.  
For example, in order to cope with any fault state that is a ≤2-slot-fault, the 
binary code for the VARP processor is generated in such a way that slots 2 and 3 
execute only NOPs. I.e., they can be considered as spare resources. When a fault 
affects slot 1 in the field, then all operations executed in slot 1 are moved from the 
rebinding algorithm into slot 2. As a consequence, the rebinding algorithm can be 
considered as a purely software-based method for administrating the available 
hardware redundancy. Therefore this is an active hardware redundancy method 
where the administration of hardware resources is done in software. However, in 
order to handle ≤m-slot-faults, m slots are preserved in the processor architecture 
as spare slots that cannot be used for executing operations in the originally 
generated schedule. Thus, there is a considerable loss of performance in the 
processor. This loss of performance is quantified in section 3.2.6. 
3.2.5.2 Operator Faults 
Please recall that a k-operator fault affects exactly k operators in an arbitrary set 
of execution units.  As a consequence the affected execution units cannot execute 
operations with the type of the affected operator.  
Definition 3-5: (≤n-operator-fault) 
Any k-operator-fault is also a ≤n-operator-fault for n  , if k ≤ n. 
For example, if an adder in EU 2 and a multiplier in EU 3 of a data path are 
faulty, then this fault state is a ≤2-operator-fault. It will be also a ≤3-operator-
fault, but not a ≤1-operator-fault.  
In order to generate a schedule that can be modified by the rebinding algorithm in 
such a way that an arbitrary ≤n-operator-fault can be handled, the following n-
operator-fault property must hold for each instruction w in the schedule. 
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Definition 3-6: (n-operator-fault property) 
An instruction w has the n-operator-fault property, if  
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. 
I.e., the operations that are scheduled into a single instruction w must have at 
least n+1 different types, whereby each NOP in w is counted as a separate type. 
For example, an instruction that contains two NOPs and two add-operations has 
the 2-operator-fault property, but not the 3-operator-fault property. An instruction 
that contains two add- and two mul-operations has the 1-operator-fault property. 
In general, for a VARP processor with k issue slots, no operation can have a n-
operator-fault property with n ≥ k, because each operation can have at most k 
different operation types. 
Theorem 3-3 
Respecting the n-operator-fault property in an arbitrary instruction w guaranties 
the existence of a legal permutation for the operations in w for each ≤n-operator-
fault. 
Proof: 
Let e0,…,em with m < n denote all the execution units with faulty operators, and 
let fi denote the number of faulty operators in execution unit ei. Because there are 
at most n faulty operators allowed for an ≤n-operator fault, for f0,…,fm holds: 
 
0
1
m
z
z
f n

  . 
It is now proven that to each ei an operation in w can be assigned that can be 
executed on ei. In e0 there are f0 ≤ n faulty operators. These faulty operators do 
not include a NOP. Hence, || – f0 > 0 faultless operators exist in e0. But w 
contains at least n+1 operations with different types (when counting each NOP as 
a separate type). Therefore, at least one of these operations can be executed by e0. 
If now an arbitrary execution unit ei, with 0 ≤ i ≤ m is considered, then for ei holds 
that 
1. at most i operations of different type were assigned to e0,…,ei-1, and 
2. fi operators are faulty in ei. 
Thus, there are at most  
 ii f  
operation types that must be excluded from being assigned to ei, because i 
operations with different type were already assigned to e0,…,ei-1 and maybe 
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another fi operation types are faulty in ei. However, because fz ≥ 1 for all z with 
0 ≤ z ≤ m, it follows: 
 
1 1
0 0 0
1 1
i i i
i i z i z
z z z
i f f f f f n
 
  
          . 
Thus, at least one operation exists in w that can be assigned to ei, because the 
operations assigned to e0,…,ei-1 and the operations that cannot be assigned to ei 
will have at most n different types.  
à 
Both properties, the m-unit-fault property and the n-operator-fault property, can 
be incorporated easily into a scheduling algorithm for generating code for a 
statically scheduled processor architecture like the VARP processor. In listing 3-4 
it is shown how both properties can be integrated into a list scheduling algorithm, 
yielding a fault-tolerant list scheduling algorithm that can generate a fault tolerant 
schedule. A list scheduling algorithm is often used for scheduling purposes in 
compilers. It uses a priority list. The operations from the priority list are scheduled 
in priority order into the current instruction w. If no more operations can be 
scheduled into w, then the next instruction is generated. Both, m-unit-fault 
property and n-operator-fault property can be easily checked during scheduling 
operations into the current instruction by counting the NOP operations in w and 
the different operation types in w. 
(N,E) ... directed acyclic graph of the basic block 
m     ... tolerable m-slot-faults 
n     ... tolerable n-operator-faults 
while not all nodes in N are scheduled do 
  create next empty instruction w 
  Compute ready-list r 
  for each node in r in priority order do 
    schedule operation r into instruction w if  
    - no dependencies are violated and 
    - there is a free resource for r and 
    - at least m EUs are unused in w after scheduling r into w and 
    - w contains at least n+1 different operation types after scheduling r into w 
  od 
  emit instruction w  
od 
Listing 3-4: Fault tolerant list scheduling algorithm that checks for the m-unit-fault property and for the n-operator-fault 
property. 
Please note that generating a fault tolerant schedule for m = 0 and n > 0 allows 
for using all execution units in each instruction. For example, an instruction of a 
four-issue VARP processor that contains two add-, a single mul-, and a single shift-
operation will have the 2-operator-fault property. This seems to be an advantage 
over the unit-fault property. However, although all slots can be used in a 
homogeneous data path with |SLOTS| slots, n operators of each type are used for 
spare purposes. This results from the fact that each instruction must contain at 
least n + 1 different operation types. Thus, for any type t, there are in each 
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instruction at least n operations that must have a different type from t. Therefore 
at least n operators of type t are unused in each instruction. Moreover, if another 
component of the slot than the execution unit is faulty, then this fault cannot be 
handled anymore. Please recall that such a fault can be handled only by avoiding 
the usage of the complete slot, and this requires at least a schedule that has the 1-
unit-fault property. 
3.2.6 Results 
3.2.6.1 Hardware Overhead 
The proposed software-based rebinding does not cause any hardware overhead in 
the VARP processor itself. However, when the processor does not provide access to 
its program memory, then the embedded system that contains the processor must 
be extended by an arbiter for instructions transfer between data and program 
memory. As shown in table 3-1, the size of the arbiter described in section 3.2.2 is 
around 3.5% of the size of the non-fault tolerant VARP processor. For comparison 
the sizes of an execution unit and a slot in relation to the full VARP processor are 
provided, too. The arbiter has approximately the size of a simple 16-bit integer 
unit. 
VARP Processor EU Slot  Arbiter 
100% 4% 16.5% 3.5% 
Table 3-1: Size of the arbiter in relation to the size of the non-fault tolerant VARP processor. 
However, there are also VLIW-like architectures that have access to their program 
memory without using an arbiter. For example, Intel's Itanium processor has a 
unified memory, but separate program and data caches for avoiding structural 
hazards in the pipeline. For such processor architectures the software-based 
rebinding can be applied without creating hardware overhead in the system that 
contains the processor. 
3.2.6.2 Performance Degradation 
The impact of the fault-tolerant scheduling algorithm (see listing 3-4) on the 
performance of the processor when executing several benchmark programs is 
investigated in this sub-section. Thereby the performance degradation depends on 
the data dependencies and the available instruction level parallelism of the used 
benchmark. The worst case, when handling ≤m-slot-faults, will occur for basic 
blocks, where the non-fault tolerant schedule has the following form: 
• No instruction contains a NOP, i.e., the benchmark provides high instruction 
level parallelism. 
108 
Chapter 3 
• All operations of an instruction are data dependent on the operations in the 
preceding instruction. I.e., delaying the scheduling of an operation also 
delays the scheduling of all operations in successive instructions. 
Every operation u that is executed in such a non-fault tolerant schedule before 
operation v, must be also executed before operation v in the fault tolerant 
schedule. When ≤m-slot-faults in a VARP processor with N slots should be 
tolerated, then each instruction must contain at most N – m non-NOP operations. 
Because each instruction in the non-fault tolerant schedule contains N non-NOP 
operations, it must be replaced by  
 :
N
k
N m
 
    
 
instructions in the fault tolerant schedule. Thus, in the worst case, the runtime of 
the fault tolerant schedule is k times the original runtime.  
In a similar way the worst case runtime for handling ≤m-operator faults is 
obtained. The non-fault tolerant schedule must have the same form as in the 
previous case. Moreover, all operations in each instruction must have the same 
type. Then, a ≤m-operator fault can be handled only, when each instruction in the 
fault tolerant schedule contains at least m NOPs, because then this instruction has 
the m-unit-property. I.e., each instruction must have the same number of NOPs as 
an instruction for handling ≤m-slot-faults in the previous case. Thus, in the worst 
case, the runtime of the application is increased by the same factor k. Table 3-2 
compares the worst-case runtimes obtained with software-based rebinding with the 
worst case runtime obtained with hardware-based rebinding for a VARP processor 
with four slots. 
 runtime for ≤m-slot-faults runtime for ≤m-operator-faults 
hardware-based 
rebinding 
software-based 
rebinding 
hardware-based 
rebinding 
software-based 
rebinding 
m = 0 100% 100% 100% 100% 
m = 1 200% 200% 200% 200% 
m = 2 300% 200% 300% 200% 
m = 3 400% 400% 400% 400% 
Table 3-2: Comparison of worst-case runtimes from hardware-based rebinding and software-based rebinding. 
Only for m = 2 the worst case runtime of the hardware-based rebinding is 
improved by the software-based rebinding. However, in practical applications it is 
very unlikely that the described structure of data dependencies will be present in 
basic blocks. For this reason the shown worst case overheads will not be achieved 
in most situations. The benchmark programs from table 2-4 were also used for 
generating fault tolerant schedules by taking various ≤n-operator-faults and ≤m-
slot-faults into account. The results are shown in table 3-3. The schedules were 
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generated for a VARP processor with four slots. For each benchmark the obtained 
schedule length is shown together with the runtime overhead in percent. 
Benchmark m=0 n=0 m=0 n=1 m=0 n=2 m=1 n=0 m=1 n=2 
ARF 8 0% 10 25% 10 25% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 25% 11 38% 
EWF 14 0% 14 0% 16 14% 16 14% 17 21% 
FFT 10 0% 11 10% 13 30% 13 30% 15 50% 
DCT-DIF 11 0% 15 36% 19 73% 18 64% 21 91% 
SWIM1 8 0% 8 0% 11 38% 10 25% 12 50% 
SWIM2 5 0% 5 0% 6 20% 5 0% 6 20% 
DCT-LEE 14 0% 14 0% 17 21% 17 21% 18 29% 
DCT-DIT 14 0% 15 7% 19 36% 18 28% 21 50% 
Average 0% 10% 32% 26% 44% 
Table 3-3: Length of schedules tolerating ≤n-operator-faults and ≤m-slot-faults. 
The length of the non-fault-tolerant schedule is shown in the column where m = 0 
and n = 0. The non-fault tolerant schedule is generated without taking the m-unit-
fault property and the n-operator-fault property into account. These schedules 
define the base-line lengths. Therefore they have a runtime overhead of 0%. The 
remaining columns in table 3-3 show the schedule length for each benchmark 
program, if it is scheduled by using the fault tolerant list scheduling algorithm 
from listing 3-4 in such a way that n-operator-faults and m-slot-faults can be 
handled. Furthermore, the performance degradation due to the increased schedule 
length is given in percent compared with the length of the non-fault-tolerant 
schedule. The results show that the performance degradation for schedules that 
tolerate a single operator fault is 0% in the best case (SWIM1) and for some 
benchmarks up to 36% (DCT-DIF). 1-slot-faults can be handled by accepting a 
performance degradation in the range of 0% to 64%. Handling either a 2-operator 
fault or a 1-slot-fault is possible with a performance degradation in the range 
between 20% and 91%.  
Note that the fault-tolerant schedules guarantee the handling of each ≤n-operator-
fault and each ≤m-slot-fault. But there are many other fault states with k faulty 
operators (k > n) that can be handled by these schedules, too. For example, there 
are usually many operators in the homogeneous data path that are rarely utilized 
by the operations in each instruction. Even when more than n of these operators 
will fail, a legal permutation will be found with the rebinding algorithm for many 
situations.  
The rebinding algorithm was implemented in assembler. This was possible with 
245 instructions per version without instruction transfer. For simplicity, the 
rebinding algorithm was implemented as a sequential program, i.e., each 
instruction contains only one operation that is distinct from a NOP. By a worst 
case analysis of the code of the rebinding routine, a worst case runtime of less than 
500 clock cycles for computing the rebinding of a single instruction was 
determined. On average the required number of clock cycles is much lower. Table 
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3-4 shows the runtimes in clock cycles for performing the rebinding of various 
benchmark programs with this rebinding routine.  
Benchmark 
SW-Rebinding 
1-operator-fault 1-slot-fault 
ARF 2543 2390 
DCT-DIF 3961 3445 
FFT 3740 3085 
EWF 3726 3890 
DCT-DIT 4365 4225 
DCT-LEE 5010 4085 
Table 3-4: Worst-case runtime of the software-based rebinding of the shown benchmark programs in clock cycles. 
Taking into account that the VARP processor can run with 500 MHz, rebinding a 
program with 216 instructions takes less than 0.07 seconds in the worst case, which 
is acceptable for a self-repair process that is executed during the startup phase. 
3.2.6.3 Reliability Analysis 
A VARP system with software-based rebinding that can handle all ≤1-slot-faults is 
considered for the reliability estimation. Such a VARP processor must have at 
least three functioning slots. Thus, all four slots can be considered as a 3-of-4-
system that is connected in series with the other non-fault tolerant components of 
the VARP processor. All the fault-tolerant components belonging to the 3-of-4-
system are gray shaded in table 3-5. Moreover, the size of all components of the 
VARP processor, including the arbiter, is shown, too. Please note that the fault 
tolerant part of a slot now also includes the fetch register. Faults in the fetch 
register can be handled, because the rebinding is done in the program memory, i.e., 
before the fetch stage.  
Component 
Fault Tolerant VARP processor 
 
Fault Tolerant Part of a Slot 
Control 
Logic 
Arbiter 
Register File 
 
Pipeline Registers Read 
Port 
Bypass EU 
Fetch 
Reg 
 Reg 
 DE WB 
Instances of components 1 4 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 64 
Cell area per component 29825 4748 791 446 146 1153 240 1171 199 539 1014 9280 145 
Reliability function - 
Rslot(t) 
= 
e-5539lt 
- - - - - - - 
Rctrl(t)
= 
e-539lt 
Rrl(t) 
= 
e-1014lt 
Rrf(t) 
= 
e-9280lt 
Rrf(t) 
= 
e-145lt 
Table 3-5: Cell area and reliability function for each component of the fault tolerant VARP processor, assuming a constant 
failure rate l. 
Hardware overhead that must be taken into account for the reliability analysis 
may also occur in the program memory for two reasons: First, storing the 
rebinding algorithm in the program memory creates some memory overhead. 
Second, by the fault tolerant scheduling of the user application, the schedule 
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becomes longer, and additional memory must be provided for these additional 
instructions. However, the latter problem will not occur, when the instructions are 
compressed, as it is done in other VLIW architectures, too [108]. Also for the 
VARP processor a compression scheme has been developed in [47], such that NOP 
operations must not be stored explicitly in the program memory. When such a 
compressed instruction is fetched, then a small decoder in the fetch stage restores 
the required NOPs. Hence, if the fault tolerant list scheduling algorithm inserts 
additional NOPs into an instruction, then these NOPs do not increase the memory 
consumption of the user application. Moreover, also the rebinding routine benefits 
from this compression, because each instruction of the rebinding routine contains 
only one operation that is different from a NOP. Therefore, the size of the 
compressed four versions of the rebinding routine is almost equal to the size of 245 
non-compressed instructions. This is a small overhead in memory that is neglected 
for the reliability analysis. The reliability function of a VARP processor with 
software-based rebinding including the arbiter is given in equation (3-1). 
   29825 10833 4748 3 4748( ) 4 1t t t tswaR t e e e e                  (3-1) 
The reliability function for a VARP system, where it is assumed that the VARP 
core has already access to its program memory, is given by the reliability function 
in equation (3-2).  
   28811 9819 4748 3 4748( ) 4 1t t t tswR t e e e e                  (3-2) 
Equation (3-2) differs from equation (3-1) by neglecting the size of the arbiter in 
the serial part of the system. Both functions are plotted in figure 3-12. 
In order to determine a reference system for comparison, two scenarios will be 
considered. First, the software-based rebinding is used for making a non-fault 
tolerant processor off the shelf fault tolerant. It is assumed that this is the non-
fault tolerant VARP processor from figure 2-1. Then the fault tolerance is achieved 
at the cost of some performance degradation, because the application executed on 
the non-fault tolerant VARP processor must be scheduled with the fault tolerant 
scheduling algorithm in such a way that each instruction has the 1-unit-fault 
property. The reliability function RNFT4(t) for the non-fault tolerant VARP 
processor was already given in equation (2-1). For the second scenario, it is 
assumed that the fault tolerance is obtained by explicitly introducing spare 
resources. Then the non-fault tolerant VARP processor has three slots only. The 
fault tolerant VARP processor is obtained by adding a fourth slot as spare 
resource that is administrated with the software-based rebinding. The reliability 
function for a VARP processor with three slots is given by 
 24069
3
( ) t
slots
R t e   . 
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The reliability functions of all four systems are plotted in figure 3-12 together with 
the reliability function Rhwr(t) from equation (2-4) for the VARP processor with 
hardware-based rebinding. 
 
Figure 3-12: Reliability plots for the software-based rebinding. 
In any case, the VARP processor with software-based rebinding has a higher 
reliability than both non-fault tolerant processors (either with four or three slots). 
The reliability improvement factor (RIF) ranges between 2.6 and 1.7 for the 
plotted time interval, whereby the highest improvement is achieved for smaller 
times. It can be noticed that the reliability of the fault tolerant system with 
hardware-based rebinding (Rhwr) does not differ very much from the reliability of 
the VARP systems with software-based rebinding (Rsw and Rswa). In particular, 
when t is very small, then the reliability of both systems with software-based 
rebinding is a little bit higher than the reliability of the system with hardware-
based rebinding (RIF  1.1). But the reliability of the system with software-based 
rebinding and arbiter (Rswa) becomes a little bit worst than the reliability of the 
system with hardware-based rebinding for t > 1, which represents in the given 
time scale 10 years. However, the differences are not significantly, such that the 
reliability of all three systems can be considered as almost equal. 
3.2.7 Conclusions 
The presented software-based rebinding is a feasible method for implementing 
active hardware redundancy in statically scheduled superscalar processors, even 
then when they were not designed to be fault tolerant. The presented software-
based rebinding is essentially a simple way for managing redundant computational 
resources in the superscalar data path of such a processor completely in software 
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and without introducing any hardware overhead for administration purposes in the 
core. The administration is accomplished in the field, but in off-line mode. 
Therefore, this approach can handle permanent faults only. With the presented 
method almost the same reliability as with a hardware-based administration 
scheme is achieved. However, the performance degradation is much lower (24% for 
handling 1-slot-faults when executing the used benchmarks) than the performance 
degradation caused by the hardware-based rebinding (99% for handling 1-slot-
faults when executing the used benchmarks). An interesting property of the 
software-based approach is that the performance can be traded against reliability. 
The reliability can be scaled by software – simply by specifying the tolerable 
operator- and slot-faults. With the selected parameters the application is compiled 
using the fault tolerant list-scheduling algorithm. This allows for in-the-field 
handling of the specified amount of faults. The presented approach is well suited 
for real-time applications, because no performance degradation of the application is 
introduced by the rebinding routine. This follows from the fact that only the 
operations within each instruction are permutated by the self-repair routine. The 
control flow of the program and the length of each basic block remain unchanged. 
However, the performance penalty is introduced during the fault tolerant 
scheduling, as it was demonstrated for some benchmarks in section 3.2.6.2. 
Moreover, this performance penalty must be paid, even then when there is no fault 
inside of the processor. This can be considered as a disadvantage. For example, the 
hardware-based rebinding presented in section 2.3 creates performance degradation 
only when a fault is present in the data path. Another disadvantage of the 
software-based rebinding (but also of the hardware-based rebinding) is that it is 
limited to processor architectures with single-cycle operation. Multi-cycle 
operations cannot be handled correctly with the rebinding routine. On the other 
hand, this allows for a very simple adaptation scheme that works locally in each 
instruction. For this reason, it is not necessary to consider any kind of 
dependencies between operations in different instructions – neither data 
dependencies nor control flow dependencies. In the next section a more 
sophisticated software-based administration is presented that also takes 
dependencies into account. Thereby, operations can be also moved into other 
instructions and multi-cycle operations can be handled. 
3.3 Fine-Grained Self-Repair 
This section introduces a software-based self-repair approach that can be used for 
fault handling in statically scheduled superscalar data paths. It relies on a 
rescheduling algorithm that uses the basic idea presented in figure 3-2, i.e., the user 
application is modified in the field such that the operations of the application are 
scheduled around faulty components in the data path. The rescheduling algorithm 
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is executed in an off-line mode, such that only permanent faults can be handled. 
The difference from the previously presented software-based rebinding is that 
operations can be moved between instructions; i.e., a new schedule can be 
computed for the user application. In order to maintain the control flow 
dependencies in the program, the rescheduling algorithm works at basic block 
level. I.e., each basic block of the user application is moved from the program 
memory into the data memory. There the schedule of the basic block is modified 
by the rescheduling algorithm according to the current fault state of the processor. 
The modified basic block, which is now adapted to the current fault state, is 
written back into the program memory. Due the rescheduling, the length of a basic 
block may be increased as it is shown in figure 3-2. This requires some more 
sophisticated adaptations of the user application that are discussed in section 
3.3.3. On the other hand, the rescheduling algorithm allows for overcoming some 
disadvantages of the rebinding algorithm. In particular, it can handle multi-cycle 
operations, and the granularity of the components, whose reconfiguration can be 
administrated, is lowered below slot- and execution unit level. First, a coarse 
grained version of the rescheduling is presented in section 3.3.1. Then this coarse-
grained version is extended in section 3.3.2 in order to lower the granularity of the 
components that can be administrated.  
3.3.1 Rescheduling at Slot- and Execution Unit Level 
It is assumed that the fault state of the processor is given at slot- and execution 
unit level by the fault state functions fsSlot and fsEU. Furthermore, the 
rescheduling algorithm is introduced first only for single basic blocks that have 
been already moved from the program memory into the data memory. Then it 
does not matter, if the length of a basic block is increased. The basic block transfer 
can be organized simply by using the arbiter presented in section 3.2.2. Then, the 
ordering of the operations in each instruction corresponds to the ordering 
presented in figure 3-5. Moreover, if all instructions of a basic block are stored in 
ascending order in the data memory, then all operations of the basic block are 
ordered sequentially in the data memory of the VARP processor. Formally this 
sequential ordering is obtained by considering the instruction sequence 
w0, w1, w2,…, wk that forms a basic block of length k + 1. This ordering implies a 
total ordering of the operations of that basic block as follows: Let wm(i) and wn(j) 
be two operations, where i, j  SLOTS and 0 ≤ m, n ≤ k. Then wm(i) < wn(j), if 
and only if m < n or m = n and i < j. This sequential ordering can be considered 
as a sequential schedule of the basic block with the same data dependencies as in 
the original schedule. 
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Theorem 3-4 
Given a basic block b by an instruction sequence s, where each instruction in s has 
the no-input-is-output property from definition 2-3. Then the sequential schedule 
of b has exactly the same data dependencies as the instruction sequence s. 
Proof: 
Consider two operations wm(i) and wn(j) of an instruction in s. It is obvious that 
the theorem holds for m  n, because then the execution order of both operations 
is not changed by the sequential schedule. For m = n, both operations were 
executed in parallel in s. Thus, no data dependency exists. Without loss of 
generality suppose i < j. Then there is neither a true- nor an anti-dependency 
between wm(i) and wn(j) in the sequential schedule, because the destination register 
of each operation differs from the source register(s) of the other operation due to 
the no-input-is-output property. Furthermore, there is no output dependency, 
because both operations must have different destination registers. 
à 
Now, the rescheduling algorithm shown in listing 3-5 uses the sequential schedule 
as input and produces an instruction sequence respecting all data dependencies 
from the sequential schedule and the current fault state of the processor.  
1 instructionCount := 0; 
2 while not all operations in the sequential schedule are scheduled do 
3   Create a new empty instruction currInstr 
4   for each slot  SLOTS do                   
5     if counter[slot] = 0 then  // Is EU slot still busy with a multi-cycle operation?           
6       for reg := 0 to 63 do    // No, then try to find an operation for that EU 
7         Def[reg] := 0; Use[reg] := 0;  
8       od 
9       for each operation v from the sequential schedule in given order do  
10         if v is already scheduled in currInstr then 
11           Def[v.Dst] := 1; Use[v.Src1] := 1; Use[v.Src2] := 1; 
12         fi  
13         if v is not scheduled then 
14           if CanBeExecuted(v,slot) &&  // Check for fault state 
15              Def[v.Src1]=0 && Def[v.Src2]=0 && // Check for flow-dependecies 
16              Use[v.Dst]=0  &&    // Check for anti-dependencies 
17              Def[v.Dst]=0    // Check for output-dependencies 
18           then 
19             counter[slot]  := latency(type(v)) 
20             currInstr[slot]:= v 
21             lastDef[v.dst] := instructionCount; 
22             srcSlot[v.dst] := slot;  
23             set state of v to scheduled; 
24             break; 
25           else 
26             Use[v.Src1] := 1 // Update lookup-tables, when v cannot be scheduled 
27             Use[v.Src2] := 1 
28             Def[v.Dst] := 1 
29           fi 
30         fi 
31       od 
32     fi 
33   od 
34   for each slot  SLOTS do                   
35     if counter[slot] > 0 then counter[slot]--; fi 
36   od 
37   instructionCount := instructionCount + 1; 
38 od 
Listing 3-5: Software-Based Rescheduling algorithm. 
116 
Chapter 3 
Thereby, the rebinding algorithm tries to parallelize the operations from the 
sequential schedule. The produced instruction sequence is the modified schedule for 
the basic block that must be written back into the program memory. Basically the 
rescheduling algorithm is a list scheduling algorithm that has some similarities 
with the scoreboard algorithm described in [80]. The scoreboard algorithm is used 
in dynamically scheduled superscalar processor architectures for dispatching the 
sequential operation stream to the available functional units. Thereby a scoreboard 
is used to check efficiently for data dependencies between operations. The 
rescheduling algorithm in listing 3-5 uses a similar lookup-table-based technique for 
detecting data dependencies. These lookup-tables are named use : REGS  {0,1} 
and def : REGS  {0,1}. The modified schedule for a basic block is now generated 
instruction by instruction with the rescheduling algorithm. For this reason in line 3 
of listing 3-5 a new empty instruction is created, which is appended to the 
modified schedule generated so far. The for-loop in line 4 tries to find for each slot 
of the current instruction an unscheduled operation from the sequential schedule 
that can be scheduled at this position. For this reason, the operations in the 
sequential schedule are processed in their given order (line 9) and for each 
unscheduled operation v it is checked in lines 14 to 17 whether it can be scheduled 
or not in the current slot of currInstr. v can be scheduled at this position, if the 
fault state of the slot allows for the execution of v (this is checked by the function 
CanBeExecuted) and no dependencies are violated (this is checked with the 
expressions in lines 15 to 1718). 
If an operation v from the sequential schedule cannot be scheduled at the current 
position, then in lines 26 to 28 the lookup-tables use and def are updated. These 
lookup-tables are used for checking for dependency violations. Suppose there is an 
operation u in the sequential schedule that writes to register r and reads from 
registers s1 and s2, and u was not scheduled in currInstr at position slot. Then 
def(r) = 1, use(s1), and use(s2) = 1. Now suppose that some iterations later of the 
loop in line 9, it must be checked for an operation v, with u < v, whether v can be 
scheduled at position slot of currInstr or not. Whether or not v violates some 
dependencies can be checked by using the lookup-tables use and def in lines 15 and 
16. Thereby, for the lookup-table def holds in this situation: def(r) = 1, if and only 
if there is an unscheduled operation u in the sequential schedule, with u < v, that 
has operand r as destination operand. Thus, if v has r as source operand, then v 
cannot be scheduled, because there is a true-dependency from u to v. In line 15 it 
is checked for this true dependency for both source operands of v. In a similar way 
anti- and output dependencies are checked. In line 16 it is checked if there is a 
18 For better understanding it is assumed that all operations have one destination register and two 
source registers. 
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preceding unscheduled operation u of v (u < v) that reads a register r that is 
written by operation v. If this is the case, then there is an anti-dependency from u 
to v, and use(r) was set to 1 when u was processed. This is easily checked, when v 
is processed and scheduling of v is avoided. Output dependencies are checked in 
line 17. If there is a preceding unscheduled operation u of v that writes to the same 
register r that is also written by v, then there is an output dependency from u to v. 
In this situation def(r) was set to 1 in line 28, when u was processed, and the 
output dependency is detected by the expression in line 17, such that v is not 
scheduled.  
Please note that each operation that is already scheduled into the current 
instruction currInst is treated in lines 10 to 12 as if it were unscheduled. Hence, it 
is ensured that that no two operations with the same destination register are 
scheduled into the same instruction. Moreover, the no-input-is-output property is 
maintained for the new generated instruction. 
Data dependencies also arise from memory operations. Determining whether or not 
there is a data dependency between two memory operations is in general not 
decidable [10]. Even making this decision for some simple situations may require a 
complex data flow analysis. For this reason a conservative approach is used that 
considers two memory operations always as data dependent, if at least one of them 
is a write operation into the memory. This can be easily incorporated into the 
rescheduling algorithm by considering the memory as a single register that is 
written with store-operations and read with load-operations. Then the 
dependencies between memory operations can be checked in the same way as the 
dependencies arising from register accesses. In general it can be stated that the 
implementation of the rescheduling algorithm is simplified, when the instruction 
set of the processor is designed in such a way that all data dependencies between 
operations are explicitly visible in the coding of the operations. For example, a bad 
solution is an instruction set, where each ALU-operation implicitly modifies the 
status flags of the processor (e.g. carry, zero, etc.). When these implicitly modified 
flags are used by successive operations, then the resulting data dependencies must 
be found by a complex data flow analysis of the binary code. Moreover, data 
dependencies that are made explicitly visible by the instruction encoding, for 
example by register addresses, can be identified easier from the rescheduling 
algorithm, when the instruction set encodes these register addresses always in the 
same bit fields. Otherwise too many different cases must be distinguished by the 
rescheduling algorithm for extracting these dependencies from the binary code. 
Hence, a very regular instruction coding as it is common for reduced instruction 
set computers (RISC) is very beneficial. 
Multi-cycle operations are handled by the proposed rescheduling algorithm in lines 
5, 19, and 34 to 36. When an operation is scheduled in a particular slot s, then the 
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latency of this operation is stored in the array counter(s). Single cycle operations 
have a latency of 1. In lines 34 to 36 the counter of each slot is decremented before 
a new instruction is created. In line 5 a slot is excluded from scheduling, if its 
corresponding counter is not 0.  
In order to use the proposed rescheduling algorithm for fault handling at various 
granularity levels, only the function CanBeExecuted in line 14 must be adapted, 
such that it takes care of the current fault state of the processor. In the subsequent 
sections this function is defined for various granularity levels.  
3.3.1.1 Fault Handling at Slot Level 
In order to handle faults at slot level the expression CanBeExecuted(v,s) in line 14 
of listing 3-5 is defined as  
 CanBeExecuted(v,s) := fsSlot(s), 
whereby fsSlot is the fault state of the slots of the VARP processor for fault 
handling at slot level. Please recall that fsSlot(s) = 0, if there is a fault in any of 
the components belonging to slot s. Thus, operation v is only scheduled into slot s, 
if s is faultless. In figure 3-13 an example is given. The basic block of the original 
schedule is shown in figure 3-13 (a). Now suppose that the add/sub-component in 
the execution unit of slot 1 is faulty; i.e., fsSlot(0) = fsSlot(2) = fsSlot(3) = 1 and 
fsSlot(1) = 0. Then the rescheduling algorithm will produce the schedule in figure 
3-13 (b). There, only NOPs are scheduled into slot 1. It can be further noticed 
that the length of the adapted schedule is increased. 
Add r0,r2 -> r4 Add r3,r1 -> r5 shl r6 -> r6 mul r0,r1 -> r8
Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7 shl r6 -> r6 Inc r20 -> r20
Mul r4,r5 -> r0 Sub r4,r1 -> r9 Dec r6 -> r6 Shr r8 -> r8
NOP NOP Inc r20 -> r20Add r0,r9 -> r2  
Add r0,r2 -> r4 Add r3,r1 -> r5 shl r6 -> r6
mul r0,r1 -> r8 Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7
shl r6 -> r6 Inc r20 -> r20 Mul r4,r5 -> r0
Sub r4,r1 -> r9 Dec r6 -> r6 Shr r8 -> r8
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
Add r0,r9 -> r2 NOP Inc r20 -> r20 NOP  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-13 (a) Example of an original schedule. (b) Schedule that is obtained from the schedule in (a) after adaptation at 
slot level. 
3.3.1.2 Fault Handling at Execution Unit Level 
In order perform the rescheduling algorithm for fault handling at execution unit 
level, the function CanBeExecuted is defined as  
 CanBeExecuted(v,s) := fsEU(s,v)  fsSlot(s),  
whereby fsEU is the fault state of the execution units and fsSlot is the fault state 
of the slots for the execution unit level. Please recall that at execution unit level a 
slot is considered as operational, if all faults are located in the execution unit of 
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that slot and at least a single operator of the execution unit is operational. Thus, 
an operation v can be scheduled into slot s, if there is no faulty component in that 
slot or all faulty components are operators in the execution unit of that slot which 
are not required for executing the operation v. Two examples are shown in figure 
3-14. 
Add r0,r2 -> r4 Add r3,r1 -> r5 shl r6 -> r6
mul r0,r1 -> r8Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7 shl r6 -> r6
Inc r20 -> r20 Mul r4,r5 -> r0 Sub r4,r1 -> r9 Dec r6 -> r6
Shr r8 -> r8 NOP
NOP
Inc r20 -> r20Add r0,r9 -> r2  
Add r0,r2 -> r4 Add r3,r1 -> r5 shl r6 -> r6
mul r0,r1 -> r8 Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7
shl r6 -> r6 Inc r20 -> r20 Mul r4,r5 -> r0
Sub r4,r1 -> r9 Dec r6 -> r6 Shr r8 -> r8
NOP
NOP
NOP
NOP
Add r0,r9 -> r2 NOP Inc r20 -> r20 NOP  
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-14: Schedule that is obtained from the schedule in figure 3-13 (a) after adaptation at slot level. 
The schedule in figure 3-14 (a) is obtained from the original schedule in figure 3-13 
(a) for a fault state in which only execution unit 1 cannot execute add/sub-
operations, but the mul-operator in slot 1 can be used. The resources are much 
better utilized in this example than in the schedule in figure 3-13 (b). However, if, 
for example, the fault in slot 1 is located in a read port of slot 1, then the whole 
slot 1 cannot be used anymore, and the schedule in figure 3-14 (b) is obtained after 
rescheduling at execution unit level.  
3.3.2 Lowering the Granularity 
Performing the rescheduling at execution unit level forces the self-repair algorithm 
to avoid the usage of the whole slot, if there is a defect in any other component 
than the execution unit. Because an execution unit of the VARP processor only 
makes up 25% of the size of a slot (see for example table 3-5), it is more likely that 
a fault occurs in another component of the slot. For this reason a finer-grained 
fault handling for the remaining components of a slot is considered now.  
3.3.2.1 Fault Handling at Read Port Level 
The VARP processor has eight read-ports in order to support simultaneous access 
of all slots to the register file. Each read port of the register file has nearly the 
same size as an execution unit. Thus, the probability that a defect is located in a 
read port is almost equal to the probability of a fault in the execution unit. 
Therefore, a finer-grained self-repair approach should explicitly account for defects 
in the read ports, such that a slot with a faulty read-port can still be used for 
executing operations. This is achieved by avoiding the usage of the defect part of a 
read port.  
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Each slot of the VARP processor contains two read ports. A single read-port of a 
register-file with 16-bit registers consists of 16 multiplexer trees; one tree for each 
output bit of the read-port, as it is shown in figure 3-15 (a). The multiplexer tree k 
selects bit k of that register whose value should be read through this port. Thus all 
multiplexer trees of the same read port receive the same control signal r. The 
control signal of the left/right read port in slot s is the value src1/src2 from the 
fetch-register of slot s (see figure 2-1). Each multiplexer tree is built up from 2:1 
multiplexers as it is shown in figure 3-15 (b). Multiplexers 1 to 32 belong to the 
lowest level of the tree and multiplexer 63 to the highest level. 
Multiplexer
Tree 0
0 1 2 61 62 63
r
Multiplexer
Tree 14
0
r
Multiplexer
Tree 0
0 1 2 61 62 63
r
0
1
14 1
5
0
1
14
... ...
...
 
1
0 1
2
2 3
3
4 5
4
6 7
33 34
49
...
...
...
...
Bit 0
32
62 63
48
63
Multiplexer 
Tree
Bits 0 of registers 0 to 63
RL RL RL RL
RLRL
RL
RL
RL
RL
r
level 0
level 1
level 4
level 5
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 3-15: (a) Structure of a read-port in the register file. (b) Structure of a single multiplexer tree from (a). 
According to [69] the faults that affect a multiplexer structure like the read port 
can be classified into data faults and address faults. When an address fault is 
present, then the wrong input is selected by the multiplexer. Such a fault may 
occur due to a stuck-at fault in the control signal r. A data fault affects the data 
inputs and/or output of a multiplexer. For example, in figure 3-15 (b) a stuck-at 
fault at the data output of multiplexer 33 is shown. This fault prevents the correct 
reading of bit 0 from the registers 0 to 3. But bit 0 of all other registers can be 
accessed correctly. In a similar way, an address fault in a read port prevents the 
correct reading of a particular subset of registers, but in most situations at least 
some registers can be accessed correctly. It is obvious that there are faults, 
effecting that the whole read-port cannot be used anymore. For example, a data 
fault at the output of multiplexer 63. However, it is much more likely that a fault 
occurs in one of the multiplexer that belongs to a lower level, because there are 
much more multiplexers in the lower levels. Thus there is a good chance to have 
functioning access to some registers via a read-port, even if there are some faults in 
this read port. 
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Please recall that the fault state of a read port is given by the fault state function 
fsRP, and that fsRP(p,r) = 1, if and only if register r can be accessed correctly 
through read port p. I.e., the fault state is given at a functional level, no matter 
whether the fault is a data- or address fault. With this fault state function also 
multiple faults in a single read port are covered. For example, the fault state 
function for the data fault of read port p shown in figure 3-15 (b) is defined as 
 
0,  if 4
( , )
1,  otherwise
r
fsRP p r
  
 
Please note that the example in figure 3-15 (b) only shows a single multiplexer tree 
of a read port. It is assumed that all other multiplexer trees of the same read port 
are faultless in this example. 
For fault handling, the usage of a faulty sub-components in a read port p is 
avoided by accessing only registers r through the read port p, for which 
fsRP(p,r) = 1. I.e., the rescheduling algorithm in listing 3-5 must schedule only 
such operations into slot s that use registers that can be accessed correctly through 
the used read port. This is incorporated in the rescheduling algorithm by defining 
the function CanBeExecuted(v,s) from listing 3-5 as  
 CanBeExecuted(v,s) := fsEU(s,v)  fsSlot(s)   
  (fsRP(2  s, src1(v))  ØusesLRP(type(v)))   
  (fsRP(2  s + 1, src2(v)  ØusesRRP(type(v))). 
In this definition src1(v) is the register number of the left operand, src2(v) is the 
register number of the right operand. The functions useLRP :   {0,1} and 
useRRP :   {0,1} determine for a given operation type, whether this operation 
type uses the left respectively the right read port or not. It is usesLRP(t) = 1, if 
and only if operations of type t uses the right read port. Now suppose that 
operation v uses the left, but not the right read port. Then the expression 
ØusesRRP(type(v)) becomes true and the fault state of the right read port, given 
by fsRP, becomes superfluous for the evaluation of the expression. I.e., whether 
operation v can be scheduled to slot s depends in this situation only on the fault 
state of the left read port and on the fault states of the execution unit and the 
slot.  
An example for the application of the rescheduling algorithm at read port level on 
the schedule in figure 3-14 (a) is given in figure 3-16. 
Add r0,r2 -> r4 Add r3,r1 -> r5shl r6 -> r6
mul r0,r1 -> r8Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7shl r6 -> r6
Inc r20 -> r20 Mul r4,r5 -> r0 Sub r4,r1 -> r9 Dec r6 -> r6
Shr r8 -> r8 NOP
NOP
Inc r20 -> r20 Add r0,r9 -> r2  
Figure 3-16: Schedule from figure 3-14 (a) adapted at read-port level. 
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It is assumed that registers r0 and r1 cannot be accessed via the left read-port of 
slot 2. Moreover, the add/sub-operator in slot 1 is still faulty. I.e., the left operand 
of all operations, which are scheduled to slot 2, must be distinct from r0 and r1. 
This property is violated by the div-operation and one add-operation in the 
schedule in figure 3-14 (a). The rescheduling at read port level exchanges the 
operations from slot 2 and 3 in the second and fourth instructions. The obtained 
schedule in figure 3-16 executes the program correctly without reading r0 and r1 
through the left read port of slot 2 and without using the add/sub-operator from 
slot 1. Note that the handling of both faults at slot level would result in a schedule 
that contains only NOPs in slots 2 and 3. Thus the schedule in figure 3-16 utilizes 
the available resources much better. However, if there is a fault in a bypass of a 
slot, then this fault must be handled at read port level by declaring the whole slot 
as faulty. This limitation is eliminated by self-repair at bypass-level described in 
the subsequent section. 
3.3.2.2 Fault Handling at Bypass Level 
In this section it is shown how a slot can be used for executing operations, even if 
there are faults in its bypasses. Moreover, it will be shown how this slot can be 
used, even when its read port(s) are completely failing; i.e., no register can be 
accessed through the read port(s).  
Each slot has a left and a right bypass. The left bypass provides the left operand 
and the right bypass the right operand (see figure 2-1) for the execution unit. A 
bypass selects either  
• the value from its corresponding read port, or  
• one of the four values from the execution stage (these are the values 
ex0,…,ex3 at the outputs of each execution units EU0,…,EU3),  
• or one of the four values from the write-back stage (these are the value 
wb0,…,wb3 at the outputs of the four write-back registers).  
Thus a bypass has the same structure as a read port for a register file with nine 
registers. The structure of a single multiplexer tree of a bypass is shown in figure 
3-17 together with the multiplexer tree from the corresponding read port.  
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Figure 3-17: Structure of a single multiplexer tree of a bypass and its connection with the multiplexer tree of the 
corresponding read port. 
The input that must be selected from the bypass is binary coded into the bpCtrl 
signal. This signal is generated from the bypass control logic. The bypass control 
must decide whether forwarding is needed or not. When no forwarding is needed, 
then the multiplexer in the highest level of the bypass multiplexer tree must select 
the value from the read port, otherwise it must select that value from the 
forwarding network. Each multiplexer tree of the bypass can have the same data 
and address faults as a read port. Moreover, a fault in the bypass control logic will 
also cause an address fault. The functional misbehaviour produced by either of 
these faults is modelled by the bypass fault state functions fsBPex and fsBPwb 
that were defined in section 2.2.2. Please recall that the meaning of these functions 
for s, d  SLOTS is: 
• If fsBPex(s, 2  d) = 0, then the value from the execution stage of slot s 
cannot be read correctly through the left read port of slot d. 
• If fsBPex(s, 2  d + 1) = 0, then the value from the execution stage of slot s 
cannot be read correctly through the right read port of slot d. 
• If fsBPwb(s, 2  d) = 0, then the value from the write-back register of slot s 
cannot be read correctly through the left read port of slot d. 
• If fsBPwb(s, 2  d + 1) = 0, then the value from the write-back register of 
slot s cannot be read correctly through the right read port of slot d. 
The functional misbehaviour that in slot d a value from the read port is not read 
correctly through the bypass, when forwarding is not needed, is modelled by the 
read port fault state function fsRP. Then for all r  REGS fsRP(2  d, r) = 0 if 
the left bypass is faulty, and fsRP(2  d + 1, r) = 0, if the right bypass is faulty. A 
fault in the bypass is now handled by avoiding the usage of the faulty bypass. This 
is achieved in two ways: 
1. Either an operation is moved into another slot with a working bypass, or 
2. the distance between the producer of an operand and the consumer of an 
operand is changed.  
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In order to determine the distance between an operation that produces a value and 
an operation that consumes a value, it is assumed that the instructions of a basic 
block are enumerated. Then the number of the last instruction that defines register 
r must be remembered for each register r. This is accomplished by the function 
lastDef that can be defined easily in the rescheduling algorithm in listing 3-5 (see 
line 21). There, for each scheduled operation v with destination register r, 
lastDef(r) is set to the number of the current instruction (instructionCount). 
Moreover, for each register r the slot in which this register has been lastly defined 
is remembered by the function srcSlot : REG  SLOT, whose value is set in line 
22 in listing 3-5. If an operation v, which reads the register r, is scheduled some 
instructions later, then the distance between the producer u of the value in r and 
the consumer v of the value in r is determined by instructionCount – lastDef(r). 
This distance is used to determine whether the value of r is found in the register 
file, in the execution stage or in the write-back stage. Therefore, the following 
three cases are distinguished: 
1. instructionCount – lastDef(r) = 1: Then u is in the execution stage, while v 
is in the decode stage. Thus, the value of r is located in the execution stage 
and the bypass provides the register value of r from the execution stage. 
2. instructionCount – lastDef(r) = 2: Then u is in the write-back stage, while v 
is in the decode stage. Thus, the value of r is located in the write-back stage 
and the bypass provides the register value of r from the write-back stage. 
3. instructionCount – lastDef(r) > 2: Then the processing of u in the pipeline is 
finished, and the value of r is already stored in the register file. The bypass 
provides the register value of r from the read port. 
According to the fault state functions fsBPex and fsBPwb, an operation v cannot 
be scheduled into slot d of the current instruction 
• if its left operand is produced from an operation u that was scheduled with a 
distance of 1 into slot s and fsBPex(s, 2  d) = 0 or  
• the right operand is produced from an operation u that was scheduled with a 
distance of 1 into slot s and fsBPex(s, 2  d + 1) = 0 or 
• its left is produced from an operation u that was scheduled with a distance 
of 2 into slot s and fsBPwb(s, 2  d) = 0 or 
• the right operand is produced from an operation u that was scheduled with a 
distance of 2 into slot s and fsBPwb(s, 2  d + 1) = 0. 
These conditions are incorporated into the function CanBeScheduled in listing 3-5 
as follows by the lines 4 and 5 for the left operand and lines 9 and 10 for the right 
operand of an operation v: 
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1 CanBeExecuted(v, s) := 
2  fsEU(s,v)  fsSlot(s)   
3  ( ØusesLRP(type(v))  
4   instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)] = 1  fsBPex(srcSlot(src1(v)), 2s)  
5   instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)] = 2  fsBPwb(srcSlot(src1(v)), 2s)  
6   instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)] > 2  fsRP(2s, src1(v)))  
7  
8  ( ØusesRRP(type(v))  
9   instructionCount -lastDef[src2(v)]=1  fsBPex(scrSlot(src2(v), 2s+1)  
10   instructionCount -lastDef[src2(v)]=2  fsBPwb(srcSlot(src2(v), 2s+1)  
11   instructionCount -lastDef[src2(v)] > 2  fsRP(2s+1,src2(v))) 
Line 2 ensures that the operation can be executed by the execution unit of slot s. 
Lines 3 to 6 will check whether or not the left operand can be provided correctly 
for the operation, and lines 8 to 11 will check this for the right operand. The 
expressions in lines 3 and 8 make sure that the expressions from line 3 to 6 
respectively 8 to 10 become true, if the corresponding operand (left respectively 
right one) is not used from the current operation. In that case the operation can be 
scheduled into the current slot, even if the bypass and/or read port are faulty. The 
expressions in line 6 (for the left operand) and line 11 (for the right operand) 
become active, if the operand is read from the register file, i.e. the distance 
between producer and consumer is larger than 2. In that case it is checked whether 
or not the requested register can be accessed correctly through the corresponding 
read port.  
For example, suppose operation v uses register r1 as left operand, register r7 as 
right operand, and should be scheduled into slot 2. Furthermore, r1 has been 
defined from an operation that was scheduled in the previous instruction in slot 3 
(i.e., instructionCount - lastDef(1) = 1 and srcSlot(r1) = 3) and r7 was defined 
three instructions before (i.e., instructionCount - lastDef(7) = 3). Thus, the value 
of r1 is found in the execution stage of slot 3 and the value of r7 is found in the 
register file. This means that the left bypass in slot 2 must provide the input value 
ex3 correctly and the right bypass must provide the value from the corresponding 
read port (see figure 3-17). Now the expression CanBeScheduled(v, 2) becomes 
true, if and only if fsBPex(3, 2  2) in line 4 and fsRP(2  2 + 1, 7) in line 11 are 
both true. If this is not the case, then v is not scheduled in slot 2. 
Please note that an operation that reads a register may be scheduled into a slot s, 
even if the register cannot be accessed correctly through the used read port in that 
slot. This is always possible, if the needed value is available in a pipeline register, 
and the forwarding from that pipeline register to slot s is functioning. Thus, the 
bypass can be used to feed the execution units directly with data from the same or 
other slots via the bypass without using a faulty read-port.  
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In figure 3-18 an example is given for a schedule that is obtained from the schedule 
in figure 3-16 by taking into account that the complete read-port for the left 
operand in slot 0 is faulty (i.e., fsRP(0, r) = 0 for all r  REGS). Thus, only 
operations whose left operand can be obtained from a pipeline register can be 
scheduled to slot 0. For this reason, in instruction 1 a NOP was scheduled to slot 
0. The value of registers r4 in instruction 2 is obtained from the execution stage, 
because it was computed in instruction 1. Similarly, the value of r6 is computed in 
instruction 2 and is read in instruction 3 from the execution stage, too. The value 
of r8 is computed in instruction 2 and is read in instruction 4 from the write-back 
stage. Thus, all left operands for operations in slot 0 can be loaded from the 
pipeline registers, and no access to the register file via the faulty read-port is 
necessary.  
Add r0,r2 -> r4Add r3,r1 -> r5shl r6 -> r6
mul r0,r1 -> r8Sub r4,r5 -> r4 div r0,r1 -> r7shl r6 -> r6
Inc r20 -> r20Mul r4,r5 -> r0 Sub r4,r1 -> r9Dec r6 -> r6
Shr r8 -> r8 NOP
NOP
Inc r20 -> r20 Add r0,r9 -> r2  
Figure 3-18: Schedule adapted at bypass level. 
The proposed rescheduling algorithm works fine for each basic block separately. 
But the register allocation for the user application is usually done globally in order 
to avoid unnecessary load- and store-operations in each basic block. Therefore, a 
value may be written into register r in a particular basic block, and the same value 
is read in another basic block. This may creates problems for the rescheduling of 
the first two instructions of each basic block, because a basic block b may have 
more than one control flow predecessors. Suppose that each of the control flow 
predecessors writes to the same register, which is accessed in the first two 
instructions of basic block b. Such a situation is shown in the control flow graph in 
figure 3-19. 
jz r6,label
ldc #2,r1
NOP NOP NOP
NOP NOP NOP
Basic Block 1...
ldc #1,r1 NOP NOP NOP
Basic Block 2...
add r1, r2, r5 NOP NOP NOP
Basic Block 3
label:
 
Figure 3-19: Example, where the location of the value in r1 in basic block 3 depends on the actual control flow. 
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There register r1 is defined in both control flow predecessors of basic block 3, and 
register r1 is accessed in the first instruction of basic block 3. Depending on the 
control flow predecessor, from which basic block 3 is entered, the value of r1 is 
either found in the register file (when control flow reaches from the basic block 1) 
or in the execute-stage (when control flow reaches from the basic block 2). Thus, 
for both situations it must be checked that register r1 can be accessed correctly, 
when the add-operation is scheduled by the rescheduling algorithm at the shown 
position. This requires knowledge about all control flow predecessors of each basic 
block, which would dramatically increase the complexity of the rescheduling 
algorithm. For this reason another strategy is used, where only the direct control 
flow predecessor a of each basic block b must be known. This is the basic block 
that can enter b without taking a branch operation. In figure 3-19 basic block 2 is 
the direct control flow predecessor of basic block 3. For all control flow 
predecessors that enter basic block b via a taken branch, it is ensured by resetting 
the pipeline that all values written in these control flow predecessors into a register 
are found in the register file, when the first instruction of b is executed. Now 
suppose that basic block b is entered from a direct control flow predecessor a. 
Then the first instruction of basic block b is located at address x, and the last 
instruction of basic block a must be located at address x – 1. Please note that the 
predecessor block a may contain a conditional branch in its last instruction, but 
this branch is not taken. The sequential ordering of basic blocks a and b implies 
that the basic blocks are processed in the given sequential ordering by the 
rescheduling algorithm. Thus basic block a has been processed by the rescheduling 
algorithm immediately before basic block b is processed. Therefore, the registers 
defined in the last two instructions of basic block a can be remembered from the 
rescheduling algorithm. During the rescheduling of basic block b, none of these 
registers is allowed to be a source operand in the first two instructions of basic 
block b. With this restriction all registers accessed in b within the first two 
instructions are located in the register file. The restriction can be incorporated 
efficiently into the rescheduling algorithm by introducing an additional function 
minInstr : REGS  . This function specifies for each register the first instruction 
in which this register is allowed to be accessed. For a register r that is defined in 
the last instruction of basic block a is minInstr(r) ≔ 2, and for a register r defined 
in the second last instruction of a, it is minInstr(r) ≔ 1. The complete function 
minInstr for a basic block b is easily obtained from the lastDef-function of the 
previously scheduled basic block a by 
 
0,  if ( ) 2
( ) :
( ) 1,  otherwise
a a
b
a a
lastDef r instructionCount
minInstr r
lastDef r instructionCount
     
. 
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Thereby, lastDefa is the function as it is defined in listing 3-5 after executing the 
rescheduling algorithm for the preceding basic block a. instructionCounta is the 
number of instructions in basic block a after rescheduling (see listing 3-5). 
Now an operation with source operand r can be scheduled into instruction currInst 
of basic block b only, if instructionCount ≥ minInstr(r). This restriction is 
incorporated in the function CanBeExecuted in lines 4 and 10 as follows: 
1 CanBeExecuted(v, s) := 
2  fsEU(s,v)  fsSlot(s)   
3  ( ØusesLRP(type(v))  
4   instructionCount ≥ minInstr(src1(v))  
5   (instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)] = 1  fsBPex(srcSlot(src1(v)), 2s)  
6   instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)]=2  fsBPwb(srcSlot(src1(v)), 2s)  
7   instructionCount -lastDef[src1(v)] > 2  fsRP(2s, src1(v))))  
8  
9  ( ØusesRRP(type(v))  
10   instructionCount ≥ minInstr(src2(v))  
11   (instructionCount-lastDef[src2(v)]=1  fsBPex(scrSlot(src2(v), 2s+1)  
12   instructionCount -lastDef[src2(v)]=2  fsBPwb(srcSlot(src2(v), 2s+1)  
13   instructionCount -lastDef[src2(v)] > 2  fsRP(2s+1,src2(v)))) 
The given definition of the function CanBeScheduled can be implemented 
efficiently in assembly for the VARP processor by using simple arrays. Thus, the 
complexity was not increased very much compared with the complexity of that 
function in the coarse grained implementation. 
3.3.2.3 Register-Level 
All of the software-based techniques presented so far will not help to cope with 
faults in the register file. For example, it is not possible to replace a faulty register 
by another register in the program code. However, the 64 registers of the VARP 
processor including the write-ports makes up about 30% of the processor. Thus, it 
is very likely that a fault will occur in the register file. The structure of a single 
register k, which also includes the logic for writing a value into this register, is 
shown in figure 3-20.  
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Figure 3-20: Implementation of a single register of the register file including the write-port. 
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Bit m of the register is stored in flip-flop m (FF m). The input for flip-flop m is 
selected by the multiplexer Mux m. This is either the output of flip-flop m 
(meaning that the register keeps the current value) or bit m of one of the four 
write-back registers. The compare logic (=k) determines the control signal of these 
multiplexers. For this reason, the compare logic compares the destination register 
number from the write-back stage of each slot (bit-fields dstWb in the write-back 
registers in figure 2-1) with k. If one of these register numbers matches with k, 
then the corresponding control signal for the multiplexers is generated.  
A fault that appears in such a register may affect the compare logic, the 
multiplexer, or the flip-flops of the register itself. In each case a wrong value may 
be loaded into the corresponding register. This may happen, too, even if the 
register should not be loaded. This will wrongly overwrite the value in the register. 
In any case, the fault state of the register file is modelled by the register fault state 
function fsRF, where fsRF(r) = 0 means that register r is faulty. The usage of 
such a faulty register is avoided by never using the data from such a register. In 
order to avoid the usage of a register, a global register renaming can be done by 
the rescheduling algorithm from listing 3-5. I.e., when the original schedule of the 
user application is generated, for example by a compiler, then a few registers in the 
register file are preserved as backup registers. These registers are not used in the 
original user application. When a fault occurs in one of the used registers, then 
each usage of such a register is replaced by the usage of a backup register. This 
replacement can be done in the scheduling algorithm from listing 3-5 in line 20. 
There the used registers in operation v are checked, and, if necessary, replaced by 
a backup register before the operation is scheduled into the new instruction. 
Because the register renaming is done globally, this functionality is easily 
implemented by using a simple mapping rename : REGS → REGS that maps each 
functioning register r on register r, and each faulty register r' on a backup register 
distinct from r'. In section 3.3.4 it is shown by simulations that a small number of 
backup registers is sufficient for most situations. 
3.3.3 Relocation of Basic Blocks 
This section describes how the prolongation of the schedule of a rescheduled basic 
block is treated. Because the rescheduling algorithm can move operations into 
other instructions, the adapted schedule of a basic block may become longer than 
the original one. This will create the following problems: 
1. The adapted schedule of the basic block may not fit into the place of the 
original schedule. Thus, the instructions that follow the original schedule 
must be relocated in the program memory. 
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2. The relocation of instructions will also change the target addresses of some 
branch operations. 
3. In order to cope with the first two problems, the basic block boundaries 
must be known. 
Solutions for these problems were presented by Müller and Schölzel in [124]. In the 
subsequent sections it is briefly described, how basic block boundaries can be 
reconstructed, how the relocation of instructions is done, and how the patching of 
branch target addresses will work. 
3.3.3.1 Reconstruction of Basic Block Boundaries 
A simple solution for determining the basic block boundaries in the binary code of 
the user application is a lookup-function t that stores for each basic block i of the 
application its length l(i). Knowing the start address s of the first basic block and 
making the assumption that the basic blocks are consecutively numbered by their 
sequential order in the program memory beginning with 0, the start address of 
basic block i is obtained by 
 
1
0
( )
i
k
s l k


 . 
This solution is simple, but consumes maybe too much memory depending on the 
application, because l must be kept in memory.  For example, having an 
application with 10.000 basic blocks requires at least 10.000 bytes of data 
memory19 that are permanently occupied by the function l. 
A more sophisticated method is the reconstruction of the basic block boundaries 
from the binary code of the user application. According to definition 2-2 a new 
basic block starts after each branch-operation and at each target address of a 
branch operation. In order to determine statically the target addresses from the 
program code, they must be given as constants in the branch operations. Register 
indirect branches are not allowed, except for returning from a function call. 
Moreover, it is assumed that all target addresses are absolute addresses. Program 
counter relative branches can be handled, but they are not discussed here, because 
the VARP processor does not support relative branches. 
The reconstruction of basic block boundaries is integrated into the relocation of 
instructions. In order to have enough buffer memory for the prolonged schedules of 
the basic blocks, the complete user application is moved first at the end of the 
program memory before the rescheduling for all basic blocks starts. During this 
19 Assuming that no basic block is longer than 255 instructions. 
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process the basic block boundaries are determined. The concept for the used 
memory layout is shown in figure 3-21. 
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Figure 3-21: (a) Memory layout at startup time. (b) User Application was moved to the end of the program memory. (c) A 
prefix of the user application has been adapted to the current fault state and moved back to the original location. 
The normal memory layout is shown in figure 3-21 (a). In order to have the buffer 
memory at the beginning of the memory area of the user application, the user 
application is moved to the end of the program memory as shown in figure 3-21 
(b). This is done by reading small fragments of the user application into the data 
memory using the arbiter protocol from section 3.2.2. Then each fragment is 
written back into the program memory at address z + b, where b is the size of the 
buffer memory and z is the original address of the fragment. Before each fragment 
is written back into the program memory, it is scanned for branch operations. 
Each branch operation at address x that branches to the target address y creates 
the beginning of basic blocks at addresses x + 1 and y. These addresses will be 
collected in an ascending order in the array s. After collecting all start addresses in 
array s, s(i) denotes the start address of basic block i. This will create dynamically 
a similar memory consumption as the simple approach using a static lookup 
function l, but the array s must not be stored permanently.  
3.3.3.2 Relocation of Basic Blocks 
The relocation of the basic blocks is strongly coupled with the execution of the 
rescheduling algorithm in listing 3-5. A single fragment of the backward shifted 
user application is moved from the program memory into the data memory. 
Thereby the already gathered basic block information in s is used such that only 
complete basic blocks are moved from program to data memory. After that a 
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sequence of basic blocks is located in the data memory. Using the basic block 
information in s, the rescheduling algorithm is called for each basic block in that 
fragment. The rescheduling algorithm adapts the current schedule of the basic 
block to the current fault state of the core. Thereby the rescheduled basic block is 
written into a new location of the data memory. After rescheduling a single basic 
block, the prolongation e of that basic block is known. The accumulation of all 
prolongations obtained so far results in the relocation of the next basic block. This 
displacement is remembered by a function bbDispl :  → , where bbDispl(i) gives 
the displacement of basic block i. After processing all basic blocks of the current 
fragment, this fragment is written back into the program memory at the first free 
address of the memory buffer. After that the probably shortened memory buffer is 
located behind the lastly written fragment, and the next unprocessed fragment is 
moved from the program into the data memory. This situation is shown in figure 
3-21 (c). 
Please note that there are various reasons, why the self-repair routine may fail in 
this stage: 
1. The rescheduling algorithm may fail, because it is not able to find a legal 
schedule that contains all operations of the original basic block. This can 
happen, when the current fault state of the processor prevents the scheduling 
of particular operations. This limitation is discussed in more detail in section 
3.4. 
2. The prolongation of the rescheduled basic blocks becomes longer than the 
length of the memory buffer. Thus the rescheduled fragment will not fit into 
program memory without overwriting another basic block. 
In both situations the self-repair method fails and the system has a failure; i.e., the 
occurred fault(s) cannot be covered anymore with the used fault tolerance method. 
3.3.3.3 Patching Branch Instructions 
When all basic blocks are relocated, then the patching of branch operations can 
start. For this reason the last instruction of each basic block is moved into the 
data memory again. Only these instructions will contain branch operations. When 
such an instruction contains a branch-operation with target address d, then d must 
be patched. In order to do so, the lookup-table s is used for determining the basic 
block i for which holds: 
 s(i) = d 
Please note that the lookup-table s contains the original start addresses of all basic 
blocks, and d is the branch target according to these original addresses. The 
displacement of basic block i is given by bbDispl(i). Thus, the target address of the 
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branch operation must be changed to d + bbDispl(i). Please note that i can be 
determined efficiently with a binary search, because the entries of the lookup-table 
s are given in ascending order. After patching the branch operation, the 
instruction is written back into the program memory. 
3.3.4 Results 
In this section the performance degradation and reliability improvement of the 
software-based rescheduling are presented. In particular, the benefits of the fine-
grained self-repair capabilities provided by the rescheduling are compared with the 
capabilities of the previously presented coarse-grained methods.  
3.3.4.1 Performance Degradation 
The software-based rescheduling algorithm has in common with the hardware-
based rebinding algorithm that both approaches cause a graceful performance 
degradation, when there are faults present in the processor. The software-based 
rebinding, on the other hand, can handle a specified set of fault states without 
causing a performance degradation. However, when software-based rebinding is 
used, then the performance degradation is introduced by the fault tolerant 
scheduling. Table 3-6 compares the worst-case performance degradations of the 
software-based rescheduling (SC) with the worst-case performance degradations of 
the hardware-based rebinding (HR) and with the performance degradations caused 
by the software-based rebinding (SR) for particular k-slot- and k-operator-faults. 
I.e., faults are handled either at slot level or execution unit level. According to the 
results shown in table 3-6, the runtime overhead of the software-based methods is 
much lower than the overhead caused by the hardware-based method. However, an 
interesting observation is that the runtime overhead of the software-based 
rebinding is sometimes a little bit lower than the runtime overhead of the 
software-based rescheduling, although the rescheduling has more degrees of 
freedom for moving operations. This result comes from the fact that the used 
rescheduling algorithm relies on a very simple heuristic that, for example, does not 
take into account the mobility of an operation, as it can be done by the fault 
tolerant scheduling. By this, some bad decisions are made by the rescheduling 
algorithm. These bad decisions increase the length of the adapted schedule. 
However, improving the simple heuristic will also improve the complexity of the 
rescheduling algorithm, which may increase significantly its runtime. A further 
examination of this trade-off was not done within the frame of this work, but could 
be part of future research, maybe leading to a more complex compiler backend 
that can be embedded into a system-on-chip for re-compiling the user application. 
Moreover, the presented runtime overhead for the software-based rescheduling in 
table 3-6, is the worst case for a particular k-operator-fault/k-slot-fault. In most 
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cases there was only a single fault state among all fault states belonging to the set 
of a particular k-operator-fault/k-slot-fault for which this worst case was achieved. 
For all other fault states the corresponding runtime overhead was lower. In several 
cases it was even lower than the runtime overhead caused by the software-based 
rebinding. 
Fault Class 1-operator-fault 1-slot-fault 2-operator-fault 2-slot-fault 
Method HR SC SR HR SC SR HR SC SR HR SC SR 
ARF 63% 25% 25% 100% 25% 25% 125% 25% 25% 200% 75% 88% 
DCT-DIF 82% 13% 36% 100% 38% 64% 145% 64% 73% 200% 118% 91% 
FFT 70% 30% 10% 100% 30% 30% 140% 90% 30% 200% 130% 80% 
EWF 93% 7% 0% 93% 7% 14% 150% 36% 14% 171% 36% 36% 
DCT-DIT 64% 21% 7% 100% 21% 28% 114% 36% 36% 200% 71% 79% 
DCT-LEE 79% 21% 0% 100% 28% 21% 157% 43% 21% 193% 86% 79% 
Average: 75% 20% 13% 99% 25% 30% 139% 49% 33% 194% 86% 76% 
Table 3-6: Comparison of the worst-case runtime overhead caused by hardware-based rebinding (HR), software-based 
rebinding (SR) and software-based rescheduling (SC). 
The comparison in table 3-6 does not take into account the benefit of the software-
based rescheduling, when faults are handled at read-port and bypass level. For 
example, a slot fault in table 3-6 means that the faulty slot cannot be used, no 
matter which self-repair method is used, and no matter which component of the 
slot is faulty. However, when the faulty component is a read port or a bypass, then 
the slot containing the faulty components can be used for some operations, if the 
fine-grained rescheduling is used for adapting the user application. The effect of 
this granularity reduction is shown by the following example. Four faults were 
injected in the VARP core: 
• The first fault affects the adder of slot 1.  
• The second fault affects the left bypass of slot 0 (forwarding from the EX-
stage of any slot to the DE-stage is faulty).  
• Two faults affect the left read port of slot 3 (register 0 to 3 and 4 to 5 
cannot be accessed through this port).  
Thus, only slot 2 is faultless. Table 3-7 shows the runtime of three benchmark 
programs after adapting them to this fault state at different granularity levels with 
the software-based rescheduling algorithm. I.e., the performance degradation is 
expressed in terms of required runtime relative to the runtime of the benchmarks 
on a faultless VARP processor. Thereby the runtime on the faultless VARP 
processor is 100%.  
135 
Fine-Grained Self-Repair 
Benchmark 
Runtime after applying software-based rescheduling 
at the following granularity level 
Slot Execution Unit Bypass and Readport 
ARF 350% 200% 125% 
FFT 380% 270% 110% 
EWF 243% 193% 121% 
DIT 343% 200% 109% 
DIF 373% 190% 114% 
LEE 350% 193% 114% 
Average 340% 208% 116% 
Table 3-7: Runtime of the rescheduled benchmark programs after adapting them using different granularity levels. 
When the repair routine handles faults only at slot level, then only slot 2 can be 
used for the execution of the benchmark programs. This results on average in a 
runtime of 340%. If faults are handled at slot- and execution unit level, then slot 2 
can be used and slot 1 can be used for executing multiplications. Slots 0 and 3 
cannot be used. This causes on average a runtime of about 208%. Slot 0 and 3 can 
be used, too, if faults are handled at bypass level and read port-level (runtime on 
average 116%). This shows that by a fine-grained self-repair the graceful 
performance degradation can be reduced substantially, because faulty slots can be 
used for carrying out operations that could not be used if only a coarse-grained 
self-repair scheme is applied20.  
The proposed rescheduling algorithm was implemented in assembler for the VARP 
processor. The runtime grows quadratically with the basic block length. Table 3-8 
shows the worst case runtime of the rescheduling algorithm in clock cycles, for 
adapting the shown benchmark programs. For comparison table 3-8 also shows the 
runtimes of the software-based rebinding routine for these benchmarks from table 
3-4.  
Benchmark  
(Length) 
1-operator-fault 1-slot-fault 
rescheduling rebinding rescheduling rebinding 
ARF (8) 44655 2543 45296 2390 
DCT-DIF (11) 65554 3961 87338 3445 
FFT (10) 66771 3740 77116 3085 
EWF (14) 125901 3726 132782 3890 
DIT (14) 116064 4365 117124 4225 
LEE (14) 109168 5010 123304 4085 
Table 3-8: Worst-case runtime of the software-based rescheduling in clock cycles for adapting particular benchmarks. 
20 The author has published in [135, 166] also techniques based on scalable algorithms that can be 
used to trade runtime of the algorithm against service quality. With these techniques the service 
quality can be reduced such that after an adaptation of the schedule, which has increased the 
schedule length, the real time constraints may be met. 
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It can be noticed that the runtime of the rescheduling is more than a magnitude of 
order larger than the runtime of the rebinding algorithm. This has a strong impact 
on the runtime needed for adapting a larger user application. This is illustrated by 
the following example: The sum of the lengths of the benchmark programs in table 
3-8 is 71 instructions (see table 2-4). The execution of the rescheduling algorithm 
for these benchmarks takes 1.17 milliseconds, when a 1-slot-fault is present, and a 
clock rate of 500 MHz for the VARP processor is assumed. Assuming that an 
application with 216 instructions is composed of basic blocks similar to the 
benchmarks in table 3-8, the total runtime will be (216 / 71)  1.17 
milliseconds = 1.08 seconds. This is approximately 28 times the adaptation time 
needed by of the software-based rebinding for the same user application. This 
example shows that increasing the complexity of the used heuristic in the 
rescheduling algorithm, in order to improve the quality of the generated schedule 
as discussed above, must be done carefully. Otherwise the runtime for adapting the 
user application will exceed very soon an acceptable amount of time. 
3.3.4.2 Reliability Improvement 
In contrast to the software-based rebinding, the software-based rescheduling does 
not require to specify the tolerable faults in advance. Assuming that the startup 
phase is organized by the VARP processor itself, as it was described for the 
software-based rebinding in section 3.2.4, and that no register renaming is 
performed, the VARP processor with rescheduling is operational as long as the 
register file and the control logic are faultless, and there is at least one faultless 
slot. The same property was assumed for calculating the reliability of the 
hardware-based rebinding in section 2.4.2. Hence, the reliability function Rsca(t) for 
the VARP processor with software-based rescheduling, but without register 
renaming, is obtained in the same way as the reliability function in equation (2-4). 
The adopted reliability function for Rsca(t) is given by 
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This formula reflects the situation that all four slots form a parallel system, and 
this parallel system forms a serial system together with the control logic, the 
register file, and the arbiter. Rsca(t) is plotted in figure 3-22 for a failure rate of 
l = 1  10-5. The reliability Rswa(t) of the VARP processor with software-based 
rebinding is also plotted in figure 3-22, and it is quite similar to the reliability of 
the VARP processor with software-based rescheduling. Please recall that Rswa is 
the reliability of a VARP processor that can handle faults only in a single slot. 
Hence, as in the hardware-based rebinding approach, software-based fault handling 
in multiple slots will not result in a significantly higher reliability than fault 
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handling in a single slot only, except the system is exposed to a significantly higher 
failure rate, as it will be shown in figure 3-23. 
 
Figure 3-22: Reliability plots for the software-based rescheduling with register renaming (Rdp) and without register 
renaming (Rsca). 
Figure 3-22 shows also the reliability plot for a VARP processor with software-
based rescheduling and a fault tolerant register file. The register file becomes fault 
tolerant, if register renaming is performed by the rescheduling algorithm as 
described in section 3.3.2.3. Thereby, each register forms a single component, 
whose reliability function is given in table 3-5. If five registers of the register file 
are preserved as backup registers, then the register file of the VARP processor 
becomes a 59-of-64 system, whose reliability is computed according to equation 
(1-20). The reliability function Rdp(t) for the VARP processor with software-based 
rescheduling and with register renaming is plotted in figure 3-22 for a failure rate 
of l = 10-5. Thereby, the reliability reaches almost the reliability RNFT1 of a non-
fault tolerant VARP processor, whose reliability function is plotted for l = 5  10-7 
(see also figure 2-6). I.e., by employing the software-based rescheduling with 
register renaming a 20 times higher failure rate is acceptable for the fault tolerant 
system, while maintaining the reliability.  
The plotted reliability function Rrf(t) in figure 3-22 is the reliability function for 
the VARP processor, when only register renaming is performed. I.e., only faults 
affecting the registers of the register file can be handled, and faults affecting any 
component of the slots cannot be handled. It can be noticed that Rrf is clearly 
below the reliability of a VARP processor, where slot-faults can be handled, e.g., 
Rsca. Hence, fault handling in slots is more beneficial for the VARP processor than 
fault handling only in the register file. However, fault handling only in the register 
file increases the reliability compared with a non-fault tolerant version of the 
0,5
0,55
0,6
0,65
0,7
0,75
0,8
0,85
0,9
0,95
1
0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8 2
R
el
ia
bi
li
ty
 R
(t
)
RNFT1(t), where l1 = 510-7
Time in years × 10-1
Rsca(t), where l = 110-5
Rrf(t), where l = 110-5
Rswa(t), where l = 110-5
t
Rdp(t), where l = 110-5
138 
Chapter 3 
processor and it can be implemented in a much easier manner than fault handling 
in slots, because only a global register renaming in the user application must be 
done. Moreover, if the statically scheduled processor has a larger register file, for 
example with 256 registers, while the data path remains small, then fault handling 
only in the register file, may become a viable simple solution for improving the 
reliability. At least software-based register renaming can be also employed in 
processors that have a simple scalar data path only. In such processors the 
registers of the register file will be the only inherently available redundant 
components. 
Now it is shown that fault handling in up to three slots becomes superior to fault 
handling in a single slot for higher failure rates. Consider a failure rate of 
l = 1  10-3 as it was also used for the plots in figure 2-15. As already discussed in 
section 2.4.2, handling of multiple faults in systems that are affected by such a 
high failure rate is only beneficial, if the portion of the non-fault tolerant 
components in the system is very low. This is achieved for the VARP processor by 
making the register file fault tolerant. By this only the arbiter and the control 
logic are non-fault tolerant components in the VARP processor. Both together 
constitute only 5.2% of the cell area. The reliability plot for handling faults in up 
to three slots (Rdp3) is compared with the reliability plot for handling faults only in 
single slot (Rdp1) in figure 3-23.  
 
Figure 3-23: Reliability plot for the VARP processor with fault handling at register level and high failure rate. 
In figure 3-23 can be also noticed that fault handling for such high failure rates is 
only beneficial, if the ratio of non-fault tolerant components is small. Rsca is the 
reliability plot of the VARP processor, if faults are handled in up to three slots, 
but not in the register file. Then the ratio of non-fault tolerant components in the 
VARP processor rises to 36%, and the achieved reliability is only slightly better 
than the reliability of a non-fault tolerant VARP processor (RNFT). 
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Now the benefit of the fine-grained rescheduling is considered, when the VARP 
processor is affected by multiple faults as it can happen for larger failure rates. For 
this reason it is allowed that all slots are affected by some faults. But for each 
operation at least one slot must exist, where this operation can be executed. As a 
consequence the startup process must be organized by an external entity, because 
the assumption of a single faultless slot that can be used for the startup process is 
no longer valid. For example, when the VARP processor is embedded into a multi-
core system-on-chip, then another faultless processor in the system adapts the user 
application for the VARP processor. Such a system was presented in [124]. 
Another system configuration with a small service core, is presented later in 
chapter 5.  
The probability that the VARP core is running after the occurrence of multiple 
faults is increased significantly by using the fine-grained rescheduling instead of 
the coarse-grained rescheduling. This is shown by a fault injection experiment. In 
this experiment, 10 faults were randomly injected in 1.000.000 VARP processor 
models, assuming an equal distribution of these faults over the cell area of the 
core. I.e., larger components have a higher probability of being affected by a fault. 
After that it was determined whether the VARP processor is still able to execute a 
user application, when the user application is adapted by one of the software-based 
rescheduling strategies. When rescheduling takes place at coarse-grained slot level 
without register renaming, then a VARP processor is operational, if all 10 faults 
are located in the components of the slots, and there is at least one faultless slot 
left. I.e., the register file, the control logic, and one slot must be faultless. The 
upper part of table 3-9 shows that for this scenario only 0.35% of the processors 
remain operational.  
Rescheduling is done at slot level without register renaming 
Operational 
VLIWs 
VLIWs 
with faulty 
Ctrl 
VLIWs with 
faults in the 
register file 
Percentage of the VLIWs where all faults are in k 
slots 
k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 
0.35% 17.2% 81.45% 0% 0% 0.01% 0.34% 1.0% 
Rescheduling is done at slot level with register renaming 
Operating 
VLIWs 
VLIWs with faulty Ctrl 
Percentage of the VLIWs where all faults are in 
the register file and in k slots 
k = 0 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 
44.58% 17.2% 0.001% 0.28% 7.36% 36.94% 33.93% 
Table 3-9: Surviving VARP processors if faults are handled either at slot level or at slot- and register-level. 
17.2% of the processors fail due to faults in the control logic. 81.45% of the 
processors have no fault in the control logic, but faults in the register file. And 
only 1.35% of the processors have all faults in the data path. Out of these 
processors, there is not a single VARP processor where all faults are located in a 
single slot. 0.01% of the VARP processors have all faults in exactly 2 slots, and 
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0.34% of the VARP processors have all faults in three slots such that there is only 
one working slot left. These are together the 0.35% operational processors.  
The results of the same fault injection experiment are shown in the lower part of 
table 3-9, when rescheduling is done for fault handling at slot level together with 
register renaming. In this scenario, a system is operational, when all faults are 
located in the register file or in at most three slots. Again, 17.2% of the processors 
fail due to faults in the control logic. Only 0.001% of the VARP processors have 
all 10 faults in the register file, i.e., all slots are faultless. 33.93% of the processors 
have four faulty slots. Hence, they are not operational. In total a considerable 
amount of 44.58% of the VARP processors have at least one working slot left. 
These are the operational VARP processors. This proofs that the number of 
surviving VARP processor is increased significantly, if faults are handled in a 
coarse grained manner at slot level in combination with register renaming.  
Finally it is shown that many faulty slots of the VARP processor in the fault 
injection experiment do not have catastrophic faults. This means, by applying the 
repair routine at bypass and read port level, many of these faulty slots can be used 
for some computations. Whether or not an operation can be executed in such a 
slot depends at least on the fault state of the read ports, bypasses, and execution 
units in these slots. The following simplifications are used for determining whether 
a VARP processor is operational or not: 
• It is assumed that each execution unit supports only two operation types. 
An execution unit is considered as operational, if at least one of its operators 
is faultless.  
• About 60% of the cell area of a bypass is occupied by the multiplexer trees 
of the bypass. The remaining area is occupied by the control logic of the 
bypass. A bypass is considered as operational, if its control logic is faultless.  
• A slot is considered as operational, when all pipeline registers are faultless 
and both bypasses and the execution unit are operational. It is assumed that 
faults in the read ports do not cause a catastrophic fault, because such a 
fault situation can be handled at bypass level. 
• Moreover, at least one operator of each type must be located in an 
operational slot. 
Using these assumptions, the slots that were considered as faulty in table 3-9 were 
reinvestigated. Table 3-10 shows for each VARP processor that has faults in 
exactly k slots after the fault injection experiment, how many of these slots are 
affected by a catastrophic fault, and how many of these slots are still considered as 
operational.  
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Referring to the lower part of 
table 3-9: Systems that have 
faults in exactly k slots 
Percentage of VARP models where j out of k 
slots have a catastrophic defect 
j=0 j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 
k = 1 0.12% 0.16% - - - 
k = 2 2.0% 3.7% 1.7% - - 
k = 3 7.0% 15.9% 11.3% 2.6% - 
k = 4 6.0% 13.9% 11.2% 2.8% 0% 
Table 3-10: Percentage of the systems with catastrophic faults in j slots. 
For example, according to the lower part of table 3-9, 7.36% of the processors have 
faults in exactly k = 2 slots. In row k = 2 of table 3-10 it is further classified how 
many VARP processors with faults in two slots have catastrophic faults in j slots. 
For example, 2.0% of the VARP processors have k = 2 faulty slots and 
catastrophic faults in j = 0 slots. I.e., both slots can be used for executing some 
operations. Only 1.7% of the VARP processors with two faulty slots have 
catastrophic faults in both slots. In 3.7% of the processors one out of the two 
faulty slots has a catastrophic fault. Finally, for k = 4 only 0% of all processors 
have a catastrophic fault in all four slots (see last column of table 3-10). However, 
4.4% of the VARP processors have at least one operational slot, but in all four 
slots the same operator is faulty. I.e., these processors are considered as non-
operational. Together with the 17.2% of the processors that have a fault in the 
control logic only about 21.6% of the VARP processors did not survive, if the fine-
grained self-repair method is used. Thus, 78.4% instead of 0.35% survived, when 
using a fine-grained self-repair method. I.e., if a population of VARP processors 
with 10 faults injected in each of them is considered, then the amount of surviving 
processors is increased significantly by using a fine-grained self-repair scheme with 
register renaming. 
From the results of the fault injection experiment it can be also derived, how many 
registers of the register file should be preserved as backup registers. Obviously 10 
backup registers will be sufficient for handling 10 injected faults. However, table 
3-11 shows that it will be sufficient to have only 6 backup registers, because only 
about 1.5% of the VARP processors from the experiment have defects in more 
than 6 registers after fault injection. 
Faulty registers 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
VARP processors in % 9.0 20.4 26.9 22.7 12.8 4.9 1.3 0.2 0.02 0.0008 
Table 3-11: Percentage of the VARP processors, where a particular number of registers is faulty after the fault injection 
experiment. 
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3.4 Limitations of a Software-Based Self-Repair Approach 
A limitation of the presented fine-grained software-based rescheduling arises from 
the combination of particular faults in all slots. For example, suppose an add-
operation of the user application uses registers r1 and r2 as source operands. 
Furthermore, half of the slots cannot access register r1 through their left read port, 
and the other half of the slots cannot access register r2 through their right read 
port. Then all slots that have a functioning adder cannot access r1 and r2 in that 
combination. Hence, the add-operation cannot be executed from the VARP 
processor, except the values of r1 and r2 may be provided through the bypass. 
Hence, whether or not an application can be executed on a VARP processor 
depends on the fault state of the processor and on the operations used in the 
application. Therefore, the results of the fault injection experiment shown in table 
3-10 are best-case results, because some processors considered as operational in 
that experiment may be not able to execute operations with particular register 
operand combinations. This limitation may be mitigated by improving the 
rescheduling algorithm. Consider again the example of the add-operation. The 
values of r1 and r2 may be accessed through the bypass. But this is only possible, 
when the add-operation is scheduled within the next two clock cycles after 
generating the values of r1 and r2. But such considerations are not taken into 
account from the simple rescheduling heuristic in listing 3-5. As a consequence, the 
rescheduling algorithm may fail to adapt the schedule to the current fault state of 
the processor, although such a schedule will exist. For this reason, many 
improvements of the presented rescheduling-algorithm are possible. For example, 
• the register allocation may be changed locally for particular operations,  
• more sophisticated look-ahead information may be used during the 
rescheduling, or  
• backtracking can be allowed in the rescheduling algorithm. 
In all cases the complexity of the rescheduling algorithm is increased. For this 
reason such extensions must be used carefully as it was already discussed at the 
end of section 3.3.4.1. Otherwise there is a significant risk that the benefit of the 
improved rescheduling does not outweigh the runtime overhead for adapting the 
user application. 
However, there are also faults that cannot be handled with software-based 
approaches, no matter how much the self-repair routine is improved. A major 
limitation of both software-based self-repair approaches is that faulty components 
are not physically decoupled from the rest of the system. Particular physical faults, 
for example a short between supply voltage Vdd and ground in a processor 
component, cannot be handled. Moreover, because the physical decoupling is 
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missing in a software-based approach, only benign faults can be handled. These are 
faults in a particular component that do not cause a misbehaviour, such that other 
faultless components are affected in the system by this misbehaviour. In particular, 
when using software-based approaches, the usage of a faulty slot is avoided by 
executing NOPs in that slot. But faults in the pipeline registers of a slot may 
change the opcode of a NOP into the opcode of another operation that disturbs 
the execution of operations in other faultless slots. This may happen by 
• disturbing the control flow, when the opcode of a NOP is changed into the 
opcode of a branch operation, or by 
• disturbing the forwarding network and/or the registers in the register file, 
when the result of the execution unit in the faulty slot is accidently 
considered as valid. This will happen, when the opcode of a NOP is changed 
into the opcode of an ALU operation. If the bit fields of the destination 
register number in the pipeline registers are not affected by a fault, then the 
faulty slot will produce only results for register r0.  
These effects can be mitigated by detecting a NOP already in the fetch stage and 
generating a load-flag there that is propagated through the pipeline registers, as it 
is done in the VARP processor. Because the load-flag is a single bit only, the 
probability that this bit is affected by a fault is lower than the probability that an 
8 bit opcode is affected by a fault. Nevertheless, the load-flags generated by the 
slots represent single points of failures, because there is still a chance that a faulty 
load-flag disturbs the execution of operations in other slots. This makes faults in 
the load-flags equivalent to faults in the control logic of the VARP processor, 
which is also a single point of failure. In both cases, the software-based self-repair 
does not provide a fault handling mechanism. However, as it was shown by the 
reliability estimations, the control logic is small enough, such that the provided 
self-repair capability for the data path increases the reliability of a VARP 
processor significantly in spite of a non-fault tolerant control logic. However, if 
needed, also the control logic can be made fault tolerant, but this requires 
hardware administrated hardware redundancy. For example, a simple TMR-
approach can be used, where the full control logic, including the PC, MAR, and 
MBR, is tripled. This increases the size of the VARP processor approximately by 
4%, because the control logic makes up only 2% of the size of the VARP core. The 
advantage of a TMR-scheme is that no diagnostic test for the control logic is 
needed. However, other active hardware redundancy schemes, like the one 
proposed in [91], may be used, too.  
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3.5 Summary 
In this chapter the concept of software-based self-repair for statically scheduled 
superscalar processors was introduced. The concept was demonstrated for the 
VARP processor, but it can be used for any statically scheduled processor with 
redundant data path resources. Basically the presented software-based self-repair 
techniques can be considered as software-administrated hardware redundancy 
methods. The benefit of the software-based method is that no hardware extensions 
are needed in the processor core itself for administrating the redundant hardware. 
This maintains the simplicity of the data- and control path of statically scheduled 
processors. Hardware-based reconfiguration schemes, as considered in chapter 2, 
will have a strong impact on the simplicity of embedded processors, because 
rebinding of operations must be organized during the execution of the user 
application, which may require a complex hardware-based administration. By 
using software-based methods, this complexity can be shifted to software. This 
reduces the hardware overhead, which in turn reduces the vulnerability of the 
processor core to temporary faults, too. Moreover, because the core itself does not 
need any hardware extensions, a software-based approach can be used for making 
processors off the shelf fault tolerant that have not included fault tolerance 
techniques. For Harvard-architectures that do not have access to their program 
memory, a work-around was presented by introducing an arbiter. Two strategies 
for adapting the user application in the field to the current fault state of the 
processor during the startup phase were presented: software-based rebinding and 
software-based rescheduling.  
The advantage of the software-based rebinding is that the adaption can be done 
locally in each instruction. This does not change the length of a basic block, and 
complex operations for relocating basic blocks and patching branch-operations are 
not needed. On the other hand, multi-cycle operations cannot be handled. 
Moreover, by the fault tolerant list-scheduling, presented in listing 3-4, the 
performance of the application is degraded statically during the development 
phase. For this reason the performance is not further degraded in the field, if the 
application is adapted to a fault situation. This allows for well predictable real 
time behaviour.  
The software-based rescheduling can handle multi-cycle operations but at the cost 
of a more complex administration, because the schedule length of basic blocks may 
be increased. On the other hand, the performance of the user application is only 
degraded as much as necessary for handling the current fault state. Thus, fault 
handling in the field may cause graceful performance degradation. Moreover it was 
shown that the granularity for fault handling can be lowered down to multiplexer 
level for read port and bypass structures in the VARP processor, without 
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increasing very much the complexity of the rescheduling algorithm. This avoids a 
strong graceful performance degradation, when faults in single and multiple 
components must be handled in the processor, because many components that are 
affected by a fault can still be used partially for executing particular operations. 
However, similar to the hardware-based approach, handling of multiple faults will 
increase the reliability only significantly, if the processor is affected by high failure 
rates. In particular the fine-grained self-repair should not be considered as a 
technique for improving the reliability. But it is very useful for avoiding strong 
performance degradations after adapting the user application to the current fault 
state of the processor.  
Both software-based approaches can handle only permanent faults that are 
detected during the startup test or by a test in idle-times. Extra methods for 
handling transient faults and permanent faults that occur during the runtime of 
the user application must be included in the system. Furthermore, for very large 
applications, the adaptation of the user application may take a few seconds during 
the startup. The next chapter provides solutions for these two drawbacks by 
considering hybrid approaches that combine hardware-based and software-based 
administration schemes. 
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Hybrid Self-Repair Techniques 
 
This chapter introduces hybrid self-repair approaches [160, 165]. These are 
approaches where the administration of hardware redundancy takes place at 
software- and hardware-level. Such approaches are also referred to as cross-layer 
approaches [48]. The two hybrid approaches presented in this chapter are obtained 
by a combination of the methods presented in chapter 2 and chapter 3. A major 
draw-back of the hardware-based self-repair presented in chapter 2 is the 
performance degradation during the runtime of the user application, because 
operations are allocated dynamically to faultless slots. Major draw-backs of the 
software-based approaches from chapter 3 are the possibly long repair-time during 
the startup process and that only permanent faults can be handled, which are 
detected during the startup phase. By the combination, the hardware-
administration of the self-repair process helps to overcome some limitations of the 
software-administration and vice versa. The first hybrid approach presented in 
section 4.2 reduces the repair-time during the startup phase of the system. 
Furthermore, the runtime overhead caused by the hardware-based rebinding is 
reduced by applying software-based self-repair methods. The second hybrid 
approach presented in section 4.3 allows for handling permanent and transient 
faults on-line in a coarse-grained manner and performs a fine-grained self-repair 
off-line. For this reason a coarse-grained on-line self-test is introduced that allows 
for detecting permanent and temporary faults by concurrent checking.  
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4.1 Related Work 
Recently, cross layer approaches gained more interest for building fault tolerant 
systems [33, 48, 50, 79, 119]. Most of the fault tolerance approaches presented and 
discussed so far work only on a single administration layer of the system stack. 
The layers of the system stack were shown in figure 1-9. According to [33] the 
draw-back of a single layer approach is that it must hide almost all faults from the 
layers above, such that these layers can assume a faultless system. This simplifies 
the implementation of the higher layers, but in most cases this introduces very 
much overhead in the single layer that has to provide fault tolerance methods for a 
broad variety of faults. This wastes resources, because fault tolerance techniques 
for some rare situations may be better implemented at higher layers, for example 
in software. For this reason techniques are proposed where the detection, diagnosis 
and fault handling takes place at different system layers. For example, diagnosis 
and reconfiguration are considered in [33] as hardware-specific tasks21, while 
recovery can benefit very much from being executed in software. Such a scheme is 
proposed [7]. There a combination of time redundancy managed at the operating 
system layer and error detection codes employed in the hardware-layer is used. 
The operating system manages the execution of each task at least two times. The 
results of both tasks are compared. If they are different, then the task is executed 
a third time for performing a majority vote. However, the hardware also supports 
error detection by error detection codes, but no error recovery. When the hardware 
detects an error during the execution of a task, then the operating system is 
notified. The operating system immediately terminates the running task and starts 
the task again. Hence, error recovery is done at software-level, and runtime is 
saved by early termination of running tasks when an error is detected by hardware 
layer methods. In [145] a combination of hardware- and software-based techniques 
for handling SEUs is proposed, whereby hardware-based techniques are only used 
for supplementing fault handling in processor components for which no software-
implemented hardware fault tolerance method [144] exists. An even tighter 
coupling of administration layers is claimed in [33]. Applications may be also 
aware of unreliable hardware, by providing interfaces for activating or deactivating 
particular features. For example, when the operating system becomes aware of 
some faults in the processor, then some features of the applications can be 
deactivated through such an interface, instead of terminating and restarting the 
whole application. 
21 In that way the software-based self-repair techniques provide an interesting supplementation for 
reconfiguration methods used in cross-layer approaches, because these approaches allow for 
reconfiguration at software-layer. 
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The tight integration of different administration layers also influences the 
compiler. Compilers can play an important role for cross-layer approaches. The 
already presented methods from Bolchini et al. [24] and Holm and Banerjee [82] 
employ the compiler for generating self-checking code by generating redundant 
computations and compare-operations. However, in both methods the redundancy 
is introduced in a very unspecific way by duplicating most of the operations of an 
application. In [55] the problem of selective protection of particular pieces of source 
code is considered. For this reason the data types in the source code can be 
annotated as reliable or unreliable. With these annotations the compiler can 
generate code that uses information and/or time redundancy for making such 
variables and operations on these variables more reliable. Hu et al. presented in 
[83] a hybrid approach, where the compiler is aware of some fault tolerance feature 
of the processor. Operations are duplicated by the compiler and comparison of the 
results is done in hardware. For this reason, a special register queue was added to 
the data path as well as some control bits to each operation. These control bits are 
set by the compiler and determine whether an operation is an original one (and 
must write its result into the register queue) or a duplicated one, whose result 
must be compared with the result of the original operation, which can be found in 
the register queue. A recovery scheme is not included in this work. Such a hybrid 
approach provides a compromise between runtime overhead and flexibility. On the 
one hand the runtime overhead is reduced compared with methods that perform 
comparison of results in software. On the other hand, the flexibility of duplicating 
only selected operations is maintained.  
However, administration schemes in cross-layer approaches must not span from 
hardware layers to software layers. Cross-layer approaches may also work only at 
different hardware administration layers. For example, various fault tolerance 
methods detect temporary faults locally, e.g., the RAZOR-Flip-Flop detects delay 
faults [56] in registers and an improved scheme in [173] detects also temporary 
faults in the combinatorial components writing into registers. For error correction 
time redundancy is used, i.e., an additional clock-cycle is needed, which changes 
the timing in the sequential system. For this reason an additional administration 
at system-level is needed that controls the global timing. This administration 
scheme may be a global stall signal routed to all register elements of the system, 
which may cause a strong overhead in wiring. But even more complex 
administration schemes are implemented in hardware. Shyam et al. presented a 
cross-layer approach in [169] that works at system- and register-transfer level. 
Computations in a processor pipeline are divided in computation periods. Before a 
computation period starts, a checkpoint is taken at micro-architectural level. 
During the computational period, which takes typically some hundreds of clock 
cycles, pipeline components are tested at register transfer level, when they are in 
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idle mode. When the test detects a fault, the data path is reconfigured and a roll-
back to the latest checkpoint is done.  
4.2 Hybrid Off-Line Approach 
The hybrid approach presented in this section works at hardware- and software-
level. Moreover, both methods do not need to communicate with each other. The 
configuration of the system that implements the hybrid off-line self-repair 
approach is shown in figure 4-1. 
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Figure 4-1: VARP system that implements the hybrid off-line self-repair approach. 
In this configuration one of the software-based self-repair routines from chapter 3 
is executed on the fault tolerant VARP processor that supports hardware-based 
rebinding (see section 2.3). For this reason the system also contains the arbiter. 
The self-repair routine is stored in the program memory. The fault tolerant VARP 
processor has a rebinding logic that is placed at the output of the fetch register 
(see also figure 2-7). The rebinding logic allows for handling of multiple permanent 
faults by rebinding operations on-line to other slots, and it can be used for fault 
handling at slot level or at execution unit level. The rebinding logic is controlled 
by a rebinding control logic (RCL) that has access to the fault state of the 
processor. Please recall that the fault state at execution unit level is given by the 
fault state registers that correspond directly with the fault state functions fsSlot 
and fsEU specified in section 2.2.1. Moreover, the same fault state registers are 
accessible with the VARP-operation ld_fs y,z,r that reads bit z of fault state 
register y and stores this value in the processor register r (see Appendix A). Hence, 
the hardware-based rebinding and the software-based self-repair routine have 
access to the same fault state.  
Depending on the software-based self-repair method that is stored in the program 
memory, the hardware-based rebinding is combined either with the software-based 
rebinding or with the software-based rescheduling. In the letter case the hybrid 
method is denoted as hardware-supported rescheduling (HSRS) and in the former 
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case the hybrid method is denoted as hardware-supported rebinding (HSRB). In 
both cases the hardware-based rebinding as well as the used software-based 
method can be used both for adapting the processor to the current fault state. 
This combination is used for 
• simplifying the startup process of such a system, 
• using the hardware-based rebinding as backup repair process for the 
software-based method,  
• performing only a partial adaptation of the user application. 
Please note that the combination of software-based rescheduling with hardware-
based rebinding is only considered for the coarse-grained version of the 
rescheduling, i.e., fault handling takes place at slot and execution unit level. By 
this, both methods can use the same fault state information. The three mentioned 
options from above are described in more detail in the subsequent sections. 
4.2.1 Simplified Startup Process 
During the startup of the hybrid system, a diagnostic self-test must be performed 
in the same way as it was done for the software-based approach. This requires that 
the rebinding logic is deactivated; i.e., each operation of the self-test program is 
executed in that slot to which it was statically scheduled. Otherwise, faults may be 
detected in the wrong slot. The fault state of the data path is stored in the fault 
state registers. Then the rebinding logic is activated and either the software-based 
rebinding or the software-based rescheduling is executed. In contrast to the startup 
process that is used for the software-based method, it is sufficient to have a single 
version of the self-repair routine. Multiple versions of the self-repair routine are not 
needed, because the hardware-based reconfiguration adapts dynamically the self-
repair routine to the current fault state. Moreover, the restriction that at least a 
single slot must be faultless can be discarded. I.e., operator faults are allowed in all 
slots, because the hardware-based rebinding maps each operation into a slot where 
it can be executed. 
Thus the hardware-based self-repair is used for fault handling during the execution 
of the self-repair routine, and the software-based self-repair routine is used for fault 
handling in the user application. The performance degradation caused by the 
hardware-based self-repair routine during the execution of the software-based self-
repair routine is negligible, because it just affects the execution time of the self-
repair routine, but not the execution time of the user application. Please note that 
it is not necessary to deactivate the hardware-based rebinding during the execution 
of the user application. The user application has been adapted by the software-
based self repair according to the fault state that is stored in the fault state 
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registers. The same fault state is used by the hardware-based rebinding. Thus, 
according to the given fault state, no operation uses a defect component, and 
therefore the hardware-based rebinding will not take any action during the 
execution of the user application.  
4.2.2 Hardware-based Backup Repair 
The next benefit of such a hybrid method comes from the fact that software-based 
methods are statically limited in their fault handling capability. In particular, fault 
handling of the software-based rebinding is limited to the number of operator- and 
execution unit faults that were specified for the generation of the fault tolerant 
schedule. The software-based rescheduling is limited by the available backup 
program memory for the prolonged schedules. Hardware-based rebinding helps to 
overcome these limitations. The details are discussed separately for both software-
based approaches. 
4.2.2.1 Hardware-Supported Rebinding 
When the number of specified operator- or execution unit faults is exceeded by the 
current fault state, the rebinding algorithm may fail for some instructions. 
However, it will succeed for most other instructions. An example is given in figure 
4-2 (a).  
   
(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 4-2: (a) VARP processor with fault tolerant schedule. (b) Fault tolerant schedule from (a) is adapted to fault in slot 
3. (c) Fault tolerant schedule from (a) cannot be adapted to faults in slot 2 and 3. Fault handling for gray instructions is 
overtaken by the rebinding logic.  
Suppose the schedule has been generated with a fault tolerant list scheduling 
algorithm for tolerating a 1-slot-fault. Thus each instruction contains at least a 
single NOP. But some instructions contain more NOPs, because there was no more 
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instruction-level parallelism available in the user application. Furthermore, 
suppose the VARP processor shown in the lower part of figure 4-2 (b) has a fault 
in slot 3, then each instruction can be adapted successfully by the software-based 
rebinding algorithm, as it is shown in the upper part of figure 4-2 (b), because the 
specified number of faults is not exceeded by the currently present number of 
faults in the processor. Now suppose that a second fault occurs in slot 2, as shown 
in figure 4-2 (c). Then the gray shades instructions shown in the upper part of 
figure 4-2 (c) cannot be adapted to this fault situation, while the white 
instructions can. In this situation the software-based rebinding for the user 
application will fail. But a failure of the system may be avoided, if the hardware-
based rebinding is used as backup repair routine. I.e., those instructions that 
cannot be adapted with the software-based rebinding are left unchanged. If such 
an instruction is fetched in the processor, the hardware-based rebinding will detect 
that this instruction cannot be executed, and it will be adapted dynamically to the 
current fault state. 
The white instructions will be executed by the fault tolerant VARP processor 
without any delay penalty, because they were adapted by the software-based 
rebinding such that they already contain NOP operations for each faulty slots. As 
a consequence, the execution speed of the user application is only degraded for 
those instructions that could not be adapted by the software-based rebinding. 
Hence, during the generation of the fault tolerant schedule, it becomes possible to 
trade the length of the fault tolerant schedule against the runtime overhead caused 
by the hardware-based rebinding. From another point of view this combination of 
the software-based and hardware-based rebinding can be considered as a 
performance improvement of the hardware-based rebinding. For example, suppose 
the original schedule has been generated in such a way that it is not fault tolerant. 
Nevertheless, there are many instructions that can be adapted from the software-
based rebinding to an occurred fault situation. By adapting these instructions 
permanently in the program memory they must not be adapted from the 
hardware-based rebinding, which, in turn will not increase the execution time of 
these instructions. 
4.2.2.2 Hardware-Supported Rescheduling 
The static limitation of the software-based rescheduling arises from the available 
backup area in the program memory that is needed for storing instructions of the 
prolonged schedules. When this backup area is exhausted, then further adaptation 
of the user application will be only successful, if this adaptation does not extend 
the length of the schedule. When the hardware-based rebinding is available as 
backup-repair method, the software-based rescheduling can leave basic blocks 
unchanged, whose adaptation to the current fault state will extend their length. 
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4.2.3 Partial Adaptation 
The partial adaptation is a more systematic way of using the hardware-based 
rebinding as a backup-repair mechanism. When partial adaptation is used, then 
only some specified regions of the user application are processed from the software-
based self-repair methods, before the user application is launched. For the other 
regions that were not processed, the fault handling is done completely by the 
hardware-based rebinding. Moreover, even for the processed regions, the hardware-
based rebinding can be used as backup-repair technique, when the software-based 
method was not successful. The partial adaptation can be used for two purposes: 
• Reducing the startup time. 
• Adapting the user application during short execution breaks of the user 
application. 
4.2.3.1 Reducing the Startup Time 
In order to reduce the startup time, the user application may be only adapted 
partially to the current fault state. For this purpose, the user application is 
partitioned into critical and non-critical code sections. Critical code sections are, 
for example, time-critical sections in real-time applications. Only the critical code 
sections will be adapted with the software-based methods to the current fault state 
during the startup of the system. Therefore, the instructions in those critical code 
sections must be not adapted dynamically with the hardware-based method, and 
therefore they can be executed without any delay penalty introduced from the 
hardware rebinding. 
Non-critical code sections are not adapted with software-based methods during the 
startup of the system. Thus, instructions in these sections will be adapted 
dynamically by the hardware-based method during the execution of the user 
application. This, in turn, creates a delay penalty. However, when the partition of 
critical and non-critical section is done in an appropriate way, then delay penalty 
will not affect the real-time constraints of the user application.  
4.2.3.2 Adaptation in Execution Breaks 
Partial adaptation can be also used for adapting the full user application piecewise 
during execution breaks. This may be useful for real-time systems that have to 
provide the required service in fixed time intervals, but short activity breaks are 
available that can be used for periodically testing or self-repairing. The utilization 
profile of such a system is shown in figure 4-3. 
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Figure 4-3: Utilization Profile for the cross-layer Approach. Gray shaded activities of the user application denote 
emergency operation mode. 
In this scenario a self-test methodology must be available that can be used for 
periodically testing of the system. When the test will detect a permanent fault, 
then the fault state is stored in the fault state memory, and the execution of the 
user application is resumed without performing a time-consuming software-based 
self-repair of the user application. In the example in figure 4-3 this happens after 
the second activity phase of the user application. During the third and fourth 
activity phase of the user application, the hardware-based rebinding is used for 
adapting dynamically the user application to the current fault state. This increases 
the runtime of the user application due to the introduced rebinding cycles. This is 
denoted by the prolonged gray bars in figure 4-3. In turn, this will shorten the 
execution breaks. This state of the system can be considered as an emergency 
operation mode, where the service of the user application is still provided, but with 
reduced performance. However, during the shortened execution breaks, a software-
based self-repair approach is activated in order to adapt partially the user 
application. Each activation of the software-based self-repair routine adapts 
another part of the user application. After adapting the complete application, the 
self-test is periodically activated again in order to detect further faults. For this 
scenario only the HSRB is well suited, because it allows for a local adaptation of 
the user application without relocation of basic blocks and branch operation 
patching. 
4.2.4 Results 
The benefit of the proposed hybrid method regarding runtime overhead and 
reliability is quantified in this section.  
4.2.4.1 Runtime Overhead 
The runtime overhead can be divided into a static and a dynamic part. The static 
part is originated by the software-based self-repair methods during the system 
startup, when the user application must be adapted to the current fault state. This 
static overhead can be reduced with the proposed hybrid methods, when they are 
used for partial adaptation. However, the partial adaptation increases the dynamic 
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runtime overhead, because for some sections of the user application the hardware-
based rebinding is used as backup-repair mechanism. In order to quantify these 
impacts the following equation is used for estimating the dynamic runtime tdyn of 
some user application. 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
cr cr ncr ncr
dyn
l cr exe dynOvh l cr exe dynOvh
t
clk
         
  (4-1) 
In that equation l is the length of the user application in instructions. cr is the 
fraction of instructions that belong to the time critical part of the application. execr 
is the execution frequency of the time critical part and exencr is the execution 
frequency of the non-time critical part of the user application. Typically less than 
10% of the code in signal processing applications is time critical and more than 
90% of the execution time is spend for executing these time critical parts [138]. 
dynOvhcr is the expected runtime overhead for the time critical part of the 
application after adapting that part to a single fault. Accordingly, dynOvhncr is the 
expected overhead for the non-time critical part. According to the results in table 
3-6 it is assumed for 1-slot-faults that software-based rebinding creates on average 
a dynamic runtime overhead of 30%, software-based rescheduling creates on 
average a dynamic runtime overhead of 25%, and hardware-based rebinding 
creates on average a dynamic runtime overhead of 99%. These properties are used 
for estimating the dynamic runtime tdyn of some applications that differ in length l 
with equation (4-1). I.e., for these applications it is assumed that they are 
composed of basic blocks that have the same properties as the benchmarks listed 
in table 2-4. The results are shown in table 4-1.  
Instructions 
in  
application 
runtime for 
faultless 
processor 
dynamic runtime for a 1-slot-fault 
SWRB 
dynOvhcr = 0.30 
dynOvhncr = 0.30 
HSRB 
dynOvhcr = 0.30 
dynOvhncr = 0.99 
SWRS 
dynOvhcr = 0.25 
dynOvhncr = 0.25 
HSRS 
dynOvhcr = 0.25 
dynOvhncr = 0.99 
16000 0.0576 msec 0.07 msec 0.09 msec 0.07 msec 0.09 msec 
64000 0.2304 msec 0.3 msec 0.38 msec 0.29 msec 0.38 msec 
256000 0,9216 msec 1.2 msec 1.5 msec 1.2 msec 1.5 msec 
Overhead 0% 30% 64% 25% 62% 
Table 4-1: Estimated dynamic runtime overhead in milliseconds for three different application scenarios. 
The runtimes of the applications on a faultless processor are shown in the second 
column. These runtimes are used as baseline (runtime overhead is 0%). The 
runtimes of the applications after adaptation to a 1-slot-fault by a software-based 
or hybrid method are shown in the remaining columns. Please note that the 
runtime overhead is 99%, if hardware-based rebinding is used (see table 3-6). As 
already shown in table 3-6 the runtime overhead of software-based rebinding 
(SWRB) is 30%, and the runtime overhead of software-based rescheduling (SWRS) 
is 25%. When the applications are adapted by using the hardware-supported 
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rebinding (HSRB), the runtime overhead increases to 64%, but it is far below the 
overhead for hardware-based rebinding. A similar result is obtained for the 
dynamic runtime overhead, if the application is adapting with hardware-supported 
rescheduling (HSRS). In this case the dynamic runtime is increased by 62%.  
This reduction of the dynamic runtime overhead from 99% down to 64% 
respectively 62% by the hybrid approach is achieved by adapting the time critical 
part of the user application with software-based methods. On the other hand this 
increases the static runtime overhead. This static runtime tstatic is estimated by 
using the equation 
 
(1 )
cr ncr
static
fragment fragment
l cr tRep l cr tRep
t
l l
    
  . (4-2) 
Thereby, l is again the length of the user application, and cr is the fraction of time 
critical code. lfragment is the length of a code fragment that is composed of the 
benchmark applications listed in table 3-4. According to table 2-4 the length of 
such a fragment is 71 instructions. tRepcr respectively rRepncr are the runtimes of 
the self-repair routine in seconds for adapting a time critical respectively a non-
time fragment. It is assumed that the time critical part and the non-time critical 
part of the application are composed of basic blocks with similar properties, such 
that the repair time for these basic blocks is almost equal, i.e., tRepcr = tRepncr. 
According to table 3-4, the execution of the software-based rebinding as repair 
routine for a fragment with 71 instructions takes 0.00004224 seconds, assuming a 
clock rate of 500 MHz. According to table 3-8, the execution of the software-based 
rescheduling for such a fragment takes 0.00117 seconds. Using these assumptions, 
the static runtime overhead for user applications with various lengths is shown in 
table 4-2. 
Instructions in  
application 
static runtime for 
SW-rebinding 
tRepcr=0,04224 msec 
tRepncr=0,04224 msec 
HSRB 
tRepcr=0,04224 msec 
tRepncr=0 msec 
SW-rescheduling 
tRepcr=0,04224 msec 
tRepncr=0,04224 msec 
HSRS  
tRepcr=0,04224 msec 
tRepncr=0 msec 
16000 0.009 sec 0,0009 sec 0,377 sec 0,0377 sec 
64000 0.038 sec 0,0038 sec 1,511 sec 0,1511 sec 
256000 0.151 sec 0,0151 sec 6,044 sec 0,6044 sec 
Total 100% 10% 100% 10% 
Table 4-2: Estimated static runtime overhead in seconds for three different application lengths. 
From equation (4-2) follows for the used assumptions that the static runtime of 
both hybrid methods (HSRB respectively HSRS) is the fraction cr of the static 
runtime of the corresponding software-based method (SW-rebinding respectively 
SW-rescheduling). By this the startup time can be reduced to 10%, which is equal 
to the fraction of the code that must be adapted. In both cases, the static runtime 
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savings come at the cost of an increased dynamic runtime, because the hardware-
based rebinding must be used as backup-repair for the non-adapted parts of the 
user application, which increases the dynamic runtime for these application parts. 
However, these are the non-time critical and less frequently executed parts of the 
application. Thus, the startup time of the system for a newly detected fault is 
reduced by almost 90%, while the runtime of the user application is increased by 
64% (for HSRB) or 62% (for HSRS) instead of by 28% respectively 25%. I.e., the 
dynamic runtime is increased only by approximately 40%, if hybrid methods are 
used instead of pure software-based methods. Thus the hybrid approaches may be 
used for trading startup time against dynamic runtime. 
4.2.4.2 Reliability Analysis 
The reliability of the hybrid system is almost the same as the reliability of the 
VARP processor with hardware-based rebinding. Both systems tolerate the same 
faults. The only difference is that the arbiter must be taken into account as an 
additional component that must be faultless in the hybrid system. Thus, the 
reliability function for the hybrid system is given by 
 1014( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t
hyb hwr arbiter hwr
R t R t R t R t e       , 
where Rhwr is the reliability function of the VARP processor with hardware-based 
rebinding and Rarbiter is the reliability function of the arbiter. Rhyb is plotted in 
figure 4-4 together with the reliability functions of a non-fault tolerant VARP 
processor (RNFT4), a fault tolerant VARP processor with hardware-based rebinding 
(Rhwr), and a fault tolerant VARP processor with software-based self-repair (Rswa). 
 
Figure 4-4: Reliability plot of the hybrid system. 
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Rhyb is slightly below the reliability of the pure hardware-based and the pure 
software-based solutions. When comparing Rhyb with Rhwr, then the reliability 
improvement factor for Rhwr ranges from 1.07 to 1.08 for the plotted time interval.  
4.2.5 Conclusions 
The hybrid off-line methods will not significantly change the reliability of an 
already fault tolerant VARP processor based system. But the hybrid off-line 
methods can be considered as a way for simplifying the startup process and 
trading static runtime overhead against dynamic runtime overhead in order to 
speed up the startup process. By this the static runtime of the software-based 
rescheduling can be reduced from seconds to some hundreds of milliseconds. This 
can be an interesting option for large user applications with small time critical 
code sections. 
The granularity of the self-repair is determined by the granularity of the hardware-
based rebinding. A combination of a finer grained software-based self-repair with 
the coarse grained hardware-based rebinding is possible, but requires that the fault 
states of the processor are represented at different granularity levels, too. For 
example, a fault in a read port must be represented as a slot-fault for the 
hardware-based rebinding, but it is not considered as a slot-fault by the finer-
grained self-repair scheme.  
Table 4-3 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of the hybrid methods 
(HSRB and HSRS), software-based methods (SWRB and SWRS) and the 
hardware-based rebinding (HWRB). This summary can be used to conclude in 
which situation which self-repair method should be used best. 
Method 
Dynamic runtime 
overhead 
Static runtime 
overhead 
Reliability 
Hardware 
Overhead 
Allowed operation 
latency 
HWRB high none high rebinding logic 1 
SWRB low low high none/arbiter 1 
SWRS low high high none/arbiter ≥ 1 
HSRB low to medium very low high 
none/arbiter + 
rebinding logic 
1 
HSRS low to medium medium high 
none/arbiter + 
rebinding logic 
1 
Table 4-3: Summary of the properties of all presented self-repair methods. Bold items are the best ones. 
The hardware-based rebinding produces the highest runtime overhead. However, 
hardware-based rebinding – and hybrid methods, too – provide a slightly higher 
reliability than the pure software-based methods. When a high dynamic runtime 
overhead is not acceptable, due to the real-time constraints of the application, 
then the software-based methods are favorable. Both software-based methods 
achieve a significant dynamic runtime reduction compared with hardware-based 
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rebinding, if a fault is present in the system. But there is a significant draw-back 
of the hybrid methods and the software- and hardware-based rebinding. All of 
these methods cannot be used for rebinding multi-cycle operations. In this case, 
only the software-based rescheduling can be used. Another draw-back of both 
software-based methods, compared with the hardware-based rebinding, is the static 
runtime overhead originated during the system startup. Depending on the size of 
the application it may range from a few milliseconds up to a few seconds, if some 
hundred thousand of instructions must be processed. The hybrid methods provide 
a good trade-off between the required repair time (i.e., the static runtime 
overhead) and the dynamic runtime overhead. This makes them attractive for the 
use in real time applications, where the time critical parts of the executed program 
are small, and the repair time at the system startup must be short. In this case the 
static runtime overhead can be reduced significantly, when the software-based 
methods are applied only to the time critical parts of the user application. Then, 
these parts can be executed with a low dynamic runtime overhead, which can be 
important for meeting real time constraints.  
Using the presented hybrid methods, the hardware redundancy in the data path of 
a statically scheduled superscalar processor is handled at two distinct system 
layers. The rebinding logic is used for administration at the hardware layer, while 
the software-based methods are used for the administration at application layer. 
Although the hardware-based rebinding immediately allows after fault detection 
for avoiding the usage of a defect component, the hybrid method is only suitable 
for handling permanent faults, because neither concurrent error detection nor error 
recovery is provided. An extension of the VARP processor that allows for handling 
temporary and permanent faults on-line is presented in the subsequent section. 
4.3 Hybrid On-Line Approach 
Now, a hybrid approach is presented that allows for detecting and handling a 
single transient or permanent fault on-line in the VARP processor. By a 
combination of this approach with a software-based method, permanent faults in 
multiple components can be handled, too. The hybrid on-line approach is also a 
cross-layer approach, because it uses a combination of hardware- and software-
based techniques for detecting and handling faults. The redundant operators in the 
data path are used for concurrent checking by executing each operation twice with 
distinct operators. Similar to the idea presented in [24], the administration is done 
in software and in hardware. Each operation in the original user application is 
duplicated by the compiler such that it can be executed a second time on a 
distinct execution unit. The results of concurrently executed operations are 
compared in hardware in order to detect an error. In contrast to the work in [24], 
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the hardware extension allows also to recover from a detected error within one to 
two clock cycles and to distinguish between transient and permanent faults. 
Recovery and fault localization are based on a re-execution of a duplicated 
operation, if there was a mismatch between the result of the original and the 
duplicated one. The result of the third execution is used for a majority vote. If a 
permanent fault was detected, then the fault state is saved such that the results of 
the faulty unit are masked for the rest of the life time of the system. The hardware 
extensions of the VARP processor and the needed modifications of the instruction 
encoding are described in the subsequent sections. 
4.3.1 Instruction Encoding 
The user application that is executed by the fault tolerant VARP processor assists 
the processor with the detection and localization of a fault. For this reason the 
compiler must generate a fault tolerant schedule from the original program by 
duplicating every operation in the original program. The scheduling algorithm of 
the compiler must ensure that an original operation and its duplicated operation 
are scheduled in different slots. Furthermore, it must ensure that the result of the 
original operation is not used before the duplicated operation was executed. This 
restriction ensures that a mismatch between two results is discovered, before a 
wrong result is used as an input for another operation. Thereby, no complex roll 
back mechanism is necessary for fault recovery. These restrictions can be 
incorporated easily in the scheduling algorithm of the compiler. An example of 
such a fault tolerant schedule is shown in figure 4-5. 
* R4 R5 R8 10 T1 0
R3 R6 R0 11 T7 1
+ R1 R2 R4 10 T0 1
nop - - - - - -
+ R4 R2 R4 10 T2 1 +
+ R3 R6 R0 10 T7 2
Slot 1 Slot 2
 
Figure 4-5: Fragment of a fault tolerant schedule with duplicated add-operation. 
This small code fragment shows the instructions of two slots. The first add-
operation in slot 1 is the original one, while the second add-operation in slot 2 is 
the duplicated one. For the remaining operations no duplicated operations are 
shown. Both add-operations have the same source and destination registers. I.e., 
they use R3 and R6 as source and R0 as destination register. Moreover, each 
operation contains some additional bit fields for encoding some bookkeeping 
information that was not present in the instruction word of the non-fault tolerant 
VARP processor. This information is used by the VARP processor for performing 
the concurrent checking correctly and, if needed, error recovery. The additional 
information is grouped in the bit-fields mod, RefReg and RefFU of each operation. 
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Figure 4-6 shows the coding of these bit fields for an operation that is scheduled to 
slot k.  
opcodek srck.1 srck.2 dstk RefRegk RefEUkmodk
8 6 6 6 2 3 2
 
Figure 4-6: Encoding of an operation for issue slot k with bookkeeping information. 
The bit fields are filled by the compiler, when an operation is scheduled. Their 
meaning is as follows: 
• opcodek, srck.1, srck.2, dstk have the same meaning as for the non-fault tolerant 
VARP processor. These four sections are pair wise equal for an original 
operation and its duplicated operation. Consequently, both instructions 
perform the same operation with the same source operands and write to the 
same destination register.  
• modk determines the type of the operation. If modk = 10, then the operation 
is an original operation, for which a duplicated operation exists. If 
modk = 11, then the operation is a duplicated one (see figure 4-5). Otherwise 
the operation is an original one, for which no duplicated operation exists.  
• RefRegk is a temporary register number. In the example in figure 4-5 
RefRegk is T7 for both add-operations. If modk = 10 (i.e., the operation is the 
original operation), then the result of the operation is stored into the register 
RefRegk and into the register dstk. If modk = 11 (i.e., the operation is the 
duplicated one), then the result of the operation is compared with the value 
stored in RefRegk. By this, a mismatch can be detected between the results 
of an original and duplicated operation. 
• RefEUk is the number of the execution unit that executes the reference 
operation. If modk = 10, then RefEUk is the number of the EU that executes 
the duplicated operation. If modk = 11, then RefEUk is the number of the 
EU that executes the original operation. This information is necessary to re-
execute the duplicated operation on an execution unit that is different from 
the execution units that executed the original and the duplicated operation. 
In the example in figure 4-5 the first add-operation in slot 1 encodes slot 
number 2 in the bit-filed RefEU1, and the corresponding duplicated 
operation in slot 2 encodes slot number 1 in the bit-field RefEU2.  
This additional information will support the on-line test and recovery process of 
the VARP processor. The required hardware extensions of the VARP processor are 
described in the next section. 
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4.3.2 Hardware Extensions of the VARP Processor 
The required hardware extensions of the VARP processor are shown in figure 4-7. 
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Figure 4-7: Fault tolerant VARP processor with hardware extensions for implementing the hybrid on-line approach. 
In order to detect a transient or permanent fault on-line in a slot and to localize 
the faulty slot, the gray shaded components were added to the non-fault tolerant 
data path from figure 2-1. These components are: 
• A temporary register file (TRF): The TRF is a collection of a small number 
of 17-bit registers. These registers store 16-bit values from original 
operations whose correctness have not been verified so far. Furthermore, a 
valid-bit is saved with each of these values. If this bit is 1, the value is 
considered as correct. Otherwise the value is considered as wrong, i.e., it was 
computed in a slot for which it is already known that it contains a 
permanent fault. 
• Fault detection and compensation logic (FDCL): Each slot k is extended by a 
FDCLk that is located between the execution unit EU k and the 
corresponding write-back register k. This unit has access to the TRF and to 
the result of the EU k. Thus, it can be used to detect a mismatch between 
the results of an original operation, which is stored in the TRF, and the 
result of a duplicated operation, which is generated from EU k.  
• A voting logic (VL): The VL controls the re-execution of a duplicated 
operation, whose result was not equal to the result of the corresponding 
original operation. 
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• A rebinding logic (RL) that maps an operation that was fetched into slot k, 
to another slot k' in order to re-execute the operation in slot k'. For the 
rebinding logic two positions in the data path were considered. Either the 
rebinding logic is located at the decode stage (early rebinding in figure 4-7) 
or it is located at the input of the execution stage (late rebinding in figure 
4-7). The position of the rebinding logic affects the fault recovery time as 
well as the reliability of the system. A discussion on that is given in section 
4.3.4. Basically, the rebinding logic has the same structure as the rebinding 
logic for the hardware-based rebinding already presented in section 2.3. Thus 
it is used for routing the content of a pipeline register of slot k (either the 
fetch or the decode register) into any other slot k', while all the other slots 
are fed with a NOP operation. During normal operation, the rebinding logic 
for slot k selects the content of the fetch register k. Thus the instructions are 
executed in those slots to which they were fetched from the program 
memory.  
The rebinding logic contains k fault state registers, such that for each slot k and 
each operation type t the fault state fsEU(k,t) is accessible.  
4.3.3 Concurrent Error Detection 
Now it is described how the presented fault tolerant VARP processor detects 
permanent or transient faults by concurrent error detection. Error detection is 
done by the fault detection and compensation logics FDCL0,…,FDCL|SLOTS|-1. For 
this reason FDCLk receives the bookkeeping information of the currently executed 
operation in slot k, the result of that operation and the fault state for slot k. Some 
details of a FDCL are shown in figure 4-8. 
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Figure 4-8: Details of the Fault Detection and Compensation Logic (FDCL) in slot k. 
Two cases must be distinguished. Either an original (case A) or a duplicated 
operation (case B) is executed. First, case A is considered. It is assumed that an 
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original operation with type t is executed in slot k; i.e., modk = 10 for that 
operation. Depending on the fault state of the processor core, two sub-cases can be 
distinguished:  
1. fsEU(k,t) = 1, then the result res is considered to be correct and saved into 
the register dstk and into the temporary register RefRegk with the valid-bit 
set to 1. 
2. fsEU(k,t) = 0, then the result res is considered to be faulty and not saved 
into register dstk. But it is saved into register RefRegk with the valid-bit set 
to 0. 
Thus, after executing the original operation, the result of that operation is stored 
in the temporary register RefRegk together with an appropriate valid-bit validk. 
Moreover, a result that is obtained from a functioning execution unit (i.e., 
fsEU(k,t) = 1) is stored in the destination register dstk. Please note that this result 
may be faulty, because it was not validated yet.  
Now case B is considered. Either in the same clock cycle or some clock cycles later 
the duplicated operation is executed in slot k', with k'  k. A duplicated operation 
is recognized by its mod-bit value (modk' = 11). Furthermore, the duplicated 
operation encodes the same temporary register RefRegk as the original operation. 
The FDCLk' receives the result ref of the duplicated operation from EUk. 
Furthermore, it receives from the temporary register file the value res together 
with the valid-bit validk. Both have been stored before in the temporary register 
RefRegk by the original operation. Four cases must be distinguished: 
1. fsEU(k',t) = 1 and validk = 1, then res and ref are assumed to be correct and 
both values are compared by the FDCLk. If res = ref, then the original and 
the duplicated operation have computed the same result and no further 
action is needed. If res  ref then a new fault has been detected and the 
voting mode of the VARP processor is activated. The voting mode is needed 
for fault localization. This mode is explained in section 4.3.4. 
2. fsEU(k',t) = 0 and validk = 1, then ref is considered to be wrong and not 
saved into the destination register dstk. Please note that the register dstk 
already contains the correct result from the original operation. However, if 
res = ref holds, then the previously detected fault of operator t in slot k' 
may was a temporary fault, and fsEU(k',t) is set to 1. With this mechanism 
temporary faults can be distinguished from permanent faults. 
3. fsEU(k',t) = 1 and validk = 0, then res is considered to be wrong and the 
current result ref must be stored into the destination register dstk'. However, 
similar to the previous case, temporary faults can be distinguished from 
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permanent faults by comparing res and ref. If res = ref, then the previously 
detected fault in slot k was a temporary one, and fsEU(k,t) is set back to 1. 
4. fsEU(k',t) = 0 and validk = 0, then both operators t, in slot k and in slot k', 
are affected by a fault. Therefore it is assumed that both results res and ref 
are wrong. The correct result cannot be determined by a majority voting 
and a global error signal is set to 1. 
The cases listed above are considered in the following example for the add-
operations in the instruction sequence from figure 4-5. The original operation is the 
add-operation in the first instruction with the source registers R3 and R6 and the 
destination register R0. It is executed in slot 1. The duplicated operation is 
scheduled in the third instruction with the same source and destination registers. 
It is executed in slot 2. Now suppose that fsEU(1,add) = fsEU(2,add) = 1, i.e., the 
valid-bit of the result of the original operation is set to 1 and the reference value of 
the second operation is considered to be correct, too. The original add-operation 
writes the result into R0 and together with the valid-bit 1 into T7 (case A.1). The 
duplicated addition performs the same operation and compares its result with the 
content of T7. If there is no mismatch, then the correct result was already stored 
into R0 by the original operation (case B.1). Thus, R0 contains the verified result. 
If there is a mismatch, then the voting mode is activated, and a re-execution of the 
second add-operation is initiated. This will delay the execution of the user 
application. Details of the voting mode are explained in the subsequent section. 
Now suppose that fsEU(1,add) = 0 and fsEU(2,add) = 1 before the instruction 
sequence from figure 4-5 is executed. Then the result of the original operation is 
not written into R0, but it is stored together with the valid-bit 0 into T7 (case 
A.2). When the second add-operation is executed, FDCL2 receives the valid-bit 
from T7, which is equal to 0. I.e., the content of T7 is not correct and therefore 
the result of the second add-operation is written to R0 without verification. It is 
important to notice that the already detected fault in EU 1 is masked and no 
delay occurs because no re-execution is initiated. However, this is at the expense of 
using the result of the second add-operation without verification. A second fault 
that will cause a wrong result of the second add-operation will be not detected. 
A very similar behavior is obtained for the fault state, where fsEU(1,add) = 1 and 
fsEU(2,add) = 0. The result of the first add-operation is treated as correct. 
Therefore it is written to R0 and to T7 (case A.1). When the second add-operation 
is executed, FDCL2 treats the result as faulty, because fsEU(2,add) = 0. Hence, 
the result of the second add-operation is not written to R0, and the result of the 
first add-operation, which has been already written to R0, is not verified. The fault 
in slot 2 is masked, and no delay occurs because no re-execution is done (case B.2). 
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So far it was explained how an already localized fault is masked during the 
execution of the user application, and how a fault is detected. In the next sub-
section it is described how a faulty operator is localized after detecting a mismatch 
between the both results of an original and a duplicated operation. For this reason 
the processor is switched into the voting mode. The voting mode is activated by 
the FDCL that has executed the duplicated operation (see case B.1). 
4.3.4 Voting Mode 
Fault localization and recovery is based on a second execution of the failed 
duplicated operation. By this, a third result is obtained that is used for a majority 
vote, such that the correct result can be selected and the faulty operator is 
determined. For the second execution of the duplicated operation, the processor is 
switched into the voting mode. For simplicity it is assumed that the rebinding 
logic is located at the output of the decode registers. This configuration is referred 
to as late rebinding. 
4.3.4.1 Late Rebinding 
The voting logic switches the processor into the voting mode, when it receives a 
vote-signal from a FDCL component (see figure 4-9). The voting mode stalls the 
fetch- and decode-stage of the processor pipeline. By this, the instruction that 
contains the failing operation stays in the decode register. It is assumed that a 
mismatch is detected in clock cycle t during the execution of the duplicated 
operation v' on EU k'. The corresponding original operation v was executed on EU 
k. This situation is shown in figure 4-9 for the example from figure 4-5. The 
duplicated add-operation is stored in the decode register of slot 2. The result res = 
0x0815 is compared with the reference value ref = 0x4711 from T7. Because both 
values are different, the processor is switched into the voting mode by setting the 
signal vote2 to 1.  
FDCL 0
EU 0
WB-Reg 0
T0
R
ea
d 
P
or
ts
V
ot
in
g 
Lo
gi
c 
(V
L)
DE-Reg 0 DE-Reg 3
Late Rebinding Logic (RL)
EX
DE-Reg 1 add r3,r6,r0,t7
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
EU 1 EU 2 EU 3
0x4711
FDCL 1 FDCL 2 FDCL 3
WB-Reg 1 WB-Reg 2 WB-Reg 3
0x47110x0815
0
st
an
da
rd
 
m
od
e
0 1 0vote2 vote3
vote1
vote0
 
Figure 4-9: Mismatch is detected during the execution of the duplicated add-operation from figure 4-5 in slot 2. 
The processor switches immediately into the voting mode. I.e., the fetch and 
decode registers keep their current values. Hence, in the next clock cycle t+1, the 
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failed add-operation is still available in the decode register, such that it can be re-
executed. For this purpose, the voting logic determines an execution unit r with 
r  k and r  k' that can execute operation v' (i.e. fsEU(r, type(v')) = 1). The 
voting logic sets the control signals of the rebinding logic in such a way that in slot 
r operation v' is executed in clock cycle t+1, and all other slots execute a NOP-
operation during that clock cycle. This situation is shown in figure 4-10. 
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Figure 4-10: Re-execution of the failed add-operation from figure 4-9. 
The add-operation, which resides in decode register 2, is mapped into slot 3 from 
the rebinding logic. All other execution units execute a NOP. Please note the 
rebinding logic also maps the mod-, refEU- and refReg-sections of the failed 
operation v' into slot r. Thus the result of EU r is compared again with the value 
of refRegk', which was produced by EU k. The outcome of this comparison is 
observed from the voting logic by reading the signal voter. According to this signal, 
the voting logic decides, which execution unit is faulty. If the FDCLr does not 
detect a mismatch during the re-execution (i.e., voter = 0), then the value in 
refRegk' is equal to the value computed by EU r. Thus, EU k computed a correct 
value and EU k' is faulty. Therefore, fsEU(k',t) is set to 0. If the FDCLr detects a 
mismatch during the re-execution (i.e., voter = 1), then the value in refRegk' (i.e., 
the value produced by EU k) was not equal to the result of EU r. Moreover, it was 
not equal to the result of EU k'. Please note that it is not checked that the result 
of EU k' and EU r are equal. However, the probability that all three results are 
different is considered to be very low. Based on this assumption, the conclusion is 
made that the results of EU k' and EU r are equal. In this case operator t of EU k 
is declared as faulty. In any case, the result of EU r is considered as correct. For 
this reason the result is written back into the register file during clock cycle t+2. 
In clock cycle t+2 the processor is switched back into the normal operation mode. 
I.e., the operations stalled in the fetch-registers are decoded and the operations of 
the failing instruction, which reside in the decode registers, are discarded.  
A flaw of this approach is that the rebinding logic also maps the operand values of 
operation v' into slot r. These operand values were loaded during the decode stage 
from the register file and stored in the decode register. I.e., these values are not 
loaded again from the register file, when the operation is re-executed. If these 
168 
Chapter 4 
operand values are corrupt, due to a faulty component in the decode stage, for 
example a faulty bypass or a faulty read port, then the wrong result is generated a 
second time in slot r. As a consequence an operator in slot k is declared as faulty, 
although the fault is located in slot k'. This problem is solved by changing the 
position of the rebinding logic. 
4.3.4.2 Early Rebinding 
When the early rebinding is used, then the rebinding logic is located at the output 
of the fetch registers, as it is shown in figure 4-11. In this configuration the 
rebinding takes place in the decode stage, such that a failed operation uses other 
bypasses and read ports during its re-execution. Thus, also faults in these 
components can be detected and handled correctly. However, the administration of 
the early rebinding becomes a little bit more complex, because a fault is detected 
in the execution stage, but the failing operation must pass again through the 
decode stage. 
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Figure 4-11: Concurrent fault detection with early rebinding and shadow registers. 
For this reason a shadow register is introduced for each fetch register. During 
normal operation, the shadow register of slot k always contains a copy of the 
operation that is currently in the execution stage of slot k. When the processor is 
switched in the voting mode, then the fetch registers and the shadow registers 
maintain their current values. The values generated in the execution stage, except 
the faulty one, go into the write-back stage. This situation is shown in figure 4-11 
again for the example from figure 4-5. For the add-operation in the execution stage 
of slot 2 a mismatch is detected during clock cycle t. A copy of that operation 
resides in the shadow register of slot 2. In clock cycle t+1 the fetch registers and 
the shadow registers maintain their current values. The early rebinding logic is 
controlled by the voting logic in such a way that the add-operation in the shadow 
register is mapped into a slot where it can be executed correctly. Thus, in clock 
cycle t+1 the add-operation is decoded again, and in clock cycle t+2 it is executed 
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a second time, such that the voting can be done in the same way as for the late 
rebinding. Moreover, in clock cycle t+2 the operations from the fetch registers are 
decoded again, such that the execution of this instruction has been delayed by two 
clock cycles. With this early rebinding more components in the data path are 
protected against permanent and transient faults. 
4.3.5 Limitations 
The presented approach allows for the concurrent checking of the results of the 
execution units. For this reason it can handle all types of operations that generate 
a result for a register in the register file. This includes memory load-operations, 
too, because the loaded value from the memory passes the execution unit in the 
VARP processor. The correct execution of memory store-operations and branch 
operations cannot be checked. Checking such operations by duplicating them 
requires more hardware modifications. For example, when duplicating a branch 
operation, the original branch operation is not allowed to perform the branch; i.e. 
it is not allowed to write into the program counter. Instead, the branch target 
must be stored, such that it can be compared with the branch target of the 
duplicated operation. Signature-based approaches may be used alternatively. Such 
approaches will check in software, whether or not the program execution follows 
the correct control flow [71, 129]. 
Moreover, more sophisticated techniques may be used for distinguishing between 
transient and permanent faults. The draw-back of the presented approach is that 
the fault state of an operator may toggle, although the operator has a permanent 
fault. This is due to the fact that the permanent fault is only activated when 
particular data is applied. This problem can be solved by using small counters as it 
was done for example in [170]. Each time a component is detected as faulty, the 
counter is incremented. When a particular threshold is reached, then the fault 
state of that component is considered as permanent. 
However, the major limitation of the presented hybrid on-line approach is that the 
fault detection capability gets lost for some operations after the detection of the 
first permanent fault. This is illustrated in figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-12: Fault detection capability gets lost after the first permanent fault. 
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Suppose that the add-operation in slot 1 is detected as faulty. Then the result of 
that operation is no longer used, and the correct result is produced from the 
corresponding reference operation in slot 2. But the result of the reference 
operation is not checked anymore, such that a faulty value may be used from a 
dependent operation. Nevertheless, a second fault that affects the add-operator in 
slot 2 can be detected, when another pair of add-operations is executed that does 
not use the same faulty operator pair. In figure 4-12 such a pair of add-operations 
is scheduled to slots 2 and 3. A second fault in slot 2 is detected by this pair of 
operations. Thus, also the add-operator in slot 2 is declared as faulty in this case. 
As a consequence case B.4 occurs (see page 166), when executing the 
add r0,r3,r6,t7 operation in slot 2. I.e., both results are recognized as faulty, but 
no mechanism is provided for computing the correct result. This problem can be 
solved by combining the hybrid on-line approach with a software-based self-repair 
approach. 
4.3.6 Combining Hybrid On-Line and Software-Based Approach 
The benefits of the combination of the hybrid on-line approach with the software-
based self-repair approach are briefly discussed now22. The hybrid on-line approach 
can be combined either with the software-based rebinding or with the software-
based rescheduling. Such a system is composed of a VARP processor with the 
hardware extensions shown in figure 4-7, and a program memory that contains a 
software-based self-repair routine. The software-based self-repair routine is used for 
adapting off-line the user application to the fault state that was detected on-line. 
Figure 4-13 shows how both methods collaborate. 
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Figure 4-13: System states of a VARP processor that combines hybrid methods with software-based self-repair. 
During normal operation all operations are executed by functioning components. 
Immediately after the concurrent detection of a fault with the hybrid method, the 
fault is masked with the techniques of the hybrid approach, until there is time for 
a more sophisticated adaption of the user application. During this time the 
22 In order to simplify the explanation it is assumed that the hybrid on-line approach uses the early 
rebinding. 
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execution of the user application is not fully protected against a second fault in the 
data path of the processor. This is not a strong limitation, if the probability of the 
occurrence of two consecutive faults within a short time period is very low. A more 
sophisticated adaptation is done with the software-based methods during execution 
breaks, or when the system is restarted after some time. Then the processor is in 
the off-line mode, and the user application is adapted in such a way that the faulty 
component is not used anymore as it is shown in figure 4-14 for the example from 
figure 4-12. 
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Figure 4-14: Fault detection capability is restored after software-based self-repair. 
In the example from figure 4-12 a fault was detected in slot 1. For this reason the 
add-operation that was scheduled to slot 1 is moved to slot 0 and the mul-
operation from slot 0 was moved to slot 2. After this adaptation, the usage of the 
faulty operator is avoided, and all results for the register file are concurrently 
checked. Thus, according to figure 4-13, the system is back to normal operation 
mode. Please note that the software-based self-repair routines presented in chapter 
3 must be slightly modified, because some more dependencies between the 
operations must be respected.  
4.3.6.1 Modifications of the Software-Based Rebinding Algorithm 
When the software-based rebinding is used, then data dependencies in the user 
application are never violated by the rebinding. But the information about the slot 
that executes the reference operation must be updated for each operation. This can 
be incorporated easily in the rebinding algorithm by keeping in mind the triple 
(i, tr, k) for each original operation op that was rebound in instruction i to slot k, 
where tr is the temporary register written by op. For a duplicated operation op' 
that was rebound to slot k' and writes into the temporary register tr', the 
corresponding triple is found by looking up for a triple with tr' in the second 
component. Then the bit field refEU in op' is updated to k. The operation op must 
be revisited such that the bit field refEU in op can be updated to k'. Due to this 
backward patching a complete basic block should be moved into the data memory 
before rebinding starts for the instructions of that basic block. Moreover, when 
rebinding operation k', then slot k must be excluded for executing operation k'. 
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This can be modeled in the rebinding algorithm by declaring the needed operator 
for executing op' as faulty in execution unit k'. 
The fault state that is determined by the concurrent error detection can be used 
directly for the adaptation with the software-based rebinding, because faults are 
localized and handled at the same granularity level in both approaches. Thus, a 
diagnostic off-line test, as it is shown in figure 4-13, is not needed.  
4.3.6.2 Modifications of the Software-Based Rescheduling Algorithm 
When the software-based rescheduling is used in combination with the hybrid on-
line approach, then also the bit field refEU of each original and duplicated 
operation must be updated. Furthermore, the data dependencies that arise from 
the temporary registers must be respected. This is incorporated into the 
rescheduling algorithm in the same way as for the regular registers with the lookup 
table use and def. Moreover, the order between an original operation and a 
duplicated operation is maintained, because both operations have the same 
destination register. This output dependency prevents the duplicated operation 
from being scheduled before the original operation. However, as a special case must 
be taken into account that both operations, original and duplicate, can be 
scheduled into the same instruction. 
The software-based rescheduling can handle faults at read-port and at bypass 
level, but the hybrid on-line approach only at execution unit level. I.e., faults in 
the read ports and bypasses are detected by the hybrid approach with early 
rebinding, but they affect all operation types of a slot. I.e., when a fault in the 
read ports or bypasses of slot k occurs, then each operation executed in slot k may 
produce a wrong result, such that step by step all operators of that slot are 
declared as faulty, until fsEU(k,t) = 0 for each operation type t  . Hence, such 
faults can be considered as a slot fault. However, if software-based rescheduling is 
used in off-line mode, then a finer grained software-based diagnosis can be 
performed before the software-based rescheduling is invoked (see figure 4-13). 
When the processor switches into the off-line mode, then the fault state 
determined by concurrent checking is discarded, and a finer grained diagnosis is 
performed that will localize, for example, the faulty read port. Then the fault state 
determined by the fine-grained diagnostic test is used for the software-based 
rescheduling. Hence, slot k is used again for executing operations. However, the on-
line determined coarse-grained fault state is needed in the voting. Then the faulty 
slot must be excluded from using it for re-executing a failed operation. 
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4.3.7 Results 
The hardware extensions shown in figure 4-7 were included in the VHDL code of 
the VARP processor with some limitations. For example, no counters were 
implemented for distinguishing permanent from transient faults. Once a fault is 
detected in an operator, then the operator is declared as faulty forever. Thus, the 
performance degradation during the execution of the user application is negligible, 
because at most two clock cycles delay occur for each operator that becomes 
faulty. The hardware overhead that is introduced in the VARP processor is not 
negligible. For this reason a reliability analysis is provided for various system 
configurations. In particular, five VARP processor systems are compared with each 
other: 
• VARPearly: the VARP processor with early rebinding,  
• VARPlate: the VARP processor with late rebinding, 
• VARP: the non-fault tolerant VARP processor from figure 2-1, 
• VARP2: a non-fault tolerant VARP processor with two slots, and  
• VARPTMR: a TMR-system based on three VARP2 processors.  
The computational performance of the VARP2 and the VARPTMR processors is 
almost equal to the computational performance of the VARPearly and VARPlate 
processors, because all of them can execute two original operations per clock cycle. 
Table 4-4 shows the cell area in µm² of the additional components needed for 
implementing the hybrid on-line approach. Please note that the size of the shadow-
fetch-registers is subsumed in the rebinding logic of the VARPearly processor. 
Component VARPlate VARPearly 
Rebinding Logic 1298 1547 
4 x FDCL 550 550 
FDCL Control 587 690 
Temporary Register File 3879 3879 
Total 6314 6666 
Table 4-4: Cell area in µm² for the additional hardware components that were introduced in the VARP processor from 
figure 4-7. 
For the reliability analysis regarding permanent faults, the components of the five 
VARP-systems are partitioned into two types; the non-fault tolerant and the fault 
tolerant components. If one of the non-fault tolerant components fails, the whole 
system will fail. Each fault-tolerant component belongs to a particular slot. The 
functionality of a slot with a permanently faulty component can be overtaken from 
another slot. Cft denotes the total cell area of the fault-tolerant components of a 
single slot and Cnft denotes the cell area of the non-fault tolerant components. The 
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partitioning is shown in table 4-5. Thereby the cell area of a single execution unit 
is explicitly denoted by CEU, because the reliability analysis of the five VARP-
systems is done for varying sizes of the execution units. The used execution unit 
sizes are listed in table 4-6. Column n denotes the number of slots in each system. 
Hence, the total cell area of each system type is obtained by Cnft + n  Cft. 
System Type Cnft Cft n 
VARP 24127 + 4  CEU 0 4 
VARP2 13868 + 2  CEU 0 2 
VARPlate 24127 + 6314 CEU 4 
VARPearly 11199 + 6666 3232 + CEU 4 
VARPTMR 7404 + 105 6464 + 2  CEU 3 
Table 4-5: Cell area of the fault tolerant and non-fault tolerant components in the five VARP systems in µm².  
The VARP and VARP2 systems have no fault tolerant components. The VARPlate 
processor has only the execution units as fault tolerant components. It is assumed 
that all hardware extensions needed for implementing the hybrid on-line approach 
(listed in table 4-4) must be faultless for a functioning processor. For this reason 
their cell area is listed in column Cnft for the VARPlate and VARPearly processors. 
Due to the early rebinding, the VARPearly processor can handle faults in its 
bypasses, read ports and decode registers. The total cell area of these fault tolerant 
components is 3232 + CEU. The VARPTMR system is obtained from the VARP2 
system by tripling the decode- and execution-stage of both slots of the VARP2 
processor. The cell area of the fault tolerant components in both slots is 6464 + 
2  CEU. The voter that is needed at the end of the execution stage has a cell area 
of 105 µm². 
The fault tolerant systems VARPlate, VARPearly and VARPTMR will work properly 
as long as there is at most a single failing slot. Hence, all the five systems can be 
considered as a serial composition of the non-fault tolerant components with an 
(n-1)-of-n system that is composed of n slots (n is given in table 4-5). Furthermore 
it is assumed that RC(t) ≔ e
-lt is the reliability function for a single cell area. Then 
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is the probability that all components of the system are faultless at time t. The 
probability that one of the slots is faulty is given by 
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From both equations follows that the reliability function RS(t) for a VARP system 
S with n redundant slots is computed by  
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The reliability plots for the five systems are shown for three different execution 
unit types in figure 4-15 to figure 4-17. The plot in figure 4-15 shows the reliability 
functions, when small sized execution units are employed in the VARP processor. 
This is an execution unit that supports only 16-bit add-/sub-operations together 
with various logical operations. 
 
Figure 4-15: Reliability plots for the VARP systems with small sized execution units (CEU = 1171). 
The reliability of the VARPlate and VARPearly processors is inferior to the reliability 
of the non-fault tolerant VARP2 processor that has the same performance. 
Moreover, the reliability of the VARPlate processor is even worse than the 
reliability of the non-fault tolerant VARP processor. This result follows from the 
size of the additional hardware components in the fault tolerant processors, which 
are too big compared with the size of the fault tolerant components. I.e., the 
proposed approach is not suitable for handling permanent faults in VARP 
processors with small sized execution units.  
However, this situation changes for medium sized execution units that support a 
single cycle mul-operation. The plot of the reliability functions for these systems is 
shown in figure 4-17. 
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Figure 4-16: Reliability plots for the VARP systems with medium sized execution units (CEU = 3796). 
There the reliability of the VARPearly processor becomes slightly better than the 
reliability of the VARP2 processor. Thus the proposed hybrid method increases the 
reliability of the VARPearly processor regarding failures due to permanent faults. 
However, the VARPearly system will not reach the reliability of the VARPTMR 
system. Moreover, for medium sized execution units the size of the non-fault 
tolerant components in the VARPearly processor becomes smaller than the size of 
the non-fault tolerant components in the VARP2 processor. I.e., the probability 
that a temporary fault causes a failure in the VARPearly processor is smaller than 
for the VARP2 processor. Hence, the early rebinding also provides a hardening 
against temporary faults for medium sized execution units. 
For larger scaled execution units23 the reliability of the VARPearly system 
approaches the reliability of the VARPTMR system, as it is shown in figure 4-17. 
Moreover, also the reliability of the VARPlate systems reaches the reliability of the 
VARP2 system.  
23 Execution units that also support div- and mod-integer operations. 
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Figure 4-17: Reliability plots for the VARP systems with large sized execution units (CEU = 8987). 
It can be concluded that the VARPTMR system provides in all three cases the best 
reliability, although for larger scaled execution units the VARPearly system 
approaches this reliability. But this benefit of the VARPTMR system comes at the 
cost of an increased hardware overhead. From the cell area sizes in table 4-5 
follows that the VARPearly processor has a fixed size of 30793 cells that grows with 
4  CEU, and the VARPTMR has a fixed size of 26901 that grows with 6  CEU.  Table 
4-6 shows in column overhead for various execution unit sizes CEU the hardware 
overhead of the VARPTMR processor compared with the VARPearly processor. 
CEU Size VARPearly Size VARPTMR Overhead 
1171 35477 33927 -4 % 
3796 45977 49677 8 % 
8987 66741 80823 21 % 
Table 4-6: Hardware overhead comparison of the VARPearly and VARPTMR systems for varying execution unit size. 
For small sized execution units the VARPTMR is smaller than the VARPearly 
processor. Therefore, the overhead is negative. But for medium and large scaled 
execution units the overhead becomes 8% and 21% respectively. This overhead will 
further increase with the size of the execution units. For example, supporting 
floating point operations increases further the size of the execution units, which 
will further increases the attractiveness of the VARPearly processor. Moreover, the 
proposed VARPearly processor provides more flexibility. For example, the compiler 
can trade performance against reliability, because not every operation must be 
duplicated. By this some code sections of the user application can be protected 
against temporary faults, while some other portions are not protected, but they 
will use the available redundancy in the data path of the processor for higher 
performance.  
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4.3.8 Conclusions 
The hybrid on-line approach provides on-line fault detection and error recovery 
capability for the VARP processor. This is achieved by concurrent error detection 
such that a transient or a permanent fault is detected on-line. The used idea is 
conceptionally very similar to the one published in [24], where operations are 
duplicated in software, but comparison of the results is done with hardware 
support. However, the work in [24] is substantially extended by the proposed 
hybrid approach, because also a fast error recovery is provided in hardware. Error 
recovery is possible within one to two clock cycles, depending on the position of 
the rebinding logic. On-line detected permanent faults can be masked in order to 
avoid fault recovery the next time. Thus the presented approach can be used for 
the design of reliable real-time systems, because the delay due to the recovery 
procedure is very small. Moreover, the architecture provides the opportunity that 
the compiler or assembler programmer can trade performance against reliability by 
selecting only certain operations for duplication. Thus some parts of an application 
may run with high reliability by using redundant resources for redundant 
computations, while other parts benefit from higher performance by using 
redundant resources for higher instruction level parallelism. 
The hybrid on-line approach has also some limitations. First, after the detection of 
a permanent fault in an operator, the fault detection capability of the system gets 
partly lost. I.e., it is no longer possible to check the result of these operations that 
are a reference operation of an operation that is executed on the faulty operator. 
Please note that further faults in all other operators that do not use the faulty 
operator as reference operator can be detected. However, it was shown that the 
partly loss of the fault detection capability is overcome by additionally performing 
off-line a software-based self-repair, such that all faulty operators are not used 
anymore. By this the system is in degraded fault detection modus after the 
detection of a permanent fault. But the full fault detection capability is restored 
after the adaptation of the user application to the current fault state, which can be 
done either during execution breaks or during the next startup phase. 
A second limitation of the presented approach is the amount of administrative 
hardware overhead needed for on-line fault handling. Because these administrative 
components are not redundantly available, they have a negative impact on the 
reliability of the processor. For the VARP processor this has the consequence that 
some portions of the data path can be protected against temporary faults. But the 
administrative hardware may be affected by permanent faults after some time, 
which increases the probability that the processor fails due to a permanent fault in 
the administrative hardware. This effect is only avoided, when the size of the fault 
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tolerant components becomes big enough. For the considered VARP processors 
this is achieved with medium to large scaled execution units.  
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter the application of the software-based self-repair in cross-layer fault 
tolerance approaches was demonstrated by supporting hardware-based fault 
tolerance techniques. Both methods fit well together, because hardware-based 
methods are active in on-line mode, and software-based methods are active in off-
line mode. By this, the self-repair functionality at software-level assists the 
techniques used at hardware-level. In particular, the combination of hardware- and 
software-based administration of redundancy allows for a better utilization of the 
remaining functional components of the processor, because the software-based 
methods perform a finer-grained reconfiguration than the hardware-based methods. 
For example, hardware-based rebinding that suffers from performance degradation, 
when the program is adapted dynamically to the current fault state, can be 
improved in this way. Also the concurrent error detection capability of the hybrid 
on-line approach can be restored by the application of software-based methods. 
Due to the support by software-based methods, a coarse-grained fault handling by 
hardware-based methods is sufficient. The software-based method allows for a finer 
grained reconfiguration, not immediately after concurrent error detection, but at 
carefully specified points in time; for example during the startup of the processor 
or during execution breaks. At these points in time, the software-based methods 
have enough time for a more detailed fault diagnosis and reconfiguration of the 
system. This time is either not available during on-line error handling or 
performing such a detailed fault diagnosis and reconfiguration on-line would 
require much more hardware resources. Hence, administrative hardware overhead 
is reduced by shifting complex reconfiguration tasks in software.  
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Adaptive Diagnostic Software-
Based Self-Test  
So far the fault state of the VARP processor was formally modeled by the fault 
state functions. These fault state functions, which are represented by fault state 
registers in the VARP processor, are needed by the self-repair routines for 
adapting the user application to the current fault state of the processor. In the 
previous chapter an on-line method for determining these fault state functions at 
coarse-grained level was presented. However, a finer grained method is needed that 
can also work off-line for providing the information needed by the fine-grained self-
repair approach presented in section 3.3. I.e., the self-test must be able to localize 
permanent faults in multiple components with the same granularity that is used 
for fault handling by the software-based rescheduling. For this reason a survey of 
existing test methods that can be used for diagnostic purposes is given. Moreover, 
the limitations of diagnostic self-test methods are described, when they are used in 
a system that employs software-based self-repair techniques. This will be a 
motivation for the novel adaptive part of the software-based self-test. Based on 
these considerations, a system configuration is described that allows for detecting 
and localizing multiple permanent faults during the startup of the VARP processor 
by executing a software-based self-test routine. The achieved fault coverage and 
diagnostic capability of the self-test method are presented. By putting together the 
adaptive diagnostic self-test and a software-based self-repair method, a 
comprehensive software-based self-test and self-repair method for a statically 
scheduled processor is obtained.  
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5.1 Related Work 
In order to determine the fault state of the VARP processor in the field, the 
correct functioning of particular components of the processor must be tested by a 
method that is simple enough to be executed by the system itself without adding 
too much hardware. Moreover, the test must provide diagnostic results at that 
granularity level that is used by the self-repair routine. The diagnostic test is 
executed in off-line mode during the startup phase of the system or during 
execution breaks. I.e., the processor does not execute the user application at that 
time, such that most of the processor resources can be used exclusively by the test 
procedure. Such a scenario appears during the manufacturing test, too. 
Manufacturing test in volume production is usually a simple pass/fail test for 
detecting faulty devices. The goal of a diagnostic test is the localization of the 
fault. The diagnostic information can be provided at structural or functional level. 
Structural diagnostic information localizes the fault site with respect to a given 
structural fault model, for example at gate level. Functional diagnostic information 
determines whether or not a particular functionality of a component is provided 
correctly. Existing diagnostic off-line techniques are strongly related with 
structural and functional test methods used for manufacturing test. Their 
advantages and disadvantages for diagnostic test in the field are discussed in the 
subsequent sections. 
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(a) (b) (c) 
Figure 5-1: (a) Scan test. (c) Scan-based built-in self-test (BIST). (d) Software-based self-test (SBST). 
5.1.1 Structural Test and Diagnosis 
Diagnostic manufacturing test is under investigation since the 1960's [36] in order 
to localize manufacturing flaws. It relies on the same test infrastructure that is 
used for manufacturing test without diagnosis. This is some kind of tester (ATE) 
that wraps the device under test (DuT) as it is shown in figure 5-1. Test patterns 
are consecutively applied to primary inputs of the DuT. The corresponding test 
response is captured at the primary outputs and compared with reference values. 
182 
Chapter 5 
Mismatches indicate a fault. Forcing a mismatch for particular faults becomes 
difficult for larger sequential circuits. For this reason various design for testability 
methods were proposed for improving the controllability and observability of 
internal states of the DuT [142]. Among these methods are scan-test designs [52, 
65], shown in figure 5-1 (a), probably the most popular ones. Scan test is a 
structural test method, because the DuT is not operated in normal functional mode 
for the test. During the test mode, the memory elements of the DuT are connected 
to one or more scan chain(s). For a full scan design these scan chains divide the 
DuT into combinatorial logic blocks that receive their inputs from the scan chains, 
and write their outputs into the scan chains. Scan chains are used for applying test 
patterns to the combinatorial blocks by shifting in test patterns, and they are used 
for capturing test responses by shifting them out after a functional cycle. Usually 
the test patterns applied during the scan test are structural test patterns. These 
are test patterns that are generated by using structural information about the 
combinatorial logic blocks in the DuT. Based on techniques developed during the 
past decades [70, 150], the process of test pattern generation is nowadays 
automated by automated test pattern generation tools (ATPG-tools). By knowing 
the internal structure of a DuT with respect to a given structural fault model, the 
quality of a test set, i.e., a set of test patterns, can be expressed by the fault 
coverage. On the other hand, structural test patterns may provide inputs that will 
never appear in functional mode, which causes an overtesting.  
The concept of a scan test can be used potentially in the field by employing a 
structural built-in self-test (BIST) [93]. The BIST was developed for overcoming 
the limitations of the slow interface between the ATE and the DuT during 
manufacturing test. Figure 5-1 (b) shows the STUMPS architecture for a BIST 
[17]. Test patterns for the scan chains are generated on-chip, for example, pseudo 
randomly with a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) or with arithmetic units 
[142]. In order to improve fault coverage and to reduce test time, additional 
deterministically generated test patterns may be stored in an on-chip memory [86]. 
Test responses are compacted on-chip into a signature, e.g., with a multiple input 
shift register (MISRs). The ATE only initiates the BIST and retrieves the 
signature(s). Hence, most of the functionality of the ATE from figure 5-1 (a) is 
moved on chip, such that the BIST infrastructure can be used in principle for 
performing a self test autonomously in the field. 
Both scan test and scan-based BIST infrastructure are used for diagnosis with 
emphasis on post production diagnosis for detecting systematic flaws in the 
manufacturing process. Thereby the only available diagnostic information comes 
from the test responses. Diagnosis is the mapping of test responses to faults. The 
best diagnostic resolution is achieved, if each fault will produce a different test 
response with respect to a given fault model. Particular methods have been 
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developed in order to improve the diagnostic resolution of a set of test patterns 
[31, 73]. Fault dictionaries provide a simple and fast way for mapping test 
responses to faults [147] during production test. They are created by fault 
simulation, most likely for single fault models. Therefore the method is very 
sensitive to unmodeled faults that produce test responses that cannot be found in 
the fault dictionary. In this case the diagnosis will fail. Moreover, fault 
dictionaries, and even more compact representations like fault trees [26, 27], 
become very large. For example, the size of the full fault dictionary for a relative 
small ISCAS89 benchmark circuit s35932 is 9532 MB [25], and the size of a fault 
tree that takes only pass/fail information of each test pattern into account is 
bounded by F  (T + 1), where F is the number of collapsed faults in the DuT and 
T is the number of test patterns [38]. The size of fault dictionaries and fault trees 
does not matter for post production test, when diagnosis is done off-chip, but it 
becomes crucial for on-chip diagnosis, when information must be stored on-chip. 
This situation does not change for diagnostic scan-based BIST methods, where test 
responses are available on-chip as signatures. The problem of diagnosis becomes 
even more complex for diagnostic scan-based BIST approaches, because test 
responses for all test patterns are typically compacted into a single signature, and 
this single signature does not provide enough diagnostic information for fault 
localization [45]. Various fault isolation techniques were proposed for overcoming 
this problem. Faults are isolated by performing additional test sessions that use 
different test pattern sets [188] or compute a signature only for specific scan chain 
elements [178]. Based on these signatures, fault candidates are determined either 
directly by mapping faulty signatures to fault candidates [42] or indirectly, by 
determining the faulty scan chain contents first [105]. From these scan-chain 
contents fault candidates in the combinatorial logic are computed [6]. However, in 
any case, this mapping is not done on-chip. The runtime of the algorithms used for 
such a diagnosis ranges between 60 and 125 seconds, measured on workstations 
[42]. Obviously this problem cannot be solved in the field from a simple embedded 
system. For this reason, diagnostic scan-based BIST methods only collect 
information on-chip that is used for off-chip diagnosis [45, 54]. The general 
problem of using diagnostic BIST approaches in the field is the fine-grained 
structural diagnosis at gate-level. This causes two inherent problems. First, the 
gate level granularity increases the required memory consumption for diagnosis 
and the runtime for fault localization. Therefore, diagnostic BIST approaches rely 
on powerful off-chip analysis techniques, such that diagnosis cannot be performed 
on-chip. Second, the structure-oriented test method works on gate level net lists 
that do not consider processor components at functional level. Mapping a fault 
localized at gate level on processor components is not in the scope of these works. 
Hence, the link from a localized fault in the structural fault model to the caused 
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functional misbehavior of the component containing that fault is not provided by 
structural testing. But this information is needed for the self-repair algorithms. 
For BIST approaches that perform diagnosis at a coarser grained level, e.g. at 
component level, the complexity of diagnosis is reduced. In [169] test patterns for 
components of pipeline stages are stored in an on-chip ROM. During idle cycles, 
these test patterns are applied as input to the components, and the test responses 
are compared with reference values. Vierhaus et al. proposed in [95] a scan-based 
BIST technique for VLIW processors that employs the redundancy in the data 
path. Test patterns are generated with LFSR structures, but test responses are not 
compared with pre-computed test responses. Rather, the same test pattern is 
applied to all slots of a VLIW processor, and the obtained results are compared 
with each other. A similar idea is used in [183]. There, the test patterns are stored 
in the program memory as if they were instructions. Due to the used VLIW 
processor architecture, these test patterns can be fetched directly into the pipeline 
for testing the pipeline, and the data path of the VLIW processor as if they were 
normal instructions. Test responses are checked at the end of the pipeline by 
comparing them with each other in a similar way as it was proposed in [95]. A 
special test mode prevents the processor from treating some of these test patterns 
as branch or illegal operations. The advantage of these BIST approaches is that 
they provide diagnostic information at coarser grained level, e.g., a particular slot 
of the VLIW processor is faultless or not. But, performing a majority vote on the 
test responses fails for multiple faults in the slots of a VLIW processor. Moreover, 
these approaches are too coarse-grained. I.e., they will not achieve the diagnostic 
resolution needed for the fine-grained self-repair at reasonable costs.  
5.1.2 Functional Test and Diagnosis 
Software-based self-test (SBST) is a functional BIST method. It was first proposed 
by Abraham and Thatte [179]. In contrast to structural BIST approaches, SBST is 
non-intrusive, i.e., no additional hardware is needed in the DuT. Moreover, the 
DuT must be a processor, and the self-test is a program that is executed on the 
processor. The processor is operated in functional mode at speed. Functional 
testing has various advantages. For example, overtesting is avoided, because only 
functionally legal inputs are provided to the DuT, and it is well suited for 
detecting unmodeled faults. As shown in figure 5-1 (c), the test program must be 
loaded into the program memory, which can be accomplished during 
manufacturing test, for example, by the ATE. Executing this test program can be 
considered as a way of originating functional test patterns in the internal registers 
of the processor with that program. Test responses in the internal registers are 
captured by an instruction sequence that computes a signature from these results, 
and finally stores this signature in the data memory, such that the ATE can check 
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this signature. The most difficult problem when using a software-based self-test is 
the generation of high quality test programs with reasonable efforts. According to 
[141] various methods exist for the generation of test programs. Test programs 
may be generated manually [185] or randomly [167] without the knowledge of the 
internal structure of the processor. Then no measure for the quality of the test is 
available. In order to reduce the size of the test programs that must be stored or 
transmitted to the memory of the processor under test, the test program can be 
generated on chip. The FRITS approach in [132] uses a random based method, 
where a small kernel is executed by the processor under test. This kernel generates 
pseudo-random test programs. By this, only the small kernel must be loaded in the 
program memory, which reduces the test time.  
With knowledge about the internal structure of the processor under test, the 
quality of manually or randomly generated test programs can be quantified by 
fault simulation. I.e., for each possible fault the test program is simulated with the 
processor model containing this fault. In this way the number of faults that can be 
detected with a set of test programs can be determined, and, hence, the fault 
coverage of these test programs. With these results the randomly generated test 
program set can be improved in an iterative way [46]. Feedback information from 
fault simulation is used in such approaches for reducing the test program size, 
while improving the fault coverage. 
Knowing the internal structure of the processor allows also for deterministic test 
pattern generation with ATPG tools. This can be used for deterministic test 
program generation [181]. Templates of instruction sequences are used, where 
particular bit-fields of the instructions are left blank, for example for operand 
values. These bit fields must be filled with appropriate values, which are generated 
with ATPG tool support. Constraints are used for specifying restrictions imposed 
by the template for test pattern generation. By this, the process of test pattern 
generation for complex logic functions is shifted into an ATPG tool, instead of 
being done manually or randomly. In [37, 39] this idea is extended such that the 
process of template selection and test program generation can be automated. 
Moreover, random and deterministic test program generation may be integrated 
into hybrid approaches [97] in order to improve the fault coverage. 
Basically, a functional test method like SBST is well suited for the diagnostic 
functional test of a particular component of the processor in the field. Test 
programs for various processor components were published recently [98] and 
achieve high fault coverage. In [69] a diagnostic method for the read ports of a 
register file is presented. A software-based self-test for the register file of a VLIW 
processor is presented in [151]. Test programs for the software-based test of the 
translation look-aside buffer and branch prediction unit were published in [152, 
180]. By putting together all of these test programs, high fault coverage for 
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complex processors may be achieved. Unfortunately, a good diagnostic test 
program is not obtained by putting together all these test programs. The 
diagnostic capability of such a test program is limited, because even a simple test 
program uses many processor components, such that a faulty component is not 
uniquely identified. For example, consider the simple test program from figure 5-2 
for the adder in slot 3 of the VARP processor. The test program is composed of 
some initialization code, test code, and capturing code. The initialization code 
loads some values into registers r0 and r1. The test code will utilize the adder, and 
the capturing code makes the result observable. The problem of that piece of test 
code is that it will not only check the adder, but it will also check many other 
components of the processor. For example, the initialization code uses some 
components of slot 1 and the register file. If there is a fault in a pipeline register of 
slot 0, then the initialization is not executed correctly, but the test program will 
detect a fault in the adder of slot 3. 
ldc 0xAAAA,r0
ldc 0x5555,r1
nop
ldc 0xffff,r0
cmp r0,r3 -> r0
jnz #addFailed
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
add r0,r1 -> r2
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
Initialization 
Code
Capturing 
Code
Test 
Code
Slot 0 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3
 
Figure 5-2: Example of a piece of test code for the adder in slot 4. 
 
Thus, a faulty response produced by a test program will not indicate necessarily a 
fault in the tested component. More sophisticated diagnostic techniques are 
needed. Chen proposes in [38] that for good diagnosis a complete test routine is 
composed of many test programs. Each test programs utilizes only few components 
of the processor, such that a failing test program refers to a small set of faults 
only. On the other hand, all the test programs together should cover as many 
faults as possible. In order to achieve both goals, Chen describes in [38] a method 
for selecting test programs from a given set of test programs. The test programs 
were generated manually. From the pass/fail information of each test program, the 
set of fault candidates is isolated by using fault trees. A major problem of this 
approach is the generation of small diagnostic test programs. Bernardi et al. 
presented in [21, 22] a method for automatically improving diagnostic test 
programs. The original test programs were derived from ATPG generated test sets. 
During an iterative phase the diagnostic resolution of the test programs is 
improved with genetic algorithms. In both approaches the execution order of the 
test programs does not matter, because diagnosis is based on fault trees, where 
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only pass/fail information of each test program is considered. The quality of the 
diagnostic resolution of both approaches is determined at gate level by fault 
simulations. Therefore, both approaches will provide structural diagnostic 
information at gate level. Mapping this structural information to functional 
diagnostic information is not in the scope of these works, because both methods 
are dedicated to manufacturing test and diagnosis. The link between the detected 
faults at gate level and the functional misbehavior caused by these faults is 
missing. However, this link is very important for a diagnostic in field self-test that 
must provide fault state information for a subsequent self-repair method.  
5.2 Towards a Systematic Adaptive SBST Routine 
As described in the previous section, structural BIST approaches suffer from a 
computational expensive diagnosis that cannot be performed on-chip. Moreover, 
the diagnostic information is too fine grained. Functional BIST approaches, i.e., 
SBST, allow for testing at the required granularity level, but test programs suffer 
from the usage of too many processor components, which makes the unique 
diagnosis of a fault difficult. Finer-grained diagnostic SBST approaches produce 
diagnostic information at structure-oriented level. This makes the result of such 
diagnostic approaches useless for self-repair approaches that need functional 
diagnostic information.  
For this reason, the starting point for developing a diagnostic self-test for the 
VARP processor is the self-repair method. This self-repair method determines the 
granularity for the test of the components and the tested functionalities of each 
component. Moreover, these components must be tested in a systematic way. In 
the best case, the test of a particular component only relies on the usage of already 
tested components, except the component under test. For example, consider again 
the example in figure 5-2. In order to make sure that only the adder is tested, all 
the other processor components used by the test program should be tested before. 
If they are faultless, then a detected fault can be allocated to the adder.  
Another problem of existing diagnostic SBST approaches is that the used test 
programs are generated statically. This becomes a problem, because faults in 
multiple processor components can be handled by the presented software-based 
self-repair method. Thus, the diagnostic SBST must be able to detect and localize 
faults accurately, even in the presence of already detected faults. But if an already 
detected fault affects, for example, the initialization code of a test program, then 
the component under test cannot be tested correctly. As an example consider again 
the test program in figure 5-2. This test program will not produce accurate 
diagnostic results for the adder, if the initialization of register r0 and r1 is done in 
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a wrong way due to a fault in slot 0. The solution to this problem is the 
adaptation of the test code. The adapted test program is shown in figure 5-3.  
ldc 0xAAAA,r0
ldc 0x5555,r1
nop
ldc 0xffff,r0
cmp r0,r3 -> r0
jnz #addFailed
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
add r0,r1 -> r2
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
nop
Slot 0 Slot 1 Slot 2 Slot 3
Initialization 
Code
Capturing 
Code
Test 
Code
 
Figure 5-3: Test code from figure 5-2 adapted to a fault in slot 1. 
All the initialization and capturing code for the test was moved into slot 1, where 
the code is executed correctly. Only the test instruction remains at their original 
position. Please note that moving the test operation to slot 1, too, would corrupt 
the test program, because the add-operation is then executed in slot 1, and 
therefore the adder of slot 1 is tested. But the test routine would still be used for 
testing adder 3. It follows that the adaptation of the test routine should be done in 
such a way that the initialization and capturing code is executed on faultless 
components of the processor, and all test instructions remain at their original 
position. Therefore, the self-test routine for the VARP processor must be adaptive 
in that sense that it is adapted to the current fault state of the processor. Thereby, 
a diagnostic test can be performed by the adapted test routine, even if the original 
test routine would deliver wrong diagnostic results. Putting together the 
systematic execution of small test programs and the adaptation of these test 
programs yields a general test flow for the startup phase that is illustrated in 
figure 5-4. 
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i = m Invoke Self-
Repair Routine
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Start User 
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i := back(i)
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Software-based Self-test Routine  
Figure 5-4: General test flow of a systematic adaptive software-based self-test routine. 
Suppose the self-repair routine can handle faults in processor components c1,…,cm. 
Then for each component ci a test program ti must be provided. Test program ti 
checks the functionalities of ci. Component ci may provide various sub-
functionalities that can be tested with ti. For example an execution unit supports 
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various operations. Then each provided operation can be considered as a sub-
function. Let Fi denote the sub-functions provided by ci that were detected to be 
faulty by ti. Each test program ti is separated in initialization code, test code, and 
capturing code, as it is shown in figure 5-3. The test programs are executed in 
ascending order t1,…,tm. In the ideal case ti uses only components ck, k < i, for 
initialization and capturing that were tested before by t1,…,ti-1. Moreover, when ti 
detects a fault, then test programs ti+1,…,tm are adapted in such a way that they 
do not use the faulty sub-functions Fi of component ci. In practice, it will be not 
possible to find an execution order, where each test program uses only tested 
components for initialization and capturing. Then it is accepted that there are test 
programs ti that use untested components ck. When such a component ck is 
detected later as faulty, then, as a general solution, the test routine can be set 
back to the test of component ci with the knowledge that ck is faulty. This is 
depicted in figure 5-4 by the node i ≔ back(i). In section 5.4.3 it will be shown 
that there are also other solutions based on observed signatures for solving this 
problem. When the self-test routine is finished, the actual fault state of the 
processor is known and can be used from the software-based self-repair routine for 
adapting the user application. 
5.3 System Architecture 
The proposed test flow from figure 5-4 requires an administrative instance that 
invokes the test programs ti and performs, if necessary, an adaptation of the 
remaining test programs. The administration and adaptation must be done in a 
faultless manner, but the components of the processor under test are tested 
incrementally, such that, especially at the beginning of the test routine, for many 
components the fault state is unknown. For this reason the administrative 
functionality is provided by a separate service core. The system architecture used 
for executing the systematic adaptive SBST is presented in figure 5-5.  
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Figure 5-5: System architecture for the diagnostic adaptive software-based self-test of the VARP processor. 
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The system with the VARP processor is extended by the following components: 
• The program memory of the VARP processor contains the diagnostic test 
programs ti and a software-based self-repair program.  
• The fault-state memory contains up to 64 64-bit fault state registers fsri, 
each of them storing the fault state of a particular component of the VARP 
processor. The bits of these registers correspond to the fault states modeled 
by the fault state functions fsSlot, fsEU, fsRP, fsBPex, fsBPwb, and fsRF. 
The bits of these registers are set by the test programs, when they are 
executed from the VLIW core. For this purpose, the VLIW core has been 
extended with special check-instructions that provide access to the fault 
state memory. 
• The service core (SC) is a very small 8-bit processor. It is used for 
administrating the self-test of the VARP core. For this purpose, the SC 
executes the service routine, which is stored in the program memory of the 
SC. Furthermore the service core has read- and write-access to the program 
memory of the VARP processor, such that it is able to modify the self-test 
programs, which are stored in the program memory of the VARP processor. 
The SC has also access to the fault-state-memory, such that it has access to 
the current fault state of the VARP processor for adapting the self-test 
programs. 
• The arbiter is responsible for organizing the memory accesses of the VARP 
processor and the service core. In particular it moves instructions from the 
VARP program memory into the SC-memory or into the VARP data 
memory. These instructions can be modified there. Then they are written 
back into the program memory. 
Please note that it is the goal to determine the fault state of the VARP processor. 
For this reason a diagnostic test is only needed for those components of the VARP 
processor for which a self-repair method exists. As a consequence, a test of the 
control logic of the VARP processor is not in the scope of the presented system 
architecture. In particular such a test is not needed, if the control logic is made 
fault tolerant by a passive hardware redundancy scheme, as it was discussed at the 
end of section 3.4. Moreover, a diagnostic test of the test infrastructure shown in 
figure 5-5 is also not in the scope of this chapter, because the presented adaptive 
diagnostic self-test will be only useful for the VARP processor in the system. In 
order to perform a test of the test infrastructure, any other method may be better 
used. For example, some kind of scan-based BIST can be employed for testing the 
test infrastructure, because a simple pass/fail information is sufficient. If the test 
infrastructure passes the BIST, then the diagnostic adaptive self-test is started. 
Otherwise the system has a failure. Alternatively, a software-based self-test of the 
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test infrastructure may be performed instead of a scan-based BIST. For this reason 
the service core can execute a software-based self-test routine that just performs a 
simple pass/fail test of the service core. However, a test of the test infrastructure is 
not further investigated. Rather the facilities of an adaptive diagnostic self-test of 
the VARP processor will be investigated. 
In order to perform an adaptive diagnostic self-test of the VARP processor an 
implementation of the general test flow from figure 5-4 was presented in [164]. In 
that work, the pipeline of the VARP processor was extended by so called 0/1-
checkers that were used for detecting stuck-at faults in the pipeline registers. In 
[153] it was shown that the self-test can be executed without this hardware 
extension of the VARP processor. Hence, the only hardware extension of the 
VARP processor is an instruction set extension, by which the VARP processor has 
access to the fault state memory. 
5.3.1 Instruction Set Extension 
The instruction set of the VARP-processor is extended with the four check-
operations shown in table 5-1 for supporting the software-based self-test. These 
operations are used for testing the data transport in the data path of the VARP 
processor and for accessing the fault state memory. 
Instruction Meaning 
chkL0 rx,fsr_n,m 
If executed in slot k, the value of register x is provided as left operand for 
EU k, and bit m of fsrn is set to 1, if this register value is distinct from 0.  
chkL1 rx,fsr_n,m 
If executed in slot k, the value of register x is provided as left operand for 
EU k, and bit m of fsrn is set to 1, if this register value is distinct from -1. 
chkR0 rx,fsr_n,m 
If executed in slot k, the value of register x is provided as right operand for 
EU k, and bit m of fsrn is set to 1, if this register value is distinct from 0. 
chkR1 rx,fsr_n,m 
If executed in slot k, the value of register x is provided as right operand for 
EU k, and bit m of fsrn is set to 1, if this register value is distinct from -1. 
Table 5-1: New SBST related VARP-instructions. 
Please note that the value -1 in table 5-1 means a bit vector, where all bits are 1. 
For a 16-bit data path this is a bit vector with 16 1-bits. The check-operations can 
be executed by all execution units of the VARP processor in parallel. They are 
encoded and executed in the same way as all other arithmetical and logical 
operations. I.e., the value of register x may be provided through the bypass or 
through the read ports from the register file, such that these check-instructions are 
very useful for testing the read ports and bypasses of the VARP processor. 
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5.3.2 The Service Core 
The adaptive SBST is controlled by a small service core. The service core executes 
a service routine that is responsible for activating the execution of particular test 
programs. Each of these test programs ti that are executed by the VARP processor 
will perform the diagnostic test of a particular component ci of the VARP 
processor. If a fault is detected in such a component, then the service core is 
responsible for adapting the remaining test programs in such a way that their 
initialization and capturing code is executed on faultless components of the VARP 
processor. For this reason, the service core has access to the program memory of 
the VARP core. This access is granted by the arbiter. The communication between 
both cores is organized by two signals: halt and continue. The halt-signal is set to 1 
by the VARP core, when it executes a halt instruction that freezes the program 
execution of the VARP core until the continue-signal is set to 1 by the service 
core. The communication of both processors during the startup phase is shown in 
figure 5-6, including the test programs executed by the VARP processor.  
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Figure 5-6: Implementation of the adaptive software-based self-test flow for the VARP processor. 
These test programs are responsible for the following diagnostic tests: 
• The check-test checks for the correct execution of the check-operations, 
because the correct result of the self-test strongly depends on the correct 
execution of them. This test will detect faults in some parts of the pipeline 
registers. 
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• The read port test checks the sub-functions of each read port. Each read port 
provides 64 sub-functions, whereby sub-function i corresponds to reading the 
value of register i through the read port. For this reason, the read port will 
also detect faults in the registers of the register file. Furthermore, the read 
port test will detect some faults in the pipeline registers that were not 
covered by the check-test. 
• The bypass test checks two sub-functions of each bypass: The first sub-
function is the forwarding from the execution or write-back stage into the 
decode stage. The second sub-function is the non-forwarding; i.e., the bypass 
passes the value from the read port.  
• The false-write-back-test checks for each register of the register file that the 
register is not accidently written with a value, although this register should 
not be loaded with a value.  
• The execution unit test checks the provided operations of each execution 
unit. 
First, the service core activates the check-test for the VARP processor and waits 
until the check-test is finished. This is the case when the halt-signal is set to 1 by 
the VARP processor. Now the service core evaluates the fault state. When the 
check-test has detected some faults, then the service core adapts the remaining 
four test programs. After that the read port test is activated. Both read port test 
and check-test together constitute the slot test, because some faults in the pipeline 
registers are detected by the check-test and some other faults in the pipeline 
registers are detected by the read port test. Most faults in the pipeline registers are 
handled by the self-repair routine by avoiding the usage of that slot. After passing 
the slot-test, the bypasses and registers of the register file are tested. After that 
the data transport through the data path and the register file of the VARP 
processor has been tested, such that finally the operations of the execution units 
are checked. If correct test data can be provided to the inputs of the execution 
units, then testing them becomes straightforward. The obtained fault state is also 
used for adapting the self-repair routine. Finally, the self-repair routine is executed 
on the VARP core and adapts the user application. Please note that it would be 
also possible to execute the self-repair routine on the service core. However, the 
instruction set of the service core has been optimized for the relative simple 
adaptations of the test programs and the self-repair routine. Their adaptation is 
simple, because these programs have a very regular form such that for adaptation 
only single operations must be moved from one slot to another slot within the 
same instruction. For example, the self-repair routine is a totally sequential 
program that contains only one operation per instruction. 
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5.4 Test Programs 
The subsequent sections describe the details of the test programs that were 
sketched on the right side of figure 5-6. The test programs were developed 
manually using the stuck-at fault model. 
5.4.1 Check-Test 
The check-test will check various parts of the pipeline registers of the VARP 
processor. The objective is to make sure that any fetched opcode, including the 
source and destination register number, will reach the execution units unchanged. 
This is of particular importance for loading immediate values into register with a 
ldc-operation, because the immediate value is encoded in the bit-fields for the 
source-register numbers of an operation (see figure 2-2). Figure 5-7 (a) shows the 
assembler code of the test program for slot 0, and figure 5-7 (b) shows the binary 
encoding of the assembler program. This test program is executed after a reset of 
the VARP processor. Therefore, all the registers r0 to r63 should have the value 0. 
chkL1 R0, fsr_7, 0; nop; nop; nop
halt; nop; nop; nop
chkL1 R0, fsr_8, 0; nop; nop; nop
chkR1 R0, fsr_7, 63; nop; nop; nop
chkR1 R0, fsr_8, 63; nop; nop; nop
slot 0 slot 1 slot 2 slot 3
 
00001010 000000 000111 000000 00 … 00 00 … 00 00 … 00
00001001 000111 000000 111111 00 … 00 00 … 00 00 … 00
00001010 000000 001000 000000 00 … 00 00 … 00 00 … 00
00001001 001000 000000 111111 00 … 00 00 … 00 00 … 00
00000111 000000 000000 000000 00 … 00 00 … 00 00 … 00
opc src1 src2 dst
slot 0 slot 1 slot 2 slot 3
 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5-7: (a) Assembler code for the check-test of slot 0. (b) Binary code for the check-test of slot 0. 
The code sequence executes various chkL1- and chkR1-operations in slot 0. These 
operations read the value of r0 and compare this value with -1 (see table 5-1). 
Obviously the value of r0 should be distinct from -1. For this reason, bits 0 and 63 
of fault state register 7 (fsr7) and fault state register 8 (fsr8) are set to 1, when this 
test sequence is executed correctly. These four bits are checked by the service core. 
When they are set to one, then the check-test is passed successfully, otherwise the 
test has failed. 
Please note that the proposed test sequence also utilizes untested components. In 
particular these are the read ports of slot 0 and register r0. However, it is very 
unlikely that faults in the read port or in the register file will change the faultless 
value 0 of r0 into a -1. This requires, for example, 16 stuck-at-1 faults that are 
present in r0, which is very unlikely.  
By considering the binary encoding of the instruction sequence in figure 5-7 (b) it 
can be noticed that only  
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• SA0 faults in bits 4 to 7 of the opc-field and  
• SA0 faults in bits 4 and 5 of the src1- and src2-field  
allow for a correct execution of the test program without being detected, because 
these bits are always 0 in each instruction of the test program. All stuck-at faults 
in the fetch and decode register that affect the other bit-fields will be detected. 
After executing the test program in figure 5-7 (b) for slot 0, the control is given 
back to the service core by executing the halt-operation. The service core checks 
bits 0 and 63 of the fault state registers fsr7 and fsr8 for the expected values. 
According to the values of these fault state registers the fault state of a slot is 
determined as follows: 
 7 8 7 8
1,  if (0) (0) (63) (63)
(0) :
0,  otherwise
fsr fsr fsr fsr
fsSlot
    
 
If fsSlot(0) = 0, then an adaptation of the remaining test programs must be done. 
This adaptation is described in more detail in section 5.5. The check-test is 
repeated for the remaining slots of the VARP processor. I.e., the check-test for slot 
i  SLOTS – {0} is done by executing the check-operations in figure 5-7 (a) in slot 
i. This is controlled by the service core that invokes the check-test for each slot 
separately. 
5.4.2 Read-Port Test 
This section describes the read port test of the VARP processor, whose main 
purpose is the detection of faults in the read ports. But this test program also 
detects some faults in the pipeline registers that were not covered by the check-test 
and faults in the registers of the register file. The structure of read ports has been 
already described in section 3.3.2. Please recall that a read port for a register file 
with 16-bit registers is composed of 16 multiplexer trees as shown in figure 3-15. In 
[115] minimal test sets were proposed for multiplexer trees. 100 % fault coverage 
can be obtained for single stuck-at faults with these test sets. A software-based 
self-test for read ports that rely on such a multiplexer-based structure is presented 
in [69]. That test distinguishes between data- and address faults. An address-fault 
occurs due to a stuck-at fault in the control signal of a 2:1-multiplexer such that 
the value from the wrong data input is selected. A data fault occurs due to a stuck-
at fault in the data input/output of a 2:1-multiplexer. With the test patterns used 
in [69] all single stuck-at faults are detected with only two test patterns. The test 
patterns are constructed in such a way that, for both data inputs L and R of a 2:1 
multiplexer in a faultless multiplexer tree, it either holds L = 1 and R = 0 or 
L = 0 and R = 1. Figure 5-8 (a) shows a multiplexer tree with 8 data inputs and 
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the corresponding two test patterns that must be loaded in the registers of the 
register file. Please recall that a -1 means a bit-vector containing only 1-bits. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5-8: (a) Test Patterns and test responses for a faultless 8:1 multiplexer tree according to [69]. (b) Test Patterns and 
test responses for a 8:1 multiplexer tree with two SA-faults. 
The test patterns are applied by loading the registers of the register file with the 
values shown as test patterns. After that the value of each register is checked by 
reading the value of each register. If the multiplexer tree is faultless, then the test 
responses shown in figure 5-8 (a) will be obtained. With these two test patterns, 
all single address faults and multiple data faults can be detected. Unfortunately, 
not all multiple address faults can be located correctly. An example is given in 
figure 5-8 (b) taken from [182]. There the multiplexer tree has two address faults. 
Multiplexer 6 always selects the left input, and multiplexer 7 always selects the 
right input, represented by the two additional arrows. As a consequence, only the 
values of registers r4 and r5 can be accessed. The same test response is obtained 
for a double SA-fault, when multiplexer 5 always selects the right input and 
multiplexer 7 always selects the left input. Thus, both fault states cannot be 
distinguished. 
In order to detect and localize all multiple address- and data faults correctly, more 
but simpler test patterns were published in [163, 164] for the VARP processor. 
These test patterns are listed in table 5-2. Each test pattern defines  
• the accessed register r, which is the value of the control signal of the read 
port, and 
• the values for all registers r0 to r63, which are the values at the data inputs 
of each read port. 
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No. of Test Pattern r r0 r1 r2 … r62 r63 
1 0 0 0 0 … 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 … 0 0 
3 2 0 0 0 … 0 0 
4 3 0 0 0 … 0 0 
…      … … 
64 63 0 0 0 … 0 0 
65 0 -1 0 0 … 0 0 
66 1 0 -1 0 … 0 0 
67 2 0 0 -1  0 0 
…      … … 
127 62 0 0 0 ... -1 0 
128 63 0 0 0 … 0 -1 
Table 5-2: List of test patterns for the read port test. 
Test patterns 1 to 64 are used for performing a stuck-at-1 test of the read port by 
setting all data inputs of each multiplexer tree to 0. I.e., all registers are initialized 
with 0. Each possible register number is applied to r. I.e., each register is accessed 
once with a chkL- or chrR-operation through each read port. If always a 0 is 
observed at the outputs of all multiplexer trees, then there is no stuck-at-1 fault on 
any data input or output of a 2:1 multiplexer that reaches the output of the 
multiplexer tree. In order to complete the test, a stuck-at-0 test of the read port is 
performed with the test patterns 65 to 128. For each k with 0  k  63, the data 
input k of all multiplexer trees is set to 1 while all other data inputs are 0. For this 
reason, register k is initialized with -1, while all other registers are initialized with 
0. Then value k is applied to the control input r of the multiplexer in order to 
select data input k. If a 1 is observed at each multiplexer-tree output, then input k 
is read correctly. This is for the following reason: From the stuck-at-1 test of the 
read port it is known that no stuck-at-1 fault can reach the output of any 
multiplexer tree. Thus the 1 must be the 1 from input k. It follows immediately 
that there is also no address fault for selecting input k.  
The test patterns from table 5-2 are applied to the read ports of the VARP 
processor by a test program. The test program24 that applies the test patterns 1 to 
64 is shown in figure 5-9.  
24 Please note that the test code is given for the case that all slots are faultless. If a 
slot has been detected as faulty by the check-test then the read port test program 
is adapted as described later in the section 5.5.2. 
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// Initialize all registers with zero 
ldc 0,r0 nop nop nop 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
ldc 0,r63  nop nop nop 
// Fragment 0: SA1 test for all read ports by reading register 0 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop   
chkL0 r0,fsr_0,0 chkL0 r0,fsr_2,0 chkL0 r0,fsr_4,0 chkL0 r0,fsr_6,0 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkR0 r0,fsr_1,0 chkR0 r0,fsr_3,0 chkR0 r0,fsr_5,0 chkR0 r0,fsr_7,0 
// Fragment 1: SA1 test for all read ports by reading register 1 
. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . . 
// Fragment 63: SA1 test for all read ports by reading register 63 
chkL0 r63,fsr_0,63 chkL0 r63,fsr_2,63 chkL0 r63,fsr_4,63 chkL0 r63,fsr_6,63 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkR0 r63,fsr_1,63 chkR0 r63,fsr_3,63 chkR0 r63,fsr_5,63 chkR0 r63,fsr_7,63 
Figure 5-9: Test program for SA1 test in all read ports. 
First, the test program initializes all registers with 0. Thereby, the data inputs of 
all multiplexer trees are set to 0. After that the test program is composed of 64 
fragments. The first two NOP-instructions at the beginning of fragment 0 make 
sure that the write-back of r63 is finished before the first instruction with check-
operations is executed. The two check-instructions in each fragment r perform the 
stuck-at-1 test for the left and right read port of each slot k. If one of these check-
instructions reads a value different from 0, then the corresponding bit r in the 
fault state register fsrk is set to 1. Hence, the following relationship between the 
values in the fault state registers and the fault state function fsRP holds: 
 
1,  if ( ) 0
( , )
0,  otherwise
k
fsr r
fsRP k r
  
. (5-1) 
A template for applying the test patterns 65 to 128 from table 5-2 is shown in 
figure 5-10. This template is parameterized by the register number r from table 5-2 
and must be instantiated for each r with 0 ≤ r ≤ 63. 
// All registers are already initialized with zero 
ldc #-1,r nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop   
chkL1 r,fsr0,r chkL1 r,fsr2,r chkL1 r,fsr4,r chkL1 r,fsr6,r 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkR1 r,fsr1,r chkR1 r,fsr3,r chkR1 r,fsr5,r chkR1 r,fsr7,r 
ldc #0,r nop nop nop 
Figure 5-10: Test program template for SA0 test of all read port.  
First, register r is initialized with -1. The next two NOP-instructions make sure 
that the -1 is written back to the register file before the value is accessed through 
the read-port. When the subsequent chkL1- and chkR1-instructions are executed, 
then only data input r of all read ports is -1. Thus, the chkL1- and chkR1-
instructions should read the value -1. If this is not the case for read port k, then 
bit r of fsrk is set to 1, such that again the relationship from equation (5-1) holds.  
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It should be noted that also the values from the pipeline registers must be taken 
into account for the read port test. This is due to the fact that the output of the 
read port is used as input of the multiplexer-tree of the bypass (see figure 3-17). 
I.e, the pipeline registers must be all 0 for the read port test, because the outputs 
of these pipeline registers are connected to the inputs ex1, …, ex4, wb1, …, wb4 of 
the multiplexer trees of each bypass (see figure 3-17). The test code in figure 5-9 
and figure 5-10 already fulfills this requirement, because, by the two NOP-
instructions before each check-instruction, it is ensured that all pipeline registers 
have the value 0, when the check-instruction is executed. 
The proposed test patterns in table 5-2 and the corresponding test program in 
figure 5-10 were developed manually. In order to determine the fault coverage and 
to prove the diagnostic capability, an exhaustive fault simulation was done for the 
VARP processor in [148] by using the stuck-at fault model. I.e., a VHDL model of 
the VARP processor with a structural implementation of the read port was used 
for the fault simulation. The read port was implemented by using 2:1-multiplexers. 
In total 6092 faults exist in the read port. Each one of these faults was injected in 
the VHDL model, and the test programs from figure 5-9 and figure 5-10 were 
executed by a simulation in the VHDL model. It turned out that each fault could 
be detected. Moreover, each fault has been classified correctly by the test program 
regarding the fault state of the processor. The same experiment was done for all 
double faults in the read ports [148]. In this case, also 100% fault coverage could 
be obtained, including the correct diagnosis of all double faults. 
5.4.3 Slot-Test 
The slot-test encapsulates the check-test and the read port test in order to localize 
faults in the pipeline registers that could not be detected with the check-test. In 
particular these are faults that prevent the ldc-operation, which is extensively used 
for initializing registers during the read port test, from being executed correctly. In 
particular, the check-test cannot detect stuck-at-0 faults that affect the gray 
shaded bit-fields of the opcode-, src1-, and src2-bit fields shown in figure 5-7. 
Stuck-at-0 faults in these bit fields will  
• change the opcode of a ldc-operation into the opcode of another operation, or  
• the specified constant of the ldc-operation is changed. 
• Moreover, due to stuck-at faults in some bit-fields of the write-back register 
of a slot, the address of the destination register may be changed, too.  
In any case, a specified destination register r of the ldc-operations in figure 5-10 is 
not initialized correctly with -1. As a consequence, the check-operations for each 
read-port k that access register r will detect a fault such that the property 
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fsRP(k,r) = 0 holds for all k  RPS. I.e., a fault state is detected, where each read 
port has a fault, when accessing register r. However, in such situations, it is more 
likely that register r is faulty or initialized incorrectly than having the same fault 
in all read ports. For this reason the service core checks for such suspicious fault 
states. In order to do this in an efficient way, the fault state fsRF of the register 
file is used. When the read port test is finished, the fault state fsRF of the register 
file is set by the service core as follows:  
 
0,  if : ( , ) 0
( ) :
1,  otherwise
k RPS fsRP k r
fsRF r
    
 (5-2) 
Based on the fault state fsRF of the register file, it is decided by the service core 
for what reason the read port test has failed. This can be either a fault in the read 
port, a fault in a register of the register file, or a fault in a pipeline register of that 
slot that has executed the initialization code. These three cases are distinguished 
by the syndrome obtained from the results of the function fsRF. The syndrome is 
considered as a bit-vector (fsRF(0), fsRF(1),…, fsRF(63)). Faults in the pipeline 
registers of the slot that has executed the initialization code for the read port test 
are recognized by the syndrome-patterns shown in table 5-3. Please note that the 
service core recognizes a pattern, when the 0-bits of the pattern in table 5-3 will 
match with the 0-bits of the syndrome. I.e., a 1 in the pattern is interpreted as a 
don't care bit in the syndrome. If the service core recognizes one of these patterns, 
then the slot that has executed the initialization code (i.e., the ldc-operations) is 
declared as faulty. 
Syndrome patterns 
Fault 
Type SA 
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 Data 0/1 
10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 10101010 
Adr0 
0 
01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 01010101 1 
11001100 11001100 11001100 11001100 11001100 11001100 11001100 11001100 
Adr1 
0 
00110011 00110011 00110011 00110011 00110011 00110011 00110011 00110011 1 
11110000 11110000 11110000 11110000 11110000 11110000 11110000 11110000 
Adr2 
0 
00001111 00001111 00001111 00001111 00001111 00001111 00001111 00001111 1 
11111111 00000000 11111111 00000000 11111111 00000000 11111111 00000000 
Adr3 
0 
00000000 11111111 00000000 11111111 00000000 11111111 00000000 11111111 1 
11111111 11111111 00000000 00000000 11111111 11111111 00000000 00000000 
Adr4 
0 
00000000 00000000 11111111 11111111 00000000 00000000 11111111 11111111 1 
11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 
Adr5 
0 
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 11111111 11111111 11111111 11111111 1 
Table 5-3: Patterns for fsRF used for recognizing faults in pipeline registers. 
For example, the first pattern with type data occurs, when the destination register 
r is always initialized with a wrong value. This may happen due to a stuck-at-0 
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fault in the src1- and src2-bit fields of the pipeline registers. Then, reading of each 
register through each read port fails, such that each register is declared as faulty. 
The remaining syndromes of type Adrx occur due to stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1 faults 
that affect bit x in the destination register bit-field of the write-back register. For 
example, if bit 0 (x = 0) in the destination register bit-field of the write-back 
register in slot 0 has a SA1-fault, then the destination register address is always 
changed to an odd address. Thus, when accessing registers with an even address 
during the read port test, a wrong value is obtained, and registers with even 
address are declared as faulty. 
Stuck-at faults in a register r of the register file will be recognized by syndromes 
that do not match with any pattern in table 5-3, but fsRF(r) = 0, i.e., register r 
could not be accessed correctly through any read port. Please recall that the read 
port test stores 0 as well as -1 in each register and will check for each value if it 
can be accessed correctly through each read port. If the slot cannot write correctly 
in a particular set of processor registers {r1,…,rk} or there is a stuck-at fault in 
registers {r1,…,rk}, then the read port test will detect a fault in each read port, 
when reading a register r  {r1,…,rk}. For k < 32 this will result in a syndrome, 
different from the syndromes listed in table 5-3, where fsRF(r) = 0 if and only if 
r  {r1,…,rk}. For such syndromes the registers {r1,…,rk} are declared as faulty. 
The read port test programs shown in figure 5-9 and figure 5-10 will detect only 
faults in the pipeline registers of slot 0, because the initialization code is executed 
only in slot 0. For this reason, the slot test includes the execution of four versions 
of the read port test. Version i executes all initialization code (i.e., all ldc-
operations) in slot i. The slot test starts with i = 0. After executing version i of 
the read port test, the control is given back to the service core that evaluates the 
syndromes obtained from the fault state function fsRF, and, if necessary, declares 
slot i as faulty. If slot i is declared as faulty, then the fault state fsRP of the read 
ports and fsRF are reset by the service core before version i+1 of the read port 
test is invoked. Otherwise the fault state fsRP determined for the read ports by 
the read port test is accepted. In order to save program memory, the service core 
modifies version i of the read port test by moving the initialization code from slot i 
into slot i+1 before the read port test is started again.  
5.4.4 Bypass Test 
As it was already shown in figure 3-17, the structure of the bypass is almost the 
same as the structure of the read port. Moreover, bypass and read-port are 
connected in such a way that they form together a multiplexer tree again (see 
figure 3-17). I.e. the output of a read port is used as data input for the bypass (see 
figure 5-11) that selects between the inputs from the pipeline registers 
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(ex0,…,ex3,wb0,…,wb3) and the input from the read port. Obviously, the whole 
read port and bypass structure is equivalent to the structure of a read port. 
Therefore, the organization of the bypass test is very similar to the organization of 
the read-port test. However, the generation of the address signal for the 
multiplexer tree of the bypass is more complex.  
ex0 ex1 ex2 ex3 wb0 wb1 wb2 wb3
Bypass
read-
port
16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
data out
16
E
nc
od
er
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp
cmp Dst_wb3 + valid_wb3
Dst_wb2 + valid_wb2
Dst_wb1 + valid_wb1
Dst_wb0 + valid_wb0
Dst_ex3 + valid_ex3
Dst_ex2 + valid_ex2
Dst_ex1 + valid_ex1
Dst_ex0 + valid_ex0
Src_deX
4
address
signal
 
Figure 5-11: Bypass with bypass control logic. 
The address signal is used to select either the input from the read port (no 
forwarding) or from one of the pipeline registers (forwarding). The address signal is 
generated by an encoder, and the input signals for the encoder are generated by 
compare-components (cmp). Each cmp compares the numbers of a destination 
register from the write-back- and execute-stage (Dst_ex0,…,Dst_wb3, 
Dst_wb0,…,Dst_wb3) with the used source register number in the decode stage 
(Src_dex) with respect to the valid-flag of each pipeline register. Encoder and 
cmp-components can be considered as the control logic for the bypass. Two sub-
functionalities of the bypass are tested separately: 
• First, the forwarding of values from pipeline registers is done correctly. 
• Second, the read port value is selected correctly, if no forwarding is needed.  
The first sub-functionality of the bypass is tested by applying the test patterns 
shown in table 5-4 at the inputs shown in figure 5-11 by using an appropriate 
instruction sequence.  
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No. 
data inputs Dst_ 
src_de read 
port ex0 ex1 ex2 ex3 wb0 wb1 wb2 wb3 ex0 ex1 ex2 ex3 wb0 wb1 wb2 wb3 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - 0 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - - - - - - 0 
…                  … 
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - 0 0 
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 - - - - - - - 63 
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 63 - - - - - - 63 
…                  … 
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - 63 63 
17 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - - - - 0 
18 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 - - - - - - 0 
…                  … 
24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 - - - - - - - 0 0 
25 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 63 - - - - - - - 63 
26 0 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 - 63 - - - - - - 63 
…                  … 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -1 - - - - - - - 63 63 
Table 5-4: Test patterns for testing the forwarding-functionality of a bypass. 
A – in columns Dst_ex0,…,Dst_wb3 means that the value of the corresponding 
pipeline register is not valid. This is achieved by executing a NOP. Please note 
that the execution of a NOP computes the value 0 at the output of the execution 
unit, such that the corresponding data input of the bypass is 0. Moreover, the bit-
field for the destination register number in a pipeline register is set to 0 by a NOP. 
Test patterns 1 to 16 check for stuck-at-1 faults in the multiplexer trees of the 
bypass, in the same manner as it was done for the read ports by the stuck-at-1 
test. I.e., all of the test patterns 1 to 16 set all data inputs of the bypass to 0. 
Moreover, each of the test patterns forces the bypass to select another data input. 
The obtained output value is compared with 0. This is accomplished in two phases 
in order test the control logic of the bypass, too. The first phase (1-8) uses register 
0 as source register in the decode stage (src_de = 0). The second phase (9-16) uses 
register 63 as source register in the decode stage (src_de = 63). By using these 
register numbers, all inputs of a single cmp-component (see figure 5-11) are set to 
0 by the test patterns 1 to 8, and they are set to 1 by the test patterns 9 to 16.  
Test patterns 17 to 32 perform the stuck-at-0 test in the same manner as it was 
done during the read port test. The test is done in two phases again (17-32), where 
the first phase uses register r0 and the second phase uses register r63 for testing 
the selection of correct data input of the bypass. Please recall that during the 
stuck-at-0 test only the selected data input of the bypass is set to -1, while all 
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other data inputs are set to 0. By this also address faults in the multiplexer tree 
will be detected.  
In order to apply the presented test patterns with a test program to the bypasses, 
the test program is composed of (d,k,p)-instruction groups, where d  {L,R}, 
k  SLOTS, and p  {1,2}. A (d,k,p)-instruction group executes an ldc-operation 
in slot k. p instructions later all slots execute either chkL-operations (d = L) or 
chkR-operations (d = R). Hence, for p = 1, the constant value of the ldc-operation 
is forwarded from the execution stage of slot k into the decode stages of all slots. 
For p = 2, the constant value of the ldc-operation is forwarded from the write-back 
stage of slot k into the decode stages of all slots. Figure 5-12 shows a code 
fragment of the bypass test. This code fragment is used for testing the forwarding 
of a value from slot 1 through all left bypasses. The applied test patterns from 
table 5-4 are referenced in the listing. 
// SA1 test with source/destination register 0; applies test patterns 2 and 6 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
chkL0 r0,fsr8,0 chkL0 r0,fsr8,1 chkL0 r0,fsr8,2 chkL0 r0,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkL0 r0,fsr8,4 chkL0 r0,fsr8,5 chkL0 r0,fsr8,6 chkL0 r0,fsr8,7 
// SA0 test with source/destination register 0; applies test patterns 18 and 22 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r0 nop nop 
chkL1 r0,fsr8,0 chkL1 r0,fsr8,1 chkL1 r0,fsr8,2 chkL1 r0,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r0 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkL1 r0,fsr8,4 chkL1 r0,fsr8,5 chkL1 r0,fsr8,6 chkL1 r0,fsr8,7 
// SA1 test with source/destination register 63; applies test patterns 10 and 14 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
chkL0 r63,fsr8,0 chkL0 r63,fsr8,1 chkL0 r63,fsr8,2 chkL0 r63,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkL0 r63,fsr8,4 chkL0 r63,fsr8,5 chkL0 r63,fsr8,6 chkL0 r63,fsr8,7 
// SA0 test with source/destination register 63; applies test patterns 26 and 30 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r63 nop nop 
chkL1 r63,fsr8,0 chkL1 r63,fsr8,1 chkL1 r63,fsr8,2 chkL1 r63,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r63 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkL1 r63,fsr8,4 chkL1 r63,fsr8,5 chkL1 r63,fsr8,6 chkL1 r63,fsr8,7 
Figure 5-12: Test program for testing forwarding from slot 1. 
For the test program in figure 5-12 it is assumed that all registers of the register 
file are initialized with 0 such that the read port input of the bypass has the value 
0. The first three instructions form a (L,1,1)-instruction group. The second 
instruction executes the ldc-operation, whose value should be forwarded. When the 
third instruction enters the decode-stage, then the ldc-operation enters the 
execution stage, and instruction 1 is in the write-back stage such that all data 
inputs of the bypasses have the value 0. Because the third instruction is in the 
decode stage, all for slots decode a chkL0-operation. I.e., the left bypass of each 
slot must select the value written into r0 by the ldc-operation from instruction 2. 
Hence, all four left bypasses select data input ex1 (see figure 5-11). Instructions 4 
to 6 form a (L,1,2)-instruction group and force the left bypasses to select the value 
of the ldc-operation from the write-back stage. Instructions 7 to 13 perform the 
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same test sequence as instructions 1 to 6, but they perform the stuck-at-0 test by 
loading constant -1 into register r0. Finally, the same test is repeated for the 
second phase, i.e., register r63 is used for forcing the bypass to perform forwarding 
from execution- and write-back stage. Hence, the instruction sequence in figure 
5-12 checks for all left bypasses of the VARP processor that they perform 
forwarding from the execute- and write-back stage of slot 1. Similar test programs 
are needed for testing the right bypasses in each slot, and for testing forwarding 
from other slots than slot 1. 
The fault coverage and diagnostic capability of this bypass test program was 
evaluated by a fault simulation in [148]. For this reason a structural 
implementation of the bypass and the bypass control logic was integrated into the 
VARP processor model. The structural bypass model has 1278 stuck-at faults. A 
fault simulation was done for each single-stuck-at fault in the bypass. I.e., the 
described bypass test program has been executed in the VHDL model with the 
injected fault. For the bypass a fault-coverage of 91.0% was obtained. By a manual 
analysis of the missed faults it was discovered that these faults are located in the 
control logic of the bypass. These were exactly those faults that will cause a false-
forwarding, i.e., a value from a pipeline register is selected, although the bypass 
must select the read port value. By a detailed analysis of the bypass control logic, 
test patterns for exciting these faults were determined manually. These test 
patterns must have the property that the binary register number r of the source 
register read in the decode stage is distinct in exactly one bit position from the 
binary register number r' of the destination registers written in the execute- and 
write-back stage. In that situation a forwarding should not take place. However, if 
there is a stuck-at fault in the bypass control such that the single bit position 
where r and r' differ becomes equal, then a false forwarding takes place and can be 
detected. A template for a test program that will check for this false-forwarding is 
shown in figure 5-13. The template is parameterized with r and r'. The first group 
of instructions checks for a false-forwarding from the execution stage into the 
decode stage. It is assumed that all registers of the register file are initialized with 
0. When a false forwarding takes place, then a chkL0-operation from the first 
instruction group reads the -1 from one of the preceding ldc-operations. In a 
similar way the remaining three instruction groups will check for a false forwarding 
from the write-back stage into the decode-stage through the left bypass, and for a 
false forwarding through the right bypasses. 
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// Group 1: Check left bypasses for false-forwarding from EX-stage  
nop nop nop nop 
ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' 
chkL0 r,fsr8,0 chkL0 r,fsr8,2 chkL0 r,fsr8,4 chkL0 r,fsr8,6 
ldc #0,r ldc #0,r' nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
nop nop nop nop; 
// Group 2: Check left bypasses for false-forwarding from WB-stage  
ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkL0 r,fsr8,0 chkL0 r,fsr8,2 chkL0 r,fsr8,4 chkL0 r,fsr8,6 
ldc #0,r ldc #0,r' nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
nop nop nop nop; 
// Group 3: Check right bypasses for false-forwarding from EX-stage  
ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' 
chkR0 r,fsr8,1 chkR0 r,fsr8,3 chkR0 r,fsr8,5 chkR0 r,fsr8,7 
ldc #0,r ldc #0,r' nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
nop nop nop nop; 
// Group 4: Check right bypasses for false-forwarding from WB-stage  
ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' ldc #-1,r' 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkR0 r,fsr8,1 chkR0 r,fsr8,3 chkR0 r,fsr8,5 chkR0 r,fsr8,7 
ldc #0,r ldc #0,r' nop nop 
 
Figure 5-13: Test program template for testing for false-forwarding. 
Thereby, the template must be instantiated for the combinations of register 
addresses r and r' shown in table 5-5.  
Instance r r' 
1 000000 000001 
2 000000 000010 
3 000000 000100 
4 000000 001000 
5 000000 010000 
6 000000 100000 
7 111111 111110 
8 111111 111101 
9 111111 111011 
10 111111 110111 
11 111111 101111 
12 111111 011111 
Table 5-5: Register combinations used for the false-forwarding test. 
If a false forwarding is detected by the false-forwarding test program for bypass k, 
then it cannot be guaranteed that bypass k provides correct values from the read 
port k. For this reason such a bypass fault is considered as equivalent to a fault in 
the read port k, where the access to each register is faulty. Thus, fsRP(k,r) ≔ 0 for 
all r  REGS, if bit k in fsr8 is set to one by the false-forwarding test program 
from figure 5-13. 
Performing a fault simulation with the test program derived from the template in 
figure 5-13 results in a fault-coverage of 55% for a bypass. In particular this test 
program covers all of those faults that were not covered from the test program for 
the forwarding-test in figure 5-12. Thus, by executing both test programs, a fault 
coverage of 100% is obtained for the bypasses including the bypass control logic. 
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5.4.5 False-Write-Back Test 
With the read port test it was also tested that a value was written correctly into a 
specified destination register. But it is not checked whether or not the values of 
other registers than the destination register may be affected by the write 
operation. This may happen due to the structure of a register as it is shown in 
figure 5-14. 
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Figure 5-14: Structure of a single register. 
A 16-bit register in the register file consists of 16 flip-flops. Each flip-flop receives 
its input from a 5:1-multiplexer. Thereby, data input m of each multiplexer n is 
connected with bit n of the write-back register in slot m. Moreover, data input 4 is 
connected with the output of the flip-flop. This data input is used to hold the 
current value of the flip-flop. The compare logic of register k is responsible for 
generating the control signal ctrlk for the multiplexers, and it receives the 
destination register numbers dst0,…,dst3 from the write-back stage of all slots: 
 
0,  if 0
1,  if 1
( 0, 1, 2, 3) : 2,  if 2
3,  if 3
4,  otherwise
k
dst k
dst k
ctrl dst ds dst dst dst k
dst k
    
 
All multiplexers receive the same control signal. A fault in the control logic or an 
address fault in a 5:1-multiplexer may cause loading a new value into register k, 
although register k should hold its current value. In order to check whether or not 
a register, which is not the destination register of an operation, is affected by a 
write operation, all registers are initialized with 0. Then the value -1 is written 
into a single register r. After that the value of all other registers is compared with 
0. If the value of one of these registers is different from 0, then it is declared as 
faulty. Figure 5-15 shows the template for this test program.  
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// Initialize all registers with 0 
ldc #0, r0 nop nop nop 
... 
ldc #0, r63 nop nop nop 
// Write test value -1 into register r 
ldc #-1,r; ldc #-1,r; ldc #-1,r; ldc #-1,r 
nop; nop; nop; nop 
nop; nop; nop; nop 
chkL0 r0,fsr9,0; nop; nop; nop 
... 
chkL0 r-1,fsr9,r-1; nop; nop; nop 
chkL0 r+1,fsr9,r+1; nop; nop; nop 
... 
chkL0 r63,fsr9,63; nop; nop; nop 
 
Figure 5-15: Test program template for the false-write-back test. 
The test program template initializes all registers with 0 and then stores -1 in 
register r. Please note that this operation is executed in all four slots. By this, all 
registers in the register file have a 1-bit at all data inputs 0 to 3 of their 
multiplexers (see figure 5-14). If one of the registers accidently loads another value 
than its own value at data input 4, then it will be a 1-bit. The check-operations in 
figure 5-14 will check all registers, except register r, to have the value 0. If one of 
them is not 0 (e.g. register j), then it was loaded accidently with a 1-bit. Thus bit j 
in fault state register 9 is set to 1, indicating that register j cannot be used as 
destination register, because writing to register r overwrites the value in register j.  
This template in figure 5-15 must be instantiated for each register r  REGS. For 
practical reasons, the template is not instantiated statically 64 times. Rather the 
service core generates dynamically the appropriate instances. I.e., originally only a 
single instance of the template exists for r = 0. After executing this instance, the 
service core updates the fault state of each register, adapts the test program for r 
in such a way that the test program for r+1 is obtained, and the adapted test 
program is started again.  
In [148] the register structure shown in figure 5-15 was implemented for register r0 
with simple gates. This structural model has in total 566 faults and was included 
in the model of the VARP processor. Each of the 566 faults was injected in the 
structural model before executing the slot test program and the false-write-back 
test program. Both test programs together detected 100% of the faults, including a 
correct classification of the caused functional misbehavior. 
5.4.6 Execution Unit Test 
The generation of test programs for the execution units can be done 
straightforward with ATPG-tool support. Appropriate methods were described for 
example in [181] and [163]. The same techniques were used in [81] for the 
generation of test programs for a 16-bit execution unit that is very similar to the 
one of the VARP processor. I.e., an ATPG tool was used for test pattern 
generation for an execution unit. The operand values for a test program template 
were extracted from the generated test patterns, and they were used to fill the 
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gaps in a test program template. In order to generate a test for a specific operation 
type, the control signals of the execution unit can be fixed by some ATPG 
constraints during test pattern generation. For the execution units a fault coverage 
of 99.93% could be obtained with the generated test patterns, requiring 
approximately 4.3 kByte of memory for storing the test sequences [81].  
The generated test programs will have the same structure as the example shown 
for the adder-test in figure 5-2. Therefore, the test patterns can be applied to an 
execution unit in a straightforward manner, because the data transportation paths 
of the VARP processor needed for register initialization and capturing were 
already tested with the previous test programs. By knowing the faults on these 
paths, correct operand values can be provided to each execution unit for test 
purposes by adapting the test programs for the execution units in the same way as 
it was sketched for the adder-test in figure 5-3. For those reasons, and because the 
software-based self-test of simple ALUs is well established [141], the execution unit 
test programs and their adaptation was not further considered for the 
implementation of the adaptive SBST. Rather, the more complex adaptation of the 
test programs, which are used for testing the data transportation in the data path, 
is described in the subsequent section. 
5.5 Adapting the Test Programs 
The previous section 5.4 has described in detail the test programs used for testing 
particular components of the VARP processor. In the subsequent sections it is 
described how the service core adapts these self-test programs when faults are 
detected. Please recall that each test program returns control to the service core 
by executing the halt-operation. When the service core gets the control back, it can 
check the fault state registers and adapts the test programs to the current fault 
state of the processor.  
5.5.1 Adaptation of the Check-Test 
The execution of the check-test from figure 5-7 starts for slot 0, and it is repeated 
for slots 1 to 3. After executing the check-test for slot k, the service core exchanges 
in each instruction the operation from slot k with the NOP from slot (k+1) mod 4 
before the check-test is started again for slot k+1. Please note that this adaptation 
is not done for adapting the test program to the current fault state of the 
processor. Rather it is only done for saving program memory. By this the check-
test program requires only 5 instructions instead of 20. In any case, the read port 
test is started after executing the check-test for each slot. 
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5.5.2 Adaptation of the Read Port Test 
The read port test program must be adapted to fault states that were detected by 
the check-test and by the slot-test. Please note that the read port test is part of 
the slot test, i.e., various versions of the read port test program are executed 
during the slot test. Thereby each version must be adapted to fault states detected 
by previously executed versions of the read port test. 
5.5.2.1 Adaptations due to the Check-Test 
If the check-tests have detected faults in slots k1,…,km, then these slots are 
declared as faulty, and they will be only used for executing NOPs. Hence, there is 
no need for testing the read ports of these slots. Moreover, they cannot be used for 
executing the initialization code for the read port test of other slots. For this 
reason some versions of the read port test are skipped. In particular, only the 
versions k  SLOTS – {k1,…,km} of the read port test will be executed. Please 
recall that for version k of the read port test program all ldc-operations are moved 
into slot k. Moreover, all check-operations in slots k1,…,km are replaced by NOPs. 
This must be done due to the fact that the operands of a check-operation may be 
altered by the faults detected during the check-test, and, therefore, the check-
operation would set a wrong bit in the fault state registers. In figure 5-16 it is 
shown how the template from figure 5-10 is adapted to faults in slots 0 and 2. The 
ldc-operations from slot 0 were moved to slot 1 and the chk-operations in slot 0 
and slot 2 were replaced by NOPs. 
// All registers are already initialized with zero 
nop ldc #-1,r nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop   
nop chkL1 r,fsr2,r nop chkL1 r,fsr6,r 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
nop chkR1 r,fsr3,r nop chkR1 r,fsr7,r 
nop nop nop nop 
Figure 5-16: Test program template from figure 5-10 adapted to faults in slots 0 and 2.  
5.5.2.2 Adaptation due to the Slot-Test 
Now suppose the slot test has detected some faults in the pipeline registers of slot 
k. This happens when the slot test recognizes the syndromes shown in Table 5-3 
after executing version k of the read port test program. In this case 
• slot k is declared as faulty, 
• the fault state of the read ports is restored to the previously known fault 
state,  
• check-operations executed in slot k are replaced by NOPs, and 
• ldc-operations are moved into the next faultless slot k' > k. 
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Faults detected from a read port test in a register or in a read port will not cause 
any adaptation of the read port test. 
5.5.3 Adaptation of the Bypass Test 
The bypass test must be adapted only to slot faults. An adaptation of the bypass 
test due to a detected fault in a read port is not needed, because the value 
provided through the read port is not used from the bypass. If the read port test 
has detected a faulty register, then the bypass test is not adapted, because the 
bypass test does not use the value from the register. Rather, it uses the register 
address only for address generation in the bypass control logic. Thus, even then, 
when a fault in registers r0 or r63 is detected, the bypass test still uses these 
registers, in order to test for stuck-at faults in the address lines of the bypass. 
5.5.3.1 Adaptation due to the Slot-Test 
Suppose that a slot k was detected as faulty by the slot test. The bypass 
forwarding test shown in figure 5-12 is adapted as follows: 
• First, all (d,k,p)-instruction groups are deleted from the test program for 
each d  {L,R} and each p  {1,2}. 
• Second, in all (d,k',p)-instruction groups, where k'  k, the check-operations 
executed in slot k are replaced by NOPs 
As an example, consider the portion of the bypass test program shown in figure 
5-12. This test program is composed of 8 instruction groups. Each group executes 
an ldc-operation in slot 1. Thus, when slot 1 is faulty, then the whole portion of 
the test program can be removed, because slot 1 will not generate data that is 
accessed by other slots through their bypasses. However, when slot 2 will be faulty, 
then all check-operations in slot 2 must be replaced by NOPs. By this the bypass 
of slot 2 is not tested anymore. The adapted test program for the latter case is 
shown in figure 5-17. 
The false-forwarding test program, based on the template shown in figure 5-13, is 
adapted in a similar way. When slot k is faulty, then all operations in the faulty 
slot k are replaced by NOPs. By this, the bypasses of faultless slots are tested for 
false-forwarding, but under the same condition as the user application is running 
later, i.e., all faulty slots execute NOPs. 
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// SA1 test with source/destination register 0; applies test patterns 2 and 6 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
chkL0 r0,fsr8,0 chkL0 r0,fsr8,1 nop chkL0 r0,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkL0 r0,fsr8,4 chkL0 r0,fsr8,5 nop chkL0 r0,fsr8,7 
// SA0 test with source/destination register 0; applies test patterns 18 and 22 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r0 nop nop 
chkL1 r0,fsr8,0 chkL1 r0,fsr8,1 nop chkL1 r0,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r0 nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r0 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkL1 r0,fsr8,4 chkL1 r0,fsr8,5 nop chkL1 r0,fsr8,7 
// SA1 test with source/destination register 63; applies test patterns 10 and 14 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
chkL0 r63,fsr8,0 chkL0 r63,fsr8,1 nop chkL0 r63,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop; 
chkL0 r63,fsr8,4 chkL0 r63,fsr8,5 nop chkL0 r63,fsr8,7 
// SA0 test with source/destination register 63; applies test patterns 26 and 30 
nop nop nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r63 nop nop 
chkL1 r63,fsr8,0 chkL1 r63,fsr8,1 nop chkL1 r63,fsr8,3 
nop ldc #0,r63 nop nop 
nop ldc #-1,r63 nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
chkL1 r63,fsr8,4 chkL1 r63,fsr8,5 nop chkL1 r63,fsr8,7 
Figure 5-17: Adapted test program from figure 5-12 for testing forwarding from slot 1, when slot 2 is faulty. 
5.5.4 Adaptation of the False-Write-Back Test 
The false-write-back test shown in Figure 5-15 must be adapted to slot-faults, 
faults in the read ports, faults in the registers, and faults in the bypasses.  
5.5.4.1 Adaptations due to the Slot Test 
When a faulty slot was detected during the slot test, then all ldc- and check-
operations in the false-write-back test program are moved into a faultless slot, 
except the ldc #-1,r operation in a faulty slot. This operation is deleted.  
5.5.4.2 Adaptations due to the Read Port and Bypass Test 
For the false-write-back test program it is important to execute each check-
operation in a slot k, where the accessed register r is read correctly, i.e., either 
fsRP(2  k, r) = 1 or fsRP(2  k + 1, r) = 1. For this reason a chkL-operation may 
be changed into a chkR-operation or the check-operation is moved into another slot 
k'. Please note that this decision is made individually for each check-operation. 
Faults in the bypasses that were detected from the forwarding test program cannot 
affect the false-write-back test program, because the test program does not utilizes 
the forwarding functionality of the bypass. But faults that were detected from the 
false-forwarding test program may prevent the check-operation from reading the 
value from the register file. However, a fault detected from the false-forwarding 
test program for bypass p, is equivalent to a fault of the read port p, where no 
register can be accessed correctly through read port p. For this reason such faults 
are already handled as described above by moving check-operations into other slots 
or changing chkL-operations into chkR-operations. 
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If the read port test has detected a faulty register, then the corresponding check-
operation is deleted in the test program. As an example consider the adapted false-
write-back test program in figure 5-18. There it is assumed that slot 0 is faulty, 
and registers r0 to r3 cannot be accessed correctly through the left read port of 
slot 1. 
// Initialize all registers with 0 
nop ldc #0, r0 nop nop 
... 
nop ldc #0, r63 nop nop 
// Write test value -1 into register r 
nop ldc #-1,r ldc #-1,r ldc #-1,r 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop nop nop 
nop nop chkL0 r0,fsr9,0 nop 
nop nop chkL0 r1,fsr9,1 nop 
nop nop chkL0 r2,fsr9,2 nop 
nop nop chkL0 r3,fsr9,3 nop 
nop chkL0 r4,fsr9,4 nop nop 
... ... ... ... 
nop chkL0 r63,fsr9,63 nop nop 
 
Figure 5-18: Example for an adapted false-write-back test program. 
5.6 Results 
In [148] the proposed self-test programs were evaluated using a gate-level 
implementation of the tested components. An integration of these self-test 
programs into the system presented in figure 5-5 together with the software-based 
rescheduling algorithm, including an analysis of the diagnostic capabilities was 
done in [153]. The results of both works are presented in the subsequent sections. 
5.6.1 Hardware Overhead 
The system shown in figure 5-5 contains various components for administrating 
the software-based self-test. In table 5-6 the sizes of these hardware extensions are 
reported. 
Component Cell area in µm² Size in % of the VARP processor 
Arbiter 1941 7.2% 
Service Core 1341 5.0% 
VARP-extensions 536 2.0% 
Table 5-6: Hardware-Overhead for the administrative components of the adaptive software-based self-test. 
The arbiter in that system configuration becomes bigger than the arbiter presented 
in section 3.2.2 for the software-based self-repair, because program memory access 
of the service core must be managed. The service core is a small 8-bit processor 
with an application specific instruction set that is adopted to the tasks of 
managing the adaptive self-repair process. The size of this service core is 
comparable with the size of a single read port of the VARP processor. The VARP-
extensions reported in table 5-6 include the additional hardware needed for the 
implementation of the check- and halt-operations in each slot. Please note that 
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most of the presented hardware overhead is not needed, when this approach is 
used in a multi-core system with shared program and data memory. Such a system 
was presented in [124]. Each core of the system may be used as a service core 
during the startup phase, and due to the shared memory, the arbiter will become 
superfluous, too. 
5.6.2 Memory Consumption 
Beside the hardware overhead, also additional memory is needed for storing the 
self-test programs and the service routine of the service core. Table 5-7 reports this 
memory consumption. 
Service Core Memory 
Administration of Instructions Bytes 
check-test 135 135 
read port test 659 659 
bypass test 80 80 
false-write-back test 487 487 
rescheduling algorithm 336 336 
miscellaneous data 229 229 
Total 1926 1926 
VARP Core Program Memory 
Test Program Instructions Bytes 
check-test 5 65 
read port test 580 7540 
bypass test 148 1924 
false-write-back test 74 962 
execution unit test25 - 4330 
rescheduling algorithm 732 9516 
static data - 512 
Total 1539 24849 
Arbiter Memory 
Fault State Registers 81 
Full System 
Total program and data memory overhead 26856 
Table 5-7: Memory-Overhead for the adaptive diagnostic software-based self-test. 
The service routine including all data structures requires less than 2 kByte of 
memory. Please note that the adaptation of all test programs and of the 
rescheduling algorithm is done in the data memory of the service core. However, 
25 Please note that the execution unit test was not included in the system configuration shown in 
figure 5-6. However, the memory consumption of a test program for a VARP-like execution unit 
was determined in [81]. 
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this adaptation can be done separately for each instruction such that memory 
must be provided only for storing a single instruction.  
The test programs for the VARP core require about 24 kByte of memory. The 
total memory consumption of 26856 bytes is independent of the size of the user 
application. I.e., even for very small user applications this amount of memory is 
needed for self-testing purposes. The size of the memory needed during the 
execution of the rescheduling algorithm depends on the size of the program 
fragments that are moved into the data memory of the VARP processor, and on 
the number of basic blocks in the user application. For example, the memory 
consumption m of the rescheduling-implementation used in [153] is bounded by 
 1160 4 104m bb fr      bytes, 
where bb is the number of basic blocks in the user application and fr is the number 
of instructions in a fragment that is moved into the data memory for rescheduling 
purposes. In that formula fr can be selected in such a way that the required data 
memory for rescheduling does not exceed the available data memory. 
5.6.3 Runtime of the Adaptive Diagnostic SBST 
The runtime of the adaptive diagnostic SBST depends on the fault state of the 
VARP processor. In [153] a comprehensive VHDL model of the system from figure 
5-5 was implemented. Various faults were injected in that model, and the adaptive 
SBST routine was executed. The runtimes are reported in table 5-8 for various 
fault states in microseconds. 
The column Fault State specifies the stuck-at faults injected in the VHDL model. 
A fault in a register (fault states 2 to 13) is always a stuck-at fault in an arbitrary 
bit position of that register. Injected address faults (fault states 15 to 18) always 
affect a single bit-position of the register address, such that only half of the 
registers are accessible through the affected read port. Faults in the write ports 
affect the data-signals from the write-back register of a slot into the register file.  
Most of the test time (around 55%) is needed for the slot test (shown in column 
slot test). This includes the time for the check-test and for the read port tests, 
including all adaptations made in the test code of the read port test. The 
adaptation times for the bypass test program (bp) and the false-write-back test 
program (fwb) are shown in columns bp and fwb. The execution time of both test 
programs is shown in column bp/fwb-test.  
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No. Fault State 
slot 
test 
adaptation bp/fwb 
test 
adapt 
repair 
Total 
bp fwb 
1 no fault 794 0 3 78 2 877 
2 fault in fetch register 1 799 70 33 77 507 1486 
3 fault in fetch register 0 819 70 49 77 566 1581 
4 faults in fetch registers 0 and 2 587 76 49 76 566 1354 
5 faults in fetch registers 0 and 1 597 76 63 76 597 1409 
6 faults in fetch registers 0 to 2 364 83 77 75 628 1227 
7 faults in fetch registers 1 to 3 346 83 33 75 507 1044 
8 faults in write-back registers 1 to 3 1078 83 33 75 507 1776 
9 faults in write-back registers 0, 1 and 3 1091 83 63 75 597 1909 
10 fault in write-back register 1 795 70 33 77 507 1482 
11 fault in write-back register 3 1076 70 33 77 507 1763 
12 faults in registers 35 to 42 796 0 39 78 507 1420 
13 faults in r0 and r8 796 0 35 78 - 909 
14 r0 not accessible through read port 0 795 0 33 78 529 1435 
15 address fault in read ports 0 and 1 796 0 39 78 549 1462 
16 address faults in read ports 0 to 3 795 0 36 78 547 1456 
17 
faults in fetch registers 0 and 1, address 
faults in read ports 4, 5, 6, 7 
597 76 69 76 - 818 
18 
faults in fetch registers 0, 1, and 2, 
address faults in read ports 7 and 8, 
fault in register 19 to 26 
364 83 79 75 - 601 
19 faults in write ports 0 to 2 799 83 87 75 - 1044 
20 
fault in fetch register 0 and write port 
of slot 1 
820 76 63 76 597 1632 
Average: 710 54 47 73 337 1271 
Table 5-8: Runtimes of the adaptive SBST in microseconds for various fault states of the VARP processor. 
The column adapt repair shows the runtime needed for adapting the rescheduling-
algorithm to the detected fault state. Rows without a specified time represent fault 
states where the self-repair routine could not be adapted to the detected fault 
state, because the adaption of the self-repair routine does not include a register 
renaming. In all cases without specified repair time a used register of the repair 
routine is faulty or not accessible in the functioning slots. In all cases, the 
execution and adaptation of the test programs takes less than two milliseconds. 
This is negligible compared with the repair time needed for larger user applications 
(see table 4-2). However, the short test time allows for the execution of the fine 
grained diagnostic self-test even in short execution breaks, as it was claimed in 
section 4.3.6 for the combination of a hybrid approach with a fine-grained off-line 
self-repair method. 
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5.6.4 Quality of the Adaptive Diagnostic SBST 
The quality of the adaptive SBST is evaluated for the data path components of 
the VARP processor for which a self-repair method exists in terms of fault 
coverage, and in terms of correct fault classification. I.e., an injected fault in the 
structural VHDL model of the VARP processor must be detected and classified 
correctly according to the caused functional misbehavior. In [148] the fault 
coverage of the test programs and the fault classification was evaluated in a VARP 
processor model for the read ports, bypasses, and single registers of the register 
file. For this reason structural models of these components were implemented 
manually and integrated into the VARP processor model. All feasible single stuck-
at faults were injected in these models. Table 5-9 shows the number of collapsed 
faults for these components and the fault coverage achieved by executing the 
proposed test programs on the VARP core. 
Component Faults FC Good Classification False Classification 
Read Port 6092 100% 6092 0 
Bypass 1278 100% 1278 0 
Register 566 100% 566 0 
Table 5-9: Achieved fault coverage with adaptive SBST programs for various components of the VARP processor. 
For all three components 100% fault coverage is achieved. The fault classification 
capability was evaluated manually. I.e., for each injected fault (or in most cases 
groups of injected faults), the expected functional misbehavior was evaluated in an 
analytical manner. Then it was checked whether or not the expected functional 
misbehavior was identified correctly from the test programs. All injected faults 
were classified correctly by the test programs.  
Please note, that the manually developed structural models of the processor 
components were needed for the analysis of the fault classification, because the 
manually developed structural models are well understood. When using a 
synthesized structural model of a component for the analysis, it becomes almost 
impossible to understand the functional misbehavior caused by an injected fault. 
In other words, the mapping of structural faults to functional misbehavior was 
supported by the manually developed model.  
However, for larger components such a method becomes impractical for evaluating 
the diagnostic capability of functional test programs. For this reason, Schölzel and 
Koal have proposed in [163] a method that allows for an automated classification 
of structural faults according to the caused functional misbehavior with respect to 
a given structural fault model. In particular, an ATPG-tool is used for test pattern 
generation. A synthesized model of the considered component is used as input for 
the ATPG-tool together with some constraints. The constraints are selected in 
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such a way that they force a particular functional behavior of the component. A 
simple example of such a constraint for a read port component is that the control 
signal must have a particular value r. This corresponds to the functional behavior 
of selecting register r with that read port. During test pattern generation, the 
ATPG-tool only generates test patterns that respect the given constraints. The 
test patterns generated with the ATPG-tool will detect all faults26 (with respect to 
the structural fault model) that affect this functional misbehavior. Finally the 
generated test patterns are mapped into a test program, such that they can be 
applied to the component with a software-based self-test. However, it turned out 
that the manually developed test programs for the read port test, bypass test, and 
false-write-back test are quite efficient. The test programs needed for applying the 
ATPG generated test patterns are five to ten times larger than the manually 
developed test programs [163].  
So far the quality of three single test programs was evaluated. It was shown that 
these test programs achieve full fault coverage and fault classification for the 
tested components, assuming that the proposed test programs are executed 
correctly without being affected from any side effects due to faults in other 
components. This assumption may be no longer valid, if faults occur in multiple 
components. For this reason, in [153] the complete adaptive self-test concept was 
evaluated also for randomly injected multiple faults. A coarse-grained structural 
model of the VARP processor was used for the evaluation. I.e., a high level 
description of the components was used.  
Component Number of fault sites Fault classification 
Pipeline Registers 
Fetch Register 4  53 = 212 slot fault 
Decode Register 4  118 = 472 slot faults and read port/bypass faults 
Write-Back register 4  46 = 184 slot fault 
Register File 
Write-Port 4  23 = 92 slot fault 
Register 64  16 = 1024 register fault 
Read Ports 
Read Ports 8  (64  16 + 6 + 16) = 8368 read port fault 
Bypasses 
Read Port Input 8  16 = 128 read port fault 
Pipeline Registers Input 8  128 = 1024 bypass fault 
Bypass Control Input 8  62 = 496 read port and bypass faults 
Bypass Output 8  16 = 128 read port and bypass faults 
Table 5-10: Fault sites in the coarse-grained VARP processor model. 
26 This assumes that all faults in the component were classified by ATPG-tool either as detectable 
or undetectable under the given constraints. 
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Stuck-at fault were injected only at the inputs- and outputs of these components. 
Table 5-10 lists the components together with the number of fault sites at inputs 
and outputs. Again, the fault sites were classified manually according to the 
caused functional misbehaviour of injected faults at these fault sites. In total 12128 
fault sites exist in the coarse-grained processor model. Using the stuck-at fault 
model these are 24256 faults. First, a full fault simulation was done for each single 
stuck-at fault in order to evaluate the diagnostic capability of the slot test that 
encapsulates the check- and read port test. The results are shown in table 5-11. 
Component Faults Detected Faults Good Classification False Classification 
Slot Faults 1408 1384 1364 20 
Non-Slot Faults 22848 22848 22848 0 
Table 5-11: Fault coverage and fault classification achieved with the adaptive SBST for injected single stuck-at faults. 
All non-slot faults in the model are detected and classified correctly. In total there 
are 1408 faults that must be detected and classified as slot faults, i.e., the slot 
containing the injected fault must be declared as faulty. 1384 out of the 1408 faults 
were detected as slot faults, while 24 faults were not detected as slot faults. 20 out 
of the 1384 detected slot faults were not classified correctly, i.e., also another slot 
was declared as faulty. These are in total 20 + 24 = 44 critical faults, whereby 
each slot contains 11 of them. They are further distinguished in table 5-12.  
Not detected, but do not cause misbehavior 12 
Not detected as slot fault, but cause misbehavior 12 
Detected, but false classification 8 
Detected, but no fault handling possible 12 
Table 5-12: Detailed classification of the critical faults from table 5-11. 
The 12 stuck-at-0 faults in the first row (3 in each slot) affect the early generated 
nop-signal in the fetch- and decode registers. This signal is used in the execution 
stage for masking load-signals that are generated accidently, when the opcode of a 
fetched operation is changed in the pipeline. A stuck-at-0 fault of that nop-signal is 
not observable, if there is only a single stuck-at fault in a slot, but it will not cause 
a functional misbehavior of the processor. The 12 stuck-at-1 faults in the second 
row affect the valid-signal of a generated result. They are not detected as slot 
faults, but they cause some misbehavior that is detected during the bypass test. 
Hence they are classified as bypass faults. The 20 detected faults in rows three and 
four of table 5-12 (5 faults per slot) affect the opcode of a NOP before it is stored 
in the fetch-register. 8 out of the 20 faults change the opcode of a NOP into an 
operation that generates an invalid load-signal that disturbs the execution of 
operations in other slots. The remaining 12 faults change the opcode of a NOP into 
the opcode of a branch operation that will disturb the program execution. Such 
faults cannot be handled with the means of the software-based self-repair. A 
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solution to this problem would be another instruction encoding, where the opcodes 
of branch operations have a hamming distance larger than one from the NOP 
opcode. By this a single stuck-at fault in the fetch-registers will not change the 
opcode of a NOP into a branch operation that disturbs the execution of operations 
in faultless slots. From the presented analysis of the faults in table 5-12 follows 
that the diagnosis of single stuck-at faults fails only for 32 faults that cause a 
functional misbehavior. Thus, the proposed adaptive SBST provides 99.87% fault 
coverage for the coarse-grained data path model of the VARP processor, including 
a correct classification. Hence, almost all faults that affect a single component in 
the data path for which a self-repair mechanism is available can be detected and 
localized correctly. Please note that these investigations do not include the control 
logic, because for the control logic no software-based self-repair technique is 
available. Nevertheless, faults in the control logic will be detected, too, by the 
service core, because it expects the response from the test program (i.e., the halt-
signal) within a specified period of time. If this signal is not received, then the 
control logic is considered as faulty, and the system has a failure. 
With the coarse-grained VHDL-model approximately 445 fault injection 
simulations per hour could be performed [153]. I.e., the simulation of all 24256 
single stuck-at-faults took 54 hours. There are approximately 294 million double 
stuck-at-faults in the coarse-grained VHDL-model. The simulation of all of them 
would take more than 75 years. For this reason 100.000 fault simulations were 
done with randomly injected faults. 50.000 fault simulations were carried out by 
injecting double faults, and 50.000 fault simulations were carried out by injecting 5 
faults per simulation. The results are shown in table 5-13.  
Fault Model 
Fault 
Simulations 
All Faults in Data 
Path Components 
Good 
Classification 
False 
Classification 
2 injected SA-faults 50000 46184 45856 328 
5 injected SA-faults 50000 41019 40339 680 
Table 5-13: Fault coverage and fault classification achieved with the adaptive SBST for injected multiple stuck-at faults.  
Please note that the fault injection campaign was not restricted to data path 
components of the VARP processor. I.e., faults were also injected in the control 
logic. However, the proposed adaptive diagnostic self-test does not account for 
faults in the control logic, because such faults cannot be handled by the 
subsequent software-based self-repair mechanisms. For this reason table 5-12 lists 
explicitly the number of those fault simulation runs where all injected faults are 
located in data-path components. In 3816 simulation runs at least one of the 
injected double faults affected the control logic. The remaining 46184 double faults 
in the data path components were all detected, and 45856 of these detected double 
faults were classified correctly according to the classification shown table 5-10. I.e., 
328 faults were not classified correctly. 325 out of these 328 double faults contain 
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at least a single critical fault as it was shown in table 5-12. The three remaining 
false classified faults occur due to address faults, when writing and reading a 
register with the test programs. I.e., one fault affects the register address when 
writing a register, such that the wrong register is initialized. Exactly the same 
address fault is caused by the second fault in the read port. By this, a check-
operation receives the value from a wrong a register, but this is not detected, 
because the correct value was written before into the wrong register. For example, 
suppose that during the read-port test a register r must be initialized with -1. But 
due to an address fault register r'  r is initialized with -1. Furthermore, the 
tested read port has an address fault, such that always register r' is read instead of 
register r. Then the faulty read port is considered as functioning, and the 
functioning read ports are declared as faulty. Please note that this fault is later 
detected by the false-write-back test, but it is not classified as a fault of those slots 
that contain the address faults, which is a flaw of the proposed test routine. 
Table 5-13 also shows the results of the fault injection of 5 faults per simulation. 
In 8981 cases at least one of the 5 faults affected the control logic of the processor. 
In the remaining 41019 simulation runs all faults were located in data path 
components, and all of them were detected, but in 680 simulation runs not all 5 
faults were classified correctly. 644 out of these 680 faults contain at least a single 
critical fault. In 35 out of the remaining 36 simulations, the faults were not 
classified correctly, because one fault affected the register address, when writing a 
register and a second fault caused the same address fault in a read port. In one 
case three slots were faulty, and the read ports of the fourth slot contained a data 
fault at their outputs, such that not a single register could be read correctly. Table 
5-14 summarizes the fault injection results for the coarse-grained data path model 
of the VARP processor. Moreover in column simulated faults the ration of 
simulated faults compared to all feasible faults is listed in percent. 
Fault model Simulated faults 
Correct detected and classified 
faults in the data path 
1 injected stuck-at-fault 100% 99.8% 
2 injected stuck-at-faults 0.016% 99.3% 
5 injected stuck-at-faults 5.87  10-14% 98.3% 
Table 5-14: Fault detection and classification results for the coarse-grained data path model of the VARP processor.  
In all three fault injection campaigns, very high fault coverage and correct 
classification could be achieved for the data path components. However, only for 
the single stuck-at-fault model the fault coverage can be considered as meaningful, 
because 100% of all single stuck-at-faults in the coarse-grained data path model 
were simulated, and all single stuck-at faults in the data path components were 
simulated at gate-level, achieving almost 100% fault coverage. However, the fault 
coverage of the simulation runs for two and five injected faults must be considered 
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very carefully, because the amount of simulated faults is very low compared with 
the total number of faults. Moreover, single faults inside a particular component 
may cause some side effects that are not covered by the fault simulation at the 
coarse-grained data path model. Nevertheless, many successful simulation runs 
have proven the fault detection and diagnostic capability of the proposed adaptive 
software-based self-test even in the presence of faults in multiple components. This 
makes this self-test concept to a viable solution for detection and diagnosis of 
multiple permanent faults in the data path of the VARP processor at that 
granularity level that is needed by the previously presented self-repair routines. 
5.7 Summary 
In this chapter a diagnostic adaptive SBST routine for the VARP processor was 
presented. Of particular importance and novelty is the adaptive capability of the 
SBST, which allows for adapting single test programs to previously detected fault 
states of the processor. By this, faults in multiple components can be detected and 
localized correctly in a processor-based system, even when the original test routine 
would fail due to the usage of a faulty component for initialization and/or 
capturing. This property is mandatory for systems, where only software-based 
methods are used for the reconfiguration of the processor, because the test 
programs cannot expect that the hardware is configured in such a way that it can 
be considered as faultless. It was shown that the adaptive self-test routine is able 
to cope with many situations, where multiple faults are present in the VARP core, 
and that the developed test programs for the read ports, bypasses, and register file 
achieve 100% fault coverage and correct fault classification at gate-level using the 
stuck-at-fault model. The test of the pipeline registers could not classify all faults 
correctly. However, by an exhaustive fault simulation for single stuck-at faults, it 
was proven that such faults are rare. More than 99% of the single stuck-at-faults 
in the data path of the VARP core were detected and classified correctly. Even for 
multiple randomly injected stuck-at faults, a correct fault classification was 
possible in most situations. Thereby the hardware- and software-overhead can be 
considered as moderate. Less than 15% hardware overhead and 26 kByte of 
memory are needed for providing the in-field test infrastructure for the adaptive 
diagnostic SBST. Almost half of the hardware overhead of this test infrastructure 
(the arbiter) is shared with the self-repair routine or it can be avoided completely 
in a multi-core system with shared data memory. Please note that the additional 
memory overhead of 26 kByte may increases the vulnerability of the memory to 
temporary and permanent faults, which has a negative impact on the overall 
reliability of the system. However, for several reasons this problem will be not that 
serious. First, in systems with large applications 26 kByte memory overhead may 
be negligible. Second, techniques for handling permanent and temporary faults in 
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memories are state of the art [106, 126]. Hence, 26 kByte of additional memory 
may not significantly affect the reliability of the memory if it is protected by such 
techniques. Third, the diagnostic self-test and self-repair is only needed during 
system startup. Before system startup these routines may be loaded into the 
program memory from a more reliable storage location (e.g., from a ROM).  
Although the adaptive SBST was presented for the VARP processor, the general 
ideas and parts of the test flow for the adaptive SBST shown in figure 5-4 are also 
applicable to other statically scheduled superscalar processors. For example, the 
test patterns presented for the read ports and bypasses may be used in other 
processors, too. But it is obvious that the test programs that apply these test 
patterns must be adapted to the instruction set architecture of other processors. 
Moreover, complete test pattern sets may be replaced by other test pattern sets for 
targeting for other fault models. For example, test programs may be developed for 
testing for delay faults and can replace the test programs for stuck-at faults. Please 
note that changing the test programs for targeting other fault models will neither 
affect the self-repair routines nor the general test flow shown in figure 5-6. These 
routines are independent from the used structural fault model for fault detection 
and localization.  
Also the test flow that systematically checks the components of the processor with 
the given test programs must be adopted for other processors. The test flow shown 
in figure 5-6 was developed manually by knowing the details of the VARP 
processor and the interdependencies between the processor components. Thus, the 
presented self-test concept has two flaws that were not solved so far. First, an 
automated or at least semi-automatic method for a systematic generation of the 
general test flow is missing. Second, the evaluation of the diagnostic capability of 
such a test flow is not solved satisfactorily, because this requires the mapping of 
structural faults to functional misbehavior. For combinatorial components this 
problem was solved in [163] with the help of ATPG-tools. However, for the 
pipeline register and other processor components in the VARP processor this 
mapping was done manually in an analytical manner, in order to have reference 
values for the diagnosis results. Obviously such a proceeding may be error-prone, 
and some functional misbehavior may be not foreseen during the manual analysis, 
especially for multiple faulty components. For this reason, a formal method for 
deriving functional misbehavior caused by multiple structural faults in various 
processor components would be very beneficial. Both problems provide potential 
for an interesting piece of work for future research. 
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5.8 Conclusions 
Hardware-based, software-based, and hybrid methods for administrating inherently 
available hardware-redundancy in a statically scheduled superscalar processor were 
investigated in this thesis. Most of them target for handling permanent faults 
during the startup phase of the system. This becomes of particular interest for 
embedded systems that are manufactured for performance and/or power reasons 
with less reliable nano-scaled technologies that will suffer from permanent faults 
during their life time [28]. For the first time, a comprehensive software-based self-
test and self-repair concept was developed, which can be used for statically 
scheduled superscalar processors, because in these architectures the usage of 
hardware resources can be controlled in software. Thereby the software-based self-
repair requires a diagnostic self-test for the processor that can be executed 
autonomously in the field and delivers the fault state of the core at that 
granularity level that is needed by the self-repair approach. For this reason a 
diagnostic and adaptive SBST was presented in chapter 5. This test requires some 
additional hardware outside of the processor core for administration purposes. 
Thereby the overhead for the diagnostic and adaptive SBST dominates by far the 
overhead for the software-based self-repair. Nevertheless the total overhead is 
moderate for the considered processor model. 
All self-repair methods – software-based, hardware-based, and hybrid methods – 
were demonstrated and evaluated using the VARP processor. This allows for a 
comparison between these concepts. The software-based self-repair methods 
presented in chapter 3 are characterized by avoiding any hardware-overhead in the 
processor core for administrative purposes. I.e., the inherently available hardware-
redundancy in superscalar processors is administrated completely in software. 
Therefore these concepts can be used for handling permanent faults even in 
processors that were not designed as fault tolerant processors. Moreover, the 
redundancy in such processors can be used either for high performance or for high 
reliability, because the decision on how to use the redundancy is made in software. 
By implementing hardware-based reconfiguration schemes for the same processor 
in chapter 2, it turned out that for low failure rates the reliability of both methods 
did not significantly differ. However, the simple hardware-based rebinding scheme, 
which was used in order to maintain the hardware-overhead low, causes a strong 
performance degradation of approximately 100%, even for single faults. This 
performance degradation could be significantly reduced with software-based 
methods. Reducing the performance degradation of hardware-based methods is also 
possible with more complex hardware-based scheduling schemes. But this causes 
more hardware overhead, which, in turn, decreases the reliability of such an 
approach. Moreover, for low failure rates, handling of faults in multiple slots of the 
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VARP processor did not significantly improve its reliability compared with fault 
handling in a single slot only. But it could be shown that for high failure rates 
handling of multiple faults becomes favourable. Lowering the granularity of the 
fault handling below slot level did not significantly increase the reliability of the 
processor, neither for high nor for low failure rates. However, in the presence of 
multiple faults this reduces the performance degradation, which is caused by 
avoiding the usage of defective components, significantly. Hence, the software-
based rescheduling at fine-grained granularity level can be considered as a powerful 
method for improving the reliability of statically scheduled superscalar processors 
affected by high failure rates without losing too much performance. Because no 
additional hardware is introduced in the processor core for administrating the fine-
grained hardware redundancy, this benefit is also achieved without increasing the 
sensitivity of the processor against transient faults.  
Unfortunately the software-based self-repair methods are characterized by a longer 
reconfiguration time during the startup phase of the system, and they cannot be 
used for handling permanent faults that manifest during the execution of the user 
application. Thus, pure software-based methods may be only used in systems 
where permanent fault handling only during the startup phase is acceptable or the 
service of the user application can be interrupted for a short period of time. If this 
is not the case, then the software-based methods may be supported by additional 
fault tolerance methods for concurrent error detection and recovery. For this 
reason in chapter 4 it was shown how the presented software-based methods can 
be used in hybrid approaches for supplementing hardware-based fault tolerance 
techniques. Such a combination allows for a reduction of the startup time, when 
the software-based methods are combined with a hardware-based reconfiguration 
of the processor. Moreover, the time consuming software-based methods can be 
used for a fine-grained reconfiguration in execution breaks or during startup, while 
hardware-based methods are used for fast, but coarse-grained on-line fault 
handling. By this the complexity of the on-line methods remains low, and after a 
fine-grained off-line reconfiguration all available non-faulty resources of the 
processor are well utilized. 
In particular the presented software-based self-repair and self-test provides an 
alternative solution to pure hardware-based solution. Whether they can be used 
efficiently or not depends on the properties of the faults affecting the system, the 
architecture of the used processor, and the application scenario that determines the 
time constraints for error detection and fault handling. Even in scenarios where 
pure software-based methods cannot be used, they provide an interesting 
alternative for supplementing hardware-based methods in hybrid approaches. 
Especially the development of more hybrid cross-layer methods, where the 
software-based self-repair methods are used for fine-grained self-repair, will be a 
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promising strategy for overcoming the challenges of building long-living reliable 
processors from unreliable hardware components. The software-based techniques 
presented in this thesis provide a solid foundation for the further development of 
such cross-layer approaches. 
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 Appendix A 
VARP Instruction Set Architecture 
Encoding of instructions is shown in figure 2-2. Encoding of operations is shown in 
the subsequent tables. Each operation is composed of the bit-fields 
 b7…b0 Src1 Src2 Sst 
where b7…b0 is a bit-group of eight bits and src1, src2, and dst are bit-groups of 
six bits each. In the shown assembler mnemonic a, b, c  {0,¼,63} are register 
numbers. Ra(i) is the i-th bit position in register Ra. M[Ra] denotes the value in 
the memory that is referenced by the address stored in Ra. k  {0,¼,216–1} is a 
constant value, whereby k15¼k0 represent the single bits of the binary 
representation of k. x is used in the tables for representing don't care values. 
FS[y,z] denotes bit z of fault state register fsry, whereby y, z  {0,¼,63}. 
Group 0: NOP, memory access operations, test operations 
Mnemonic Meaning 
Encoding 
b7¼b4 b3¼b0 Src1 Src2 Dst 
nop no operation 0000 0000 x x x 
ld0 [Ra],Rc 
Rc Ü M[Ra] 
0000 0001 
a x c 
ld1 [Ra],Rc 0000 0010 
st0 [Ra],Rc 
M[Ra] Ü Rc  
0000 0011 
a c x 
st1 [Ra],Rc 0000 0100 
chk_l_0 Ra,y,z if Ra = 0 then  FS[y,z] Ü 0  
 else  FS[z,z] Ü 1 
0000 0101 a y z 
chk_r_0 y,Ra,z if Ra = 0 then  FS[y,z] Ü 0  
 else  FS[y,z] Ü 1 
0000 0110 y a z 
chk_l_1 Ra,y,z if Ra = -1 then  FS[y,z] Ü 0  
 else  FS[y,z] Ü 1 
0000 1010 a y z 
chk_r_1 y,Ra,z if Ra = -1 then  FS[y,z] Ü 0  
 else  FS[y,z] Ü 1 
0000 1001 y a z 
halt Stops the program execution 0000 0111 x x x 
ld_fs y,z,Ra if FS[y,z] = 1 then  Ra Ü 1  
 else  Ra Ü 0 
0000 1000 y z a 
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Group 1: Register indirect branch operations 
Mnemonic Meaning 
Encoding 
b7¼b4 b3¼b0 Src1 Src2 Dst 
jz Ra,Rb if(Ra(0) = 1) then PC Ü Rb 0001 0001 b a x 
jnz Ra,Rb if(Ra(0) = 0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 0010 b a x 
js Ra,Rb if(Ra(1) = 1) then PC Ü Rb 0001 0111 b a x 
jns Ra,Rb if(Ra(1) = 0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 1000 b a x 
jc Ra,Rb if(Ra(2) = 1) then PC Ü Rb 0001 1001 b a x 
jnc Ra,Rb if(Ra(2) = 0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 1011 b a x 
jo Ra,Rb if(Ra(3) = 1) then PC Ü Rb 0001 1100 b a x 
jno Ra,Rb if(Ra(3) = 0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 1101 b a x 
jmpt Ra,Rb if(Ra  0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 0101 b a x 
jmpf Ra,Rb if(Ra = 0) then PC Ü Rb 0001 0110 b a x 
call Ra,Rb Rb Ü PC+1; PC Ü Ra 0001 0011 a x b 
jmp Ra PC Ü Ra 0001 0100 a x x 
Group 12: Arithmetic and logical operations 
cml Ra,Rc Rc Ü not Ra  1100 0001 a x c 
inc Ra,b,Rc Rc Ü Ra + b 1100 0010 a b c 
dec Ra,b,Rc Rc Ü Ra – b 1100 0011 a b c 
add Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra + Rb 1100 0100 a b c 
adc Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra + Rb + 1 1100 0101 a b c 
sub Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra – Rb 1100 0110 a b c 
sbb Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra – Rb – 1 1100 0111 a b c 
and Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra and Rb 1100 1000 a b c 
or Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra or Rb 1100 1001 a b c 
xor Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü Ra xor Rb 1100 1010 a b c 
cmp Ra,Rb,Rc Rc Ü 000000000000vcsz, whereby 
if(Ra = Rb) then z Ü 1 else z Ü 0 
if(Ra < Rb) then c Ü 1 else c Ü 0 
if((Ra – Rb ≥ 215) then s Ü 1 else s Ü 0 
if((Ra < 215 && Rb ≥ 215 && Ra – Rb ≥ 215) ||  
   (Ra ≥ 215 && Rb < 215 && Ra – Rb ≤ 215)) 
   then v Ü 1 else v Ü 0 
1100 1011 a b c 
shr Ra,Rc Rc Ü shr Ra  1100 1100 a x c 
shl Ra,Rc Rc Ü shl Ra  1100 1101 a x c 
rrc Ra,Rc Rc Ü rrc Ra  1100 1110 a x c 
rlc Ra,Rc Rc Ü rlc Ra  1100 1111 a x c 
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Groups 2 to 11, 14, 15: Operations of I-Type 
Mnemonic Meaning 
Encoding 
b7¼b4 b3¼b0 Src1 Src2 Dst 
ldc k,Ra Ra Ü k 1111 k15¼k12 k11¼k6 k5¼k0 a 
jmp k PC Ü k 1110 k15¼k12 k11¼k6 k5¼k0 x 
jz Ra, k if(Ra(0) = 1) then PC Ü k 0010 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jnz Ra, k if(Ra(0) = 0) then PC Ü k 0011 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
js Ra, k if(Ra(1) = 1) then PC Ü k 0100 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jns Ra, k if(Ra(1) = 0) then PC Ü k 0101 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jc Ra, k if(Ra(2) = 1) then PC Ü k 0110 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jnc Ra, k if(Ra(2) = 0) then PC Ü k 0111 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jo Ra, k if(Ra(3) = 1) then PC Ü k 1000 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jno Ra, k if(Ra(3) = 0) then PC Ü k 1001 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jmpt Ra, k if(Ra  0) then PC Ü k 1010 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
jmpf Ra, k if(Ra = 0) then PC Ü k 1011 k15¼k12 a k11¼k6 k5¼k0 
Group 13: Unused 
- - 1101 x x x x 
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RPC-operations  read pc-operation 
RPS (definition)  61 
R-type operation  57 
SA0  see Fault, stuck-at-0 
SA1  see Fault, stuck-at-1 
SBST  see software-based self-test 
SC  see service core 
Scalar Processor  45 
SEL  see single-event latch-up 
Self-Repair  23, 27 
hardware-based  49 
hybrid self-repair  151 
software-based  87 
Sequential Schedule  118 
Serial Composition  36, 81, 82, 140 
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SET  see single-event-transient 
SEU  see single-event-upset 
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SIHFT  see software implemented 
hardware fault tolerance 
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SLOTS (definition)  61 
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Structural Test Patterns  187 
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Super Rebinding Graph  101 
Superscalar Processor  45 
SWRB  see software-based rebinding 
SWRS  see software-based 
rescheduling 
Syndrome  206 
TDDB  see time-dependent dielectric 
breakdown 
Temporary Register File  167 
Test Code  191, 194 
Test Pattern  186 
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Time-Dependent Dielectric 
Breakdown  14 
TMR  see triple modular redundancy 
Total Runtime (definition)  27, 28 
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TRT  see total runtime 
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VARP Processor  55 
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VL  see voting logic 
VLIW processors  see very long 
instruction word processor 
Voting Logic  168 
WB  see pipeline write-back 
WPC-operations  write pc-operation 
Write PC-Operation  73 
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